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In this study of China’s listed companies, we apply a 2SLS fixed effects model in a 
simultaneous equation system to study the interaction among firm value (Tobin’s Q), 
managerial ownership, and the largest shareholder’s ownership, controlling for two 
sources of endogeneity: unobserved firm heterogeneity and the simultaneity problem. We 
find all three variables are jointly determined under a cross-sectional framework of 
simultaneous equation analysis. However, when taking into account unobserved firm-
specific effects under a panel data framework, we find only that firm value and the largest 
shareholder’s ownership are jointly determined, although managerial ownership still 
affects firm value in a linearly positive way. Firm value has positive effects on the largest 
shareholder’s ownership, while the largest shareholder ownership is found to have an 
inverse-“U” shape influence on firm value. To further allow for ultimate ownership in the 
relation, we use cross-sectional data and find the separation between cash flow rights and 
voting rights is negatively related to firm value. This proves the coexistence of the 
incentive alignment effect (embodied by cash flow rights) and the entrenchment effect 
(embodied by voting rights). Finally, by using a dynamic random effect probit model to 
allow for unobserved firm heterogeneity, dynamic factors and endogeneity of initial 
conditions, we explore the occurrence mechanism of the largest shareholder’s tunneling. 
We find that tunneling of the largest shareholder is rather persistent during sample years. 
Firms with longer listing histories and higher debt levels are more likely to suffer from 
tunneling problems. Firms located in western area of China are more likely to be tunneled 
by their controlling shareholders. We find government policy against such behavior 
becomes more and more effective. From local authorities’ perspective, however, we only 
find an insignificant negative role for the local unemployment rate. On the other hand, 
local fiscal deficit has insignificantly positive relation to tunneling occurrence, reflecting 
the tax evasion nature of tunneling. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction   
1.1 Research Background  
Since Berle and Means (1932), it has been widely believed that well dispersed 
ownership is a fundamental feature of modern corporations and the source of the central 
conflict of interest existing between self-serving managers and shareholders. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) suggest managerial shareholding as a method to mitigate management 
incompetence and unaccountability. However, the literature on the relation between 
managerial shareholding and firm value, using different samples, reaches inconclusive 
results. While some studies find a monotonic form of the function (Mehran 1995; Morck 
et al. 2000; Chen et al., 2003), various nonlinear functions were detected in others 
(Morck et al., 1988; McConnell and Servaes 1990; Cui and Mak, 2002). Managerial 
ownership generates two conflicting effects on managers’ behavior: the incentive 
alignment effect and the entrenchment effect. The non-linear relation between managerial 
ownership and firm value arises because of the dynamic dominance between the interest 
alignment effect and the entrenchment effect through all levels of managerial ownership.  
  Demsetz (1983) argues that theoretically managerial ownership should be regarded as an 
endogenous variable that is jointly determined by firm external environment, and internal 
characteristics such as industry affiliation, investment opportunity, growth potential, and 
asymmetric information. Holderness et al. (1999), Himmelberg et al. (1999) and Demsetz 
and Villalonga (2001) fail to find any statistically significant effects of managerial 
ownership on firm value. Additionally, some researchers even find the reverse causality 
running from firm value to managerial ownership (Loderer and Martin, 1997; Rose, 
2005). 
Recent researches, on the other hand, find that a well dispersed ownership structure is 
relatively rare outside the U.S. and the U.K. (La Porta et al., 1999; Faccio and Lang, 2002; 
Franks and Mayer, 2001). Instead, concentrated corporate ownership is rather common in 
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both developed and developing economies. The expropriation of minority shareholders 
by controlling shareholders gives rise to another type of agency problem between 
controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. La Porta et al. (1999) claim that the 
current major agency problem plaguing corporate governance across the world, is how to 
restrict the expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling shareholders.  
Johnson et al. (2000) use the word “tunneling” to generally describe controlling 
shareholders’ private-benefit-pursuing activities of transferring resources out of firms 
they control. Many empirical studies have proved the existence of the private benefits of 
control by demonstrating that controlling shareholders are willing to pay share trading 
premiums during block share trading (Hanouna et al. 2001; Dyck and Zingales, 2004) or 
to pay voting premiums for shares with enhanced voting rights (Chung and Kim, 1999; 
Nenova, 2003). Another important issue of ownership and firm value relation is the 
separation between cash flow rights and voting rights under ultimate controlling 
structures. La Porta (1999) argued that globally many large corporations are ultimately 
controlled by their controller though complex controlling structures, such as pyramid 
control, dual class shares, and cross shareholding. Accordingly, Claessens et al. (2000) 
claim that the separation between cash flow rights and voting rights, measured by the 
difference of voting rights and cash flow rights, have negative effects on firm value. 
Since the beginning of 1990s, China’s large SOEs have witnessed a restructuring process 
by carving out profit-generating assets to form state (department) and SOE controlled 
PLCs to raise capital in the stock markets. Liu and Sun (2005) argue that in this share 
issue privatization (SIP) the state has not actually relinquished its control over the 
majority of PLCs listed on China’s stock markets. Instead it ultimately dominates the 
markets directly through its departments at various levels and indirectly through state-
owned legal persons (institutions). A pyramid controlling structure is the most pervasive 
ultimate controlling structure in China. 
There are some issues of existing researches on the relation between corporate 
ownership and firm value. Firstly, the majority of these studies have just focused on 
either the managerial agency problem or the controlling shareholder’s expropriation 
agency problem, leaving the interaction between managerial ownership and controlling 
shareholders’ ownership unexplored. Under a concentrated corporate ownership structure, 
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the largest shareholder is expected to take control of the firm, and monitor managers to 
maximize firm value. Given that both are insiders of the firm, how the manager and the 
largest shareholder react to changes in each other’s ownership of the firm is a fresh angle 
from which to study corporate ownership.  
The second issue of these studies on ownership-and-firm value relation is the way they 
tackle the endogeneity of ownership. Most studies use OLS on pooled samples or simple 
panel data models to study the relation. However, these methods cannot solve the 
endogeneity problem that arises because of the omission of unobserved firm-specific 
effects and simultaneity problems between ownership variables and firm value. Simply 
using instrument variables (2SLS) in panel data models in a single equation framework 
will just mitigate the endogeneity problem in that it does not tackle simultaneity problem 
properly and the effectiveness of mitigation has to rely on the quality of the instruments. 
1.2 Theme Question and Research Framework 
1.2.1 Theme Question of this Study 
This study provides a more consistent picture of the ownership-and-firm value relation 
in China’s stock markets. We aim to answer the following questions. Are managerial 
ownership and the largest shareholder’s ownership endogenous in the relation? Are firm 
value and the two ownership variables jointly determined? What is the relation between 
managerial ownership and the largest shareholder’s ownership? What is the role of the 
largest shareholder in China’s PLCs? How does tunneling happen? 
1.2.2 Research Methods 
1.2.2.1 Estimation of Ownership and Firm Value Relation  
Many standard studies (Morck et al., 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990) on the 
ownership-and-firm value relation employ a cross-sectional estimation method. However, 
the endogeneity of ownership variables renders the OLS estimation these studies used 
inconsistent. There are two main sources of the endogeneity of ownership variables. First, 
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the simultaneity problem exists between firm value and key ownership variables. In other 
words, firm value and key ownership variables might be jointly determined. Thus single 
equation analysis studying the causality from ownership to firm value, even with good 
instruments, will not properly solve the endogneity problem of ownership variables. 
Second, unobserved firm-specific effects affect a firm’s ownership structure. Therefore, 
OLS estimations of the firm value model that do not allow for unobserved firm 
heterogeneity will inevitably suffer from endogeneity problems. Panel data models can 
mitigate the endogeneity problem by taking into account unobserved firm-specific effects. 
As such, controlling these two sources of endogeneity of ownership variables, 2SLS 
applied in a simultaneous equation system using a fixed effects model is the most suitable 
way to more consistently estimate the relation between ownership variables and firm 
value. 
In this study, we first use OLS to estimate the pooled sample in both single equation 
analysis and simultaneous equation analysis. Comparatively, panel data modes are 
applied in both single equation and simultaneous equation analysis. Due to the 
availability of data on the ultimate controlling shareholders in China’s stock markets, we 
can only manage to explore the first issue using the information on the largest 
shareholders who directly control listed firms. In terms of the ultimate controller issue, 
noted in the latter part of this chapter we use cross-sectional data to analyze the effects of 
the separation between cash flow rights and voting rights on firm value. 
1.2.2.2 Estimation of Controlling Shareholders’ Tunneling  
As far as estimation of the tunneling model is concerned, since a static binary choice 
model cannot capture the high persistence of tunneling behavior of controlling 
shareholders, we choose a dynamic binary choice model, allowing for lagged-term 
information on the tunneling. The unobserved persistent firm-specific heterogeneity, such 
as managerial skill and quality, and organization efficiency and culture, can be plausibly 
assumed to affect the tunneling decision of the largest shareholder, who is necessarily 
familiar with this insider information unobserved by outside investors. Thus theoretically 
a fixed effects model (linear) and a standard random effects binary choice model are 
expected to be more suitable than the pooled estimation methods. However, with many 
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firms in the sample, fixed effects models will not only lose substantial degrees of 
freedom, but also have to exclude some time-invariant factors of interest, such as location 
and industry. A standard random effects binary choice model suffers from an endogeneity 
problem once we include the lagged-term dependent variables, which are definitely 
correlated to the error term. 
As such, we introduce the Mundlak-Chamberlain Random Effects Model (Mundlak, 
1978; Chamberlain, 1984) to relax the assumption of independence between the 
individual effects and explanatory variables. This method assumes that the regression 
function of unobserved firm heterogeneity is linear either in all time means of time-
variant variables or a combination of their lags and leads (Propper and Burchardt, 1999; 
Arulampalam et al., 2000; Propper, 2000). Unlike the standard (traditional) random 
effects model, this method allows for the correlation between the unobserved firm-
specific effects and explanatory variables by introducing time means of time-variant 
variable(s) to control for individual effects correlated with explanatory variables.  We 
choose the average return on assets (ROA) and the dividend ratio to represent firm 
heterogeneity.  
  By integrating a lagged dependent variable in the Mundlak-Chamberlain Random 
Effects Model to capture state dependence in tunneling, we form a dynamic random 
effects probit model, which has been used in empirical research (Orme, 1996; 
Arulampalam et al., 2000; Propper, 2000). However, the dynamic panel model suffers 
from this endogeneity problem called the initial conditions problem caused by the 
correlation between unobserved effects and the initial observation (Hsiao, 1986). As a 
result, in order to fix this endogeneity problem, following Heckman (1981a; 1981b) we 
use a Heckman two-step estimation method for a dynamic random effects probit model, 
which simplifies the estimation into two probit models: one for the model of interest and 
the other for the initial conditions. Taking account of the correlation between unobserved 
effects and explanatory variables (including the lagged dependent variable) and the 
correlation between unobserved effects and initial conditions (i.e. the initial conditions 
problem), the Heckman estimator is expected to be the most suitable method to analyze a 
panel data like ours that has a lot of persistence in the dependent variable.  
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1.3 Contribution and Limitations of this Study 
1.3.1 Contribution of this Study 
The contribution of this study lies in our solving of the problems and limitations of 
empirical studies. First, most studies on ownership-and-firm value relation in China’s 
stock markets use cross-sectional estimation methods and do not properly deal with the 
endogeneity problem of ownership variables. In this study, by using a two-stage panel 
data method in a simultaneous equation model we control for two sources of the 
endogeneity problem: the unobserved firm heterogeneity and the simultaneity problem 
between firm value and two ownership variables. This method also gives us an 
opportunity to explore the interaction between firm value and ownership variables. 
Second, the majority of studies are based on the misleading official classification of 
shareholders, which categorizes state-owned institutions or state-owned enterprises into 
the “legal person” category that also includes private enterprises (Liu and Sun, 2005). 
Basically, in terms of state and private ownership, legal person creates an ambiguous 
classification. As a result, studies that only focus on state direct ownership underestimate 
the influence of state ownership on firm value. To handle this issue, we manually 
collected identity information on the PLC’s largest shareholders and divided the whole 
sample into state controlled firms (both directly and indirectly) and private legal person 
controlled firms, to distinguish their effects on firm value.  
Third, it is quite common to use accounting indicators such as return on assets (ROA) 
and return on equity (ROE), to measure firm performance. However, this information 
might not reflect the actual operation and performance due to the pervasiveness of 
tunneling and earning management in China’s stock markets. Thus in this study we use a 
simple version of Tobin’s Q as the proxy of firm value: a widely used market value based 
indicator. 
Fourth, few studies take into account local political factors, such as local unemployment 
and local fiscal condition. State ownership is predominant in China’s stock markets. Due 
to the tradability constraints imposed on shares held by the state and legal persons, it is 
crucial to allow for local social and political indicators that affect authorities’ decisions 
on transference of block shares. Uniquely, we include city-level unemployment ratios and 
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fiscal deficit information to capture the political pressure PLCs are facing. We also 
include this information in our tunneling model to see how the largest shareholder reacts 
to these political factors when making tunneling decisions. By comparing the effects of 
these local political factors on tunneling and those of year dummies, we can see the 
difference between the supervision of tunneling by local governments and that by central 
government in China. 
Finally, existing studies on the occurrence mechanism of tunneling normally use a 
standard binary choice model. However, this method cannot capture the dynamic 
characteristics of the tunneling decision and tackle the initial condition problems. 
Therefore, we adopt a dynamic random effects probit model to allow for these 
indispensible aspects and provide more consistent estimation of tunneling occurrence.  
1.3.2 Limitations of this Study 
There are some limitations of this study. First, because there is no complete information 
of ultimate ownership for China’s PLCs during the whole sample period, we mainly study 
the influence of the largest shareholders, instead of the ultimate controller, on firm value 
and assume these largest shareholders are the ones who making tunneling decision. For 
our sample period between 2001 and 2004, information of ultimate controllers of PLCs is 
only available for 2004. We can only use this cross-sectional data to examine how the 
separation between cash flow rights and voting rights affect firm value. This result can 
only be used as a supplementary result of the ownership and firm value relation.  
Second, when calculating the simple version of Tobin’s Q, we used the product of 
average stock price and total shares to calculate the market value of shareholders’ equity. 
In other words, we tend to treat tradable and untradeable shares equally, although there is 
tradability constraints on shares held by the state and legal persons in China’s stock 
markets. 
Third, the study only focuses on PLCs in China’s market, which are just a part of the 
whole economy. So the results might not be applicable to all enterprises in China’s 
market and our policy insights are mainly drawn from the stock markets perspective. 
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1.4 Structure of this Thesis 
The whole thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 1 overviews the research background 
and produces the theme research question and research framework. In Chapter 2 we take 
a closer look at the existing literature on the ownership and firm value relation and 
tunneling by the largest shareholders. Chapter 3 provides the institutional background of 
China’s stock markets, and the political and economic factors involved in the ownership 
and firm value relation and tunneling are introduced. In Chapter 4 firm value and 
ownership models and a tunneling model are developed and hypotheses are developed 
accordingly. Estimation methods, data and variables are also introduced. Chapter 5 
presents empirical results for the ownership and firm value model using simultaneous 
equation analysis, tunneling model using dynamic random effect probit model, and a 
simple cross-sectional analysis of ownership-and-firm value relation and tunneling under 
an ultimate ownership framework. Finally, in Chapter 6 we draw conclusions and provide 
policy insights.  
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review  
2.1 Introduction 
There has been a large stream of literature studying the impact of ownership structure on 
company performance. Berle and Means (1932) regarded the separation between 
ownership and operation under a widely dispersed ownership as a fundamental feature of 
the modern company. The agency problems caused by the unaccountable manager’s non­
profit-maximizing behavior in this separation case have been a focal topic in corporate 
governance studies (Williamson, 1963a, 1963b; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) suggest management shareholding as a method to mitigate the agency 
problem of management entrenchment and incompetence.  Many other studies (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983; Morck et al., 1988; Stulz, 1988; Barnhart and Rosenstein, 1998), however, 
find out a nonlinear relation between managerial ownership and firm value. 
Since the 1980s the main focus of this literature has been fixed on the impacts of 
ownership concentration on company performance. Fama and Jensen (1983), and Shleifer 
and Vishny (1986) argue that theoretically a larger shareholder who has a large enough 
stake can monitor the management so as to largely overcome the traditional free rider 
problem characterized by the diffused small shareholders case. Although a large number 
of studies suggest a positive role for the larger shareholder, some researchers find that 
there is a non-linear relation between ownership concentration and the company’s 
performance. Some researchers even find an insignificant or negative impact of 
ownership concentration on company value (McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Bianco and 
Casavola, 1999) and maintain that the role of ownership concentration on company value 
depends on the type of owner (Nickell et al., 1997). Recent corporate governance 
literature shows that the current main agency problem in corporate governance across the 
world is how to restrict the expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling 
shareholders (La Porta et al. 1999). 
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The aforementioned findings about the ownership-firm value relation are far from 
conclusive. Demsetz (1983) argued that firm’s ownership structure is endogenously 
determined to maximize shareholders’ interests. Holderness, Kroszner and Sheehan (1999) 
and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) confirm the endogeneity of corporate ownership. If 
ownership is endogenously determined, then our understanding of the relation between 
ownership structure and firm performance is biased by spurious results from misspecified 
models. Cross-section methods adopted by the majority of the above studies are rendered 
unsuitable by the endogeneity of a firm’s ownership structure so that panel data methods 
emerge as a preferred way to study the ownership-firm value relation.        
As mentioned in the previous chapter, we will focus on the role of ownership structure 
and corporate governance. The reform of gradually privatizing state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) in China produced highly concentrated corporate ownership and delegated many 
effective control rights to managers. Although the state still has ultimate control rights for 
many large and strategically important companies, China provides us with a unique 
partially privatized environment to study the influence of different corporate ownership 
structures on mitigating agency problems to improve corporate governance.   
This chapter is organized as follows. In the next section we discuss the managerial 
ownership and firm value relation. Section 2.3 reveals the role of controlling shareholders 
in corporate governance. Tunneling behaviors by controlling shareholders are further 
explored in Section 2.4. The following section reviews the endogeneity of ownership 
structure. Finally, we summarize the chapter in Section 2.6.  
2.2 Managerial Shareholding and Firm Value 
2.2.1 Traditional Agency Theory  
Berle and Means (1932) saw that due to the separation between ownership and control, 
conflicting goals between shareholders (principle) and managers (agent) will give rise to 
managerial agency problems (moral hazard and adverse selection) when ownership of a 
modern firm is widely dispersed. Under a widely dispersed ownership, monitoring of 
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managers has “public goods” features in the sense that collecting information and 
monitoring the manager benefit all shareholders. But the relatively small cash value of 
this to any individual shareholder makes it less worthwhile to them than free riding. As a 
result, an unaccountable manager may take control of the firm and might pursue private 
benefits by rewarding low competence, and indulging in high perquisite consumption, 
and non-profit-maximizing investment.  
Agency theory in corporate governance was pioneered by Jensen and Meckling (1976), 
who established a contract framework to describe the agency relation between 
shareholders and managers in corporate governance. In the contract, shareholders 
delegate control (the decision-making of the firm) to managers. Both shareholders and 
managers have own self-utility-maximizing objectives, so that conflicts of interests 
between them inevitably result in “residual loss” to all shareholders. They define agency 
cost as the sum of shareholders’ monitoring cost, the deposit paid by the manager to 
guarantee his accountability and competence, and residual loss.  
Agency relations exist universally in the economy. Agency problems arise when there 
are conflicts of interests between a principal and an agent in the delegation of control and 
when the effective monitoring of the agent becomes unavailable or expensive. Thus 
agency theory has been focusing on two issues: finding the optimal contract to align 
interests between shareholders and managers, and improving monitoring forces through 
internal corporate mechanisms and effective external markets (capital, labor, and 
production markets). Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest managerial shareholding as a 
method to align interests of the firm’s management and shareholders, so as to mitigate the 
agency problem. From the monitoring forces perspective, Fama (1980) advocates that 
efficient capital and labor markets can serve as information mechanism to curb managers’ 
self-serving opportunism and behaviors. 
2.2.2 Managerial Shareholding in Corporate Governance  
The separation between ownership and operation under a widely dispersed ownership 
gives rise to the agency problems caused by the unaccountable manager’s non-profit­
maximizing behavior (Williamson, 1963a, 1963b; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Jensen 
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and Meckling (1976) suggest managerial shareholding as a method to mitigate the 
management incompetence and unaccountability. Jensen and Meckling theoretically 
advocate the ‘convergence of interests’ hypothesis (incentive alignment effect) that the 
positive wealth effect of more managerial ownership will align managers’ interests with 
those of shareholders, so that firm value increases monotonically with managerial 
ownership. 
Supporting evidence for the incentive alignment effect was found by other researchers. 
Mehran (1995) uses a randomly-selected sample of 153 US manufacturing firms in 1979 
and 1980 and finds that incentive compensation of executives and managerial ownership 
are positively and significantly related to firm performance. By studying 60 of 90 IPO 
(initial public offering) firms in Finland in 1984 and 1993, Keloharju and Kulp (1996) 
shows that firm performance is positively affected by managerial ownership, but the 
relation is only weakly significant. Morck et al. (2000) and Chen et al. (2003) study 
Japanese PLCs respectively and collectively find results supporting the incentive 
alignment effect of managerial shareholding.  
Many other studies, however, discover a nonlinear relation between managerial 
ownership and firm value. Fama and Jensen (1983), argue that with lower level holdings 
of firm shares, managers are disciplined by market forces so that they are more motivated 
to maximize firm value, whereas with high levels of managerial share holdings, the 
liquidity of firms’ shares is reduced and managers entrench to pursue self interest 
maximization, so that firm value decreases. Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) studying a 
cross-section sample of 371 U.S. Fortune 500 firms for 1980 found a positive relation 
between managerial ownership and firm value when managerial ownership is either 
below 5 per cent or above 25 per cent, and a negative relation between 5 per cent and 25 
per cent. Stulz (1988) suggests that with larger ownership of the firm, managers carry out 
more entrenchment activities so that they become more capable and more motivated to 
fight against takeover threats and increase the price for the firm to be taken over. 
Moreover, by studying 1173 companies in 1976 and 1093 companies in 1986 in the U.S., 
McConnell and Servaes (1990) detect a quadratic (inverse U-shaped) relation between 
Tobin’s Q and managerial ownership.  Cui and Mak (2002) focus on high R&D PLCs in 
the U.S. market, and find a W-shaped relation between Tobin’s Q and managerial 
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ownership. Although three studies all examine the U.S. market, different patterns of 
relation between firm value and managerial ownership are found. Barnhart and 
Rosenstein (1998) reconfirm the curvilinear result of Morck et al. (1988) by using an 
OLS specification with industry dummies.  
To sum up, managerial ownership generates two conflicting effects on managers’ 
behavior: the incentive alignment effect and the entrenchment effect (Morck et al., 1988; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). The non-linear relation between managerial ownership and 
firm value arises because of the dynamic dominance between the interest alignment effect 
and the entrenchment effect through all levels of managerial ownership. At low levels of 
managerial ownership, shareholders and outside market forces (labor, production, and 
take-over markets) have considerable influence on managers so that the interests of 
managers tend to be aligned with those of shareholders. In other words, the manager’s 
value maximizing incentive dominates his self-serving incentives. However, as 
managerial shareholding increases, pressures from shareholders and outside markets 
become relatively limited so that managers might become entrenched in their position to 
carry out self-serving activities even at the expense of firm value reduction. Nonetheless, 
with very high ownership, managers have to take into account considerable benefits 
forgone when pursuing private benefits through their non-value-maximization activities, 
so that the interest alignment effect is expected to dominate the entrenchment effect.  
  On the other hand, Demsetz (1983) argues theoretically that a firm’s ownership structure 
is endogenously determined to maximize shareholders’ interest. According to Demsetz, 
managerial ownership should be regarded as an endogenous variable that is jointly 
determined by firm external environment, and internal characteristics such as industry 
affiliation, investment opportunity, growth potential, and asymmetric information. Thus 
heterogeneous firms might have different optimal ownership structures. Further, Demsetz 
and Lehn (1985) employ a linear model to study 511 US large corporations and discover 
firm profitability is independent of managerial ownership. Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), 
Holderness et al. (1999), and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) confirm the endogeneity of 
managerial ownership by finding no statistically significant relation between firm value 
and ownership structure. Himmelberg et al. (1999) use a fixed effects model to examine 
600 U.S. listed firms between 1982 and 1984, and also fail to detect any significant 
19 
influence of managerial ownership on firm value.  
Some researchers even find the causality runs from firm value to managerial ownership. 
Loderer and Martin (1997) use a simultaneous equations framework to examine the 
causality between executive stock ownership and firm performance for firms involved in 
acquisitions. They found that higher Tobin’s Q ratios lead to greater managerial 
ownership, but not vice versa. Cho (1998) finds similar results, and using simultaneous 
equations and piecewise OLS regression shows that the endogeneity of ownership 
structure produces conflicting results on firm value and ownership structure. Rose (2005) 
studied Danish listed firms in 1998-2001, and using piecewise OLS regression and 3SLS 
found that managerial ownership increases with firm performance (Tobin’s Q). 
The endogeneity of a firm’s ownership structure renders the cross-section methods 
adopted by the majority of the above studies unsuitable. So panel data methods come to 
be a preferred way to study the managerial ownership-firm value relation. Unlike the 
results from cross-section studies by Morck et al. (1988) and McConnell and Servaes, 
Cho (1998) employs simultaneous equations using two-stage least squares (2SLS) to 
control for endogenous managerial ownership. He finds little evidence that firm value is 
dependent on managerial ownership. Himmelberg et al. (1999) employed a fixed effect 
panel data model to control for unobservable inter-firm differences, but failed to find any 
statistically significant effects running from managerial ownership to firm value. In 
contrast, the reverse causality between managerial ownership and firm value is supported 
by Kole (1996)’s finding that with its value increased, the firm might increase managerial 
ownership as a reward. Further evidence has been found that with other conditions equal, 
managers who have insider information tend to increase managerial ownership as an 
investment (Loderer and Martin, 1997), or choose stock options as rewards (Cho, 1998) if 
they believe firm value will increase in the future.  Nevertheless, Short and Keasey (1999) 
use a cubic specification on a sample of U.K. listed companies between 1988 and 1992, 
and find firm value is a curvilinear function of managerial ownership. This is similar to 
results by Morck et al. (1988) but with two new inflection points (at 12 per cent and 40 
percent). Furthermore, Lee and Ryu (2003), studying the South Korean market, justify 
the necessity of panel data methods by confirming the history of managerial ownership 
changes matters in the managerial ownership-firm value equation in the sense that these 
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changes can signal to outside investors the insiders’ prediction of firm value.  
2.2.3 Managerial Ownership in China 
Studies on the managerial ownership-firm value relation in China have not reached a 
consistent result. Wang and Chen (2004) conclude that without a well established 
takeover market, there is a less pressure for managers to entrench to protect themselves 
by increasing their ownership of the firm, and instead managerial ownership is used as an 
effective tool to improve managers’ incentive to maximize firm value.  In other words, 
firm value is a monotonically increasing function of managerial ownership. Yu (2003) 
suggests a linear relation between total (average) firm shares held by directors and firm’s 
ROE (rate of return on common shareholders’ equity), although a curvilinear function 
was not found. Zhou and Sun (2003) find that for fast growing companies there exist 
positive relations between managerial ownership and firm performance. Zhang and Chen 
(2002) and Xu and Pu (2003) also find managerial ownership has positive effects on firm 
value. 
Nevertheless, Yuan et al. (2000) fail to detect any significant effects arising from shares 
held by senior managers (directors, supervisors, and other senior managers) on China’s 
listed companies’ ROE. Wei (2000) argues there is no curvilinear relation between 
managerial ownership and firm value in China. Instead, he regards managerial ownership 
as a welfare arrangement that has not effectively improved managers’ incentives. Li 
(2000), Gao (2001), and Zhang and Song (2002) find no evidence of a significant relation 
between managerial ownership and firm value.  
On the other hand examples of non-linearity have been discovered in the managerial 
ownership and firm value relation. An inverse U-shaped relation is detected by Wu (2002) 
between ownership concentration, managerial ownership and firm performance (ROA). 
Liu and Tan (2005) examine 331 firms listed on the Shenzhen Exchange and find that 
firm performance is a cubic function of managerial ownership, with two turning points at 
0.1138% and 0.1746% respectively. 
2.2.4 Summary of Studies on the Managerial Agency Problem 
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As we can see, these findings on managerial ownership-firm value relation are 
inconclusive in deciding whether the function of firm value is monotonic, quadratic, or 
cubic. The finding of endogenous ownership structure has triggered the evolution of 
estimation methods from cross-section methods to panel data models that take into 
account firm-specific effects. Besides, the reverse causality between managerial 
ownership and firm value can sometimes occur. After studying several countries 
(Australia, Germany, Japan, Spain, UK, and US) with different institutional and 
legislation backgrounds and diverse corporate governance structures, Miguel et al. (2004) 
maintain that the nature of the prevailing governance system has a significant influence 
on the managerial ownership-firm value relation. 
Likewise, studies on the managerial ownership-firm value relation in China have not 
reached a conclusive finding. There are three possible reasons. First, the majority of these 
studies adopt cross-section methods, without taking into account unobservable inter-firm 
differences (firm heterogeneity), the endogeneity of managerial ownership, or the 
possibility of reverse causality between managerial ownership and firm value. Second, 
the samples used by these studies are mostly dominated by SOEs, where state or state 
agents are the largest shareholders. Managerial ownership in most SOEs tends to be at 
quite a low level (an average 0.017%) and is likely affected by government policies and 
other political factors. Third, some accounting-based measures for firm value, such as 
ROA (return on assets) and ROE, can sometimes be manipulated by management and the 
controlling shareholder. Given the fact that the managerial ownership-firm value relation 
is mainly an empirical issue, with the unique partially privatized ownership structure and 
reform in China, it is worthwhile carrying out a fresh study on the relation between 
managerial shareholding and firm value that controls for above three issues. 
2.3 Controlling Shareholders and Firm Value  
2.3.1 The Pervasiveness of Ownership Concentration  
We have already noted that in a well dispersed ownership structure the separation 
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between ownership and control can easily give rise to traditional principal agency 
problem: the managerial agency problem. However, recent researches find the dispersed 
ownership structure is relatively rare outside the U.S. and the U.K. (La Porta et al., 1999; 
Faccio and Lang, 2002; Franks and Mayer, 2001). Instead, a majority of firms elsewhere 
around the world tend to have concentrated ownership, with families or the state as their 
controlling shareholders. 
Ownership concentration commonly exists in most developed economies.  By using a 
sample of the largest 10 firms in each of 49 countries, La Porta et al. (1998) find that 
apart from the U.S and the U.K., where effective shareholder protection is available, a 
concentrated corporate ownership structure is rather common in most developed 
economies (e.g. Germany, Italy, Finland, and Sweden), and especially in countries like 
Greece with weak protection of minority shareholders. A further study by La Porta et al. 
(1999) focused on the largest 20 publicly listed companies in each of 27 developed 
economies and showed that for companies outside the U.S. and the U.K only a very small 
proportion of PLCs have well dispersed ownership, whereas around 64% of PLCs have 
controlling shareholders. Faccio and Lang (2000) study 5232 firms of Western Europe 
and find dispersed ownership widely exists in the U.K. and in Ireland, whereas firms in 
continental Europe mostly have concentrated ownership. They remark that financial 
institutions normally have dispersed ownership, whereas most non-financial and small 
firms are controlled by families. Research by Barca and Becht (2001) shows that around 
half of the firms in Austria, Belgium, Germany and Italy have controlling shareholders 
whose ownership exceeds 50% of the firm, and half of the firms in Denmark, Spain, and 
Switzerland have controlling shareholders on average owning 44%, 35% and 35% of the 
firm respectively. Franks and Mayer (1998) confirm that 85% of German PLCs have a 
controlling shareholder. Moreover, Prowse (1990) finds cross shareholding is quite 
common in Japan, and financial institutions and banks control most firms.   
In emerging market economies, corporate ownership has become more concentrated due 
to the absence of effective corporate governance mechanisms and strong investor 
protection. By studying 2980 companies in 9 East Asian countries, Claessens et al. (2000) 
provide evidence that over two thirds of these firms have a controlling shareholder and 
more than 40% of PLCs are under the control of a small number of families. Lins (2003) 
23 
argues “pyramid ownership structures are prevalent across virtually all emerging 
markets”, which give rise to a separation between the voting rights (control) and the cash 
flow rights (ownership) of controlling shareholders. In South Korea, 67% of large 
corporations are controlled by founders and their offspring who own less than 10% of 
these corporations (Joh and Ryoo, 2000). Bertrand et al. (2002) find it is rather common 
that Indian business groups have controlling shareholders. 
For transition economies, transformations in ownership structure, especially from state 
sector to private sector (privatization), have been one of the basic features. Most 
transition economies, though not China, carried out some large scale privatization in a 
shock therapy way, which meant they released previously state-owned assets to non-state 
entities over a short period of time. Due to their underdeveloped financial markets, and 
lagging institutional reforms, ownership in these transition economies tends to be highly 
concentrated and plagued by insider control and the expropriation of minority investors 
by large shareholders. Insider control in Russia is pervasive and insiders (managers) 
become controlling shareholders (Barberis et al., 1996; Claessens et al., 1997; 
Kapelyushnikov, 2000). Controlling shareholders in Russia own on average 32% of 
firm’s shares (Kapelyushnikov, 2000). Cull et al. (2002) find evidence of insider control 
in concentrated ownership in Czech Republic.  
2.3.2 The Separation between Ownership and Control  
It is widely believed that traditionally the separation between ownership and control 
takes place in dispersed ownership structure. Due to their low voting rights, shareholders 
in a well dispersed ownership lose control to managers, so that managerial agency 
problems arise. However, the pervasiveness of concentrated corporate ownership around 
the world found recently raises a question on this standard separation: under a 
concentrated ownership, are the ownership and control still separated? If the answer is 
yes, then how are they separated? Who will benefit from it? This subsection will answer 
these questions. 
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Ultimate Controlling Shareholders 
Generally speaking, in order to become a controlling shareholder of a firm and directly 
control the firm, the shareholder has to own the majority of the firm’s shares (more than 
50%). However, La Porta et al. (1999) propose the ultimate ownership principle 
suggesting the ultimate control of a firm can be achieved by owning a smaller volume of 
firm’s shares through superior voting rights and pyramid shareholding. La Porta et al. 
(1999) find controlling shareholders usually gain more voting rights than their actual cash 
flow rights. Supportive evidence is also provided by Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000). 
Bebchuk et al. (1999) use the term “controlling minority shareholder” to describe the 
controlling shareholders who use a small number of cash flow rights to ultimately control 
PLCs. The multiple classes of shareholding, including pyramid shareholding, cross 
shareholding, and dual class shareholding, result in the separation between control 
(voting rights) and ownership (cash flow rights), which further gives rise to agency 
problems caused by controlling shareholders’ expropriation of minority shareholders 
(Bebchuk et al.,1999; La Porta et al., 1999；Faccio and Lang, 2002). Bertrand et al. 
(2002) find controlling shareholders of firms may use the difference in cash flow rights 
among firms in the multi-class control structure to tunnel resources and divert investment 
opportunities to related companies where they have higher cash flow rights. 
As far as identities are concerned, La Porta et al. (1999) divide ultimate controlling 
shareholders into five categories: a family or an individual, the State, a widely held 
financial institution, a widely held corporation, and others. Accordingly, Claessens et al. 
(2000) find that apart from Japan and Singapore, firms ultimately controlled by families 
have the largest separation between ownership and control in all other East Asian 
economies. Widely held financial institutions and state controlled firms have the largest 
separation between voting rights and cash flow rights in Japan and Singapore respectively. 
Using a sample of 5232 corporations in 13 Western Europe countries, Faccio and Lang 
(2002) find 44.29% of firms are ultimately controlled by families.   
Ultimate Controlling Structures  
According to La Porta et al. (1999), a pyramid shareholding structure means the 
ultimate controlling shareholder controls the firm through a chain of other firms. Under a 
25 
pyramid shareholding structure, the cash flow rights of an ultimate controlling 
shareholder are defined as the sum of the direct shareholding and the indirect 
shareholding of the firm. The indirect shareholding is the product of the ownerships of all 
shareholding layers. The voting rights of an ultimate controlling shareholder are defined 
as the sum of the direct voting rights and the sum of the smallest voting rights in every 
shareholding chain.  For example, if the ultimate controller owns 10% of the shares of 
firm A, which owns 15% shares of firm B, and the ultimate controller directly owns 8% 
shares of firm B, then the ultimate controller has 9.5% (8% + 10%*15%) cash flow rights 
of firm B, and 18% (8% + 10%) of the voting rights of firm B. Therefore, by owning 
9.5% shares of firm B, the controlling shareholder ultimately maintains and extends her 
control up to 18% voting rights of the firm B. Pyramid shareholding is so effective for 
controlling shareholders with low cash flow rights to ultimately control firms that 
globally it has become the most pervasive ultimate control structure, especially in 
underdeveloped economies where effective shareholder protection is not available 
(Mitton, 2002; Almeida and Wolfenzon, 2006).  
The main ultimate controlling shareholder of the controlling group can consolidate his 
status though cross shareholding ownership structure (La Porta et al., 1999). Unlike 
pyramid shareholding where one ultimate controlling shareholder vertically extends their 
control of the firm through a chain of firms, cross shareholding is a structure that can 
allocate voting rights of the firm among those firms in the control chain both vertically 
and horizontally. A firm can be identified as having a cross shareholding controlling 
structure when at least one firm in the control chain holds shares of its own holding firm 
or other firms in the control chain (Bebchuk et al., 1999). Cross shareholding usually 
involves multi-control chains and the separation between cash flow rights and voting 
rights will become larger as the number of firms in the control chains and the number of 
shares they hold in each other increase (Bebchuk et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2000; 
Durnev and Kim, 2005). Joh and Ryoo (2000) find top 30 plutocrats in South Korea 
averagely use 10% cash flow rights to gain ultimate control of large corporations mainly 
through cross shareholdings. 
  Dual class shareholding is another way to separate cash flow rights and voting rights. 
Controlling shareholders can create disproportions between voting rights and cash flow 
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rights through issuing shares with limited voting rights, so as to enjoy larger proportion 
of voting rights (La Porta et al., 1999；Bebchuk et al., 1999). When a firm issues two 
classes of shares: shares with full voting rights (one share one voting right) and shares 
with limited voting rights, although both classes of shares have the same cash flow right, 
their holders’ voting rights become more disproportional. Faccio and Lang (2002) find 
dual class shares more often used by firms in Italy, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland. 
Similar to pyramid shareholding and cross shareholding, the divergence between voting 
rights and cash flow rights caused by dual class shares issuing, solidifies the controlling 
status of the controlling shareholder and makes them more likely to expropriate minority 
shareholders (La Porta et al., 1999). 
  Countries’ heterogeneities in economic and political environment, and social and 
cultural backgrounds, result in different popularity levels for the above three ultimate 
controlling structures around the world, which further generate different levels of 
separation between ownership (cash flow rights) and control (voting rights). Also, firm 
characteristics also matter in choosing ultimate controlling structures for business groups 
(Almeida and Wolfenzon, 2006). In many cases, controlling shareholders adopt more 
complex controlling structures by combining the above three basic structures.  
2.3.3 Controlling Shareholders in Corporate Governance 
  Concentrated corporate ownership, instead of dispersed ownership, has become one of 
the fundamental features of modern corporations across the world (La Porta et al. 1999). 
The assumption of homogeneous shareholders does not seem plausible. It is demonstrated 
that controlling shareholders have a double-edged-sword role in corporate governance 
since they can mitigate managerial agency problems to improve firm value, but 
meanwhile they can also cause another type of agency problem by their tunneling 
behavior. Recent literature on corporate governance extends agency theory from the 
traditional managerial agency problems to the role of controlling shareholders in 
corporate governance. It is argued that controlling shareholders have two effects on firm 
value: the incentive alignment effect and the entrenchment effect (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997; Claessens et al., 2000; Dyck and Zingales，2004). 
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Incentive Alignment Effect of Controlling Shareholders 
The incentive alignment effect means with large ownership of the firm the controlling 
shareholder has the incentive to effectively monitor management and maximize firm 
value. Fama and Jensen (1983) and Shleifer and Vishny (1986), argue that theoretically a 
shareholder who has a large enough stake can mainly overcome the traditional free rider 
problem of the diffused small shareholders, and have incentive to monitor management. 
Wruck (1989), and Franks and Mayer (1995) find that management turnover is higher in 
firms with large shareholders in developed economies, indicating the positive role of 
large shareholders in reducing the managerial agency problem. Chidambaran and John 
(1998) suggest that the presence of large shareholders can mitigate asymmetric 
information problem in that large shareholders can gradually collect information on 
managers’ investment through “relation investing” cooperation and use their knowledge 
to avoid managers’ short term irrational investments. Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000) 
maintain that controlling shareholders are capable of monitoring managers and can even 
directly manage firms, whereas other large shareholders of the firm lack the incentive and 
power to monitor the controlling shareholder. 
In emerging markets, Claessens et al. (2000) find a positive relation between cash flow 
rights of controlling shareholders and firm value in East Asian economies. Studies 
conducted by Claessens and Djankov (1999) on the Czech Republic and Claessens et al. 
(1998a, 1999) on East Asia have confirmed the positive relation between the firm’s 
performance and the highly concentrated ownership in these emerging economies. 
Furthermore, by studying 18 emerging markets with poor shareholder protection, Lins 
(2003) argues that large shareholders can act as “a partial substitute for missing 
institutional governance mechanisms.” 
Controlling shareholders’ incentive to engage in value-increasing activities can be 
affected by different factors. From a dynamic perspective, as the cash flow rights of 
controlling shareholders increase, the cost for controlling shareholders to expropriate 
minority shareholders goes up. Durnev and Kim (2005) think both the incentive 
alignment effect and the marginal cost of tunneling increases as ownership becomes more 
concentrated, so that controlling shareholders have more incentive to improve firm value. 
Faure-Grimaud and Gromb (2004) suggest that in a stock market with high liquidity 
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stock prices can effectively reflect efforts information of large shareholders’ activities so 
that the incentive of large shareholders to carry out value-increasing activities increases. 
Bloch and Hege (2001) use a control contest model to show how the competition between 
multiple large shareholders in a firm will reduce the private benefits of control.  
Entrenchment Effect of Controlling Shareholders 
The entrenchment effect of a controlling shareholder means that with significant control 
of the firm the controlling shareholder can expropriate minority shareholders to pursue 
private benefits (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Claessens et al., 2000). The recent corporate 
governance literature shows that the current central agency problem in corporate 
governance across the world is how to restrict the expropriation of minority shareholders 
by controlling shareholders (La Porta et al. 1999). 
Johnson et al. (2000) use the word “tunneling” to describe the situation where a 
controlling shareholder carries out legal and illegal activities to undercoverly transfer 
resources out of the PLC to other firms it controls. Empirical studies (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997; La Porta et al., 1997, 1999, 2000; Bertrand et al., 2002) found controlling 
shareholders may negatively affect a firm’s performance through “tunneling” activities, 
including managing firm’s earnings to steal profits, transferring assets and making 
transactions at non-market prices to the related companies, irregular loan guarantees, 
excessive executive compensation, and divert investment opportunities to related 
companies where they have higher cash flow control. In order to continue tunneling the 
firm value, controlling shareholders have incentives to manage the firm’s earning to 
conceal the negative effects of their tunneling on the firm. Chaney and Lewis (1995) 
show how earning management and management of accounting information disclosure 
influence market assessment of firm value. Faccio et al. (2001) suggest controlling 
shareholders can expropriate outside shareholders by issuing lower dividends. Shleifer 
and Wolfenzon (2002) develop a theoretical model of tunneling, find that under plausible 
assumptions there is a positive relation between investors’ protection and firm value. But 
there is a negative relation between investor protection and the diversion of profits 
(private profits control through tunneling actions). The results their model predicted are 
consistent with existing empirical findings (Zingales, 1994; La Porta et al., 1997, 1999, 
2002; Claessens et al., 2000, 2002). 
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Controlling shareholders are more likely to be motivated to tunnel when their voting 
rights (control) far exceed their cash flow rights (ownership) under the ownership 
structure of pyramids and cross shareholding of related companies (Claessens et al., 2000; 
Bertrand et al., 2002). Morck and Nakamura (1999) find tunneling is more likely to take 
place in firms that controlling shareholders directly manage. Claessens et al. (2000) find 
that more than two thirds of firms in East Asia are controlled by a single shareholder who 
is usually closely related to the firm’s management. They find pyramid and cross-holding 
ownership structures are commonly used in all East Asia countries to separate cash flow 
rights and voting rights, and provide more opportunities for the controlling shareholder to 
tunnel profits to another related firm where it holds higher cash flow rights.  
Dynamic Dominance between the Two Effects 
La Porta et al. (1999), Claessens et al. (2000) and Lemmon and Lins (2003) collectively 
find a negative relation between firm value and the ratio of voting rights to cash flow 
rights. It is the case that in order to obtain voting rights, a controlling shareholder has to 
own cash flow rights in the firm. The positive relation between firm value and cash flow 
rights indicates that the incentive alignment effect of controlling shareholders mainly lies 
in their cash flow rights. When making the decision of whether to pursue private benefits, 
controlling shareholders have to take into account the benefit (cash flow rights) forgone 
due to their non-value-maximization activities. Therefore, as the discrepancies between 
voting rights and cash flow rights, measured by their ratio, become larger, controlling 
shareholders become more entrenched and their capability and incentive to carry out 
tunneling activities to expropriate other shareholders increase. As such, the dynamic 
discrepancies between controlling shareholder’s ownership (cash flow rights) and control 
(voting rights) will determine the dynamic dominance between the incentive alignment 
effect and the entrenchment effect of controlling shareholders, which will further 
determine the ultimate role of the controlling shareholder in corporate governance.  
2.4 Tunneling by Controlling Shareholders 
The previous subsection has illustrated the entrenchment effect of controlling 
shareholders negatively affect firm value through different tunneling activities. In this 
30 
subsection, we first further define tunneling by controlling shareholders and then 
summarize the methods empirical studies used to measure the private benefits of control. 
Finally we specifically review various types of tunneling activities around the world, 
especially in China.  
2.4.1 Definition of Tunneling  
Originally, the term tunneling was first employed to describe controlling shareholders’ 
activities of removing assets from PLCs, through undercover ways, in the Czech 
Republic during the 1990s. Johnson et al. (2000) use the word “tunneling” to name the 
situation that controlling shareholders expropriate other shareholders through different 
legal and illegal activities to consolidate their controlling status and undercover 
transferring resources out of PLCs to other firms they control. Johnson et al. (2000) 
believe through these tunneling activities controlling shareholders can obtain more 
private benefits than they are entitled to according to their cash flow rights. 
According to Johnson et al. (2000), there are two forms of tunneling: transfer resources 
out of the firm through self-dealing, and financial transactions that discriminate against 
minority shareholders. Self-dealing includes not only illegal activities, such as outright 
theft and fraud (like earning management), but also other seemingly legal activities, such 
as transferring assets and making transactions at non-market prices to the related 
companies, irregular loan guarantees, excessive executive compensation, and divert 
investment opportunities to related companies where they have higher cash flow control. 
Alternatively, without transferring any assets out of the firm, the controlling shareholder 
can increase his ownership and control of the firm by financial transactions that 
discriminate against minority shareholders, such as issuing new shares to dilute other 
shareholders’ equity, insider trading, and creeping acquisitions.  
It is noted that tunneling can take place not only in countries with poor shareholder 
protection, but also happen in developed economies with advanced common law and civil 
law legal systems (Johnson et al., 2000). The nature of tunneling activities is tools 
(methods) that controlling shareholders used to gain private benefits of control through 
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expropriating other shareholders. In other words, tunneling itself does not create any 
value, but undercover transfers resources to controller shareholders.  
2.4.2 Motivation of Tunneling: Private Benefits of Control  
It is rather difficult to directly observe and quantify the so called private benefits of 
control that can be obtained by a controlling shareholder but are not shared by other 
shareholders (Grossman and Hart, 1980; Dyck and Zingales, 2004). This explains why 
the expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling shareholders is a universal 
agency problem under different legal systems around the world. There are two methods 
empirical studies usually use that indirectly measure the expropriation of minority 
shareholders: block shares trade premiums (Bradley, 1980; Bradley et al., 1983) and 
voting premiums (Lease, 1984).  
First, the method of block shares trade premium was pioneered by Bradley (1980) and 
Barclay and Holderness (1989). Bradley (1980) analyzed 161 successful tender offers in 
the U.S. corporate control market and found bidding firms paid an average premium of 
13% for the shares they purchased. Bradley (1980) thus argues this premium was not 
generated by cash flow rights of the target firm, but the control rights of it. Barclay and 
Holderness (1989) studied 63 privately negotiated interfirm trades of block shares 
between 1978 and 1982 in the U.S., and advocated using block trade premiums, the 
difference between the price per share paid by the acquiring party and the price per share 
prevailing on the market, to measure the private benefits the controlling shareholder can 
obtain. 
Logically, trading of control block shares usually results in the transference of the 
underlying firm’s control from the current controlling shareholder to the acquirer. It is a 
stylized fact that after the announcement of the acquisition the firm’s stock price will go 
up thanks to the market’s expectation of management and production reconstruction, and 
new technology introduction. This increase in the stock price reflects the public benefits 
the acquisition brought to all shareholders of the target firm before the acquisition 
actually takes place. As a result, when the acquirer eventually becomes the controlling 
shareholder of the firm, his benefits of this acquisition are actually squeezed. Therefore, 
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the acquirer takes account of this factor and quotes a higher acquiring price per share than 
the expected prevailing stock price after the announcement of the acquisition so as to 
obtain private benefits, which are reflected in the difference between these two prices. 
Dyck and Zingales (2004) study 412 control transactions in 39 countries between 1999 
and 2000 and find on average the trading price of block shares is 14% higher than the 
stock price after the announcement of the acquisition, and the value of control ranges 
from -4% of firm value (Japan) to 65% of firm value (Brazil). Hanouna, Sarin, and 
Shapiro (2001) examine 9566 acquisitions between 1986 and 2000 in seven western 
economies and find the trading price of a control block is on average 18% higher than 
that when a small number of shares are traded.  
Second, for firms with multiple-class shares Lease et al. (1983, 1984) propose voting 
premiums between prices of shares with different voting rights as a measure of the 
market value of control. Traditional corporate finance theory suggests under a one share-
one vote corporate structure, shares with the same residual claiming rights should have 
the same price. Thus, a price difference in shares with the same residual claim rights but 
with differential voting rights reflects the market value of voting rights, which is linked to 
the extraction of private benefits by a controlling shareholder (Zingales, 1994). Empirical 
studies on vote value have been carried out across the world with different samples for 
Canada (Smith and Amoako, 1995), UK (Megginson, 1990), Italy (Zingales, 1994), US 
(Lease et al., 1983; Zingales, 1995), South Korea (Chung and Kim, 1999), Sweden 
(Rydqvist, 1996). These studies confirm the existence of voting rights’ value in that they 
collectively found that shares with higher voting rights have higher prices than those 
shares with lower voting rights or without voting rights. Nenova (2003) examines 661 
firms issuing shares with differential voting rights in 18 countries and finds the market 
value of controlling block vote varies widely across countries in a range of voting value 
from zero (Denmark) to 50% of the firm value (Mexico). 
As we can see, the above two measurement methods of private benefits of control can 
only be applied under different conditions. The methods are not substitutes for each other. 
The method of block shares trade premium is suitable for firms with block trade of shares, 
whereas the voting premium method is for firms with multi-classes of shares with 
differential voting rights. Besides, although private benefits of control is a common 
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economic phenomenon that can happen in any firm with concentrated ownership, the 
contents (forms) of private benefits of control and methods (tunneling activities) 
controlling shareholders used to extract private benefits are rather different across 
countries. Both methods are originally used in developed markets where a developed 
equity market and a corporate control market are available. Thus it is difficult to claim 
that in underdeveloped stock markets of emerging markets the above mentioned two 
methods can be widely used to measure the expropriation of private benefits by 
controlling shareholders. 
2.4.3 Tunneling around the World 
From a legal perspective, investors are better protected in countries with common law 
systems than in countries with civil law systems, where concentrated corporate 
ownerships are more likely to be used as a substitute mechanism to poorer investor 
protection against managerial agency problems (La Porta et al., 1998, 1999). However, 
under a concentrated ownership, conflicts of interests between the controlling shareholder 
and other shareholders arise because of the private benefits of control. Controlling 
shareholders may extract private benefits through “tunneling” activities (Johnson et al., 
2000). As different complicated ultimate controlling structures are used by controlling 
shareholders, the interests conflicts become intensified as the proportion of private 
benefits of control in the whole benefits set of the controlling shareholder gets larger, 
thanks to the sharper separation between ownership and control under these structures 
(Claessens et al., 2002; Bertrand et al., 2002). Tunneling by controlling shareholders has 
become an ever-increasingly focal agency problem across the world (La Porta et al., 
1999). 
Some studies examine the determinants of tunneling. A low level of investor protection 
and a high relevant marginal tax rate might give corporate insiders more motivation to 
tunnel (La Porta et al. 2000; Thomsen, 2005). La Porta et al. (2000) also find that 
stronger minority investors pressure corporate insiders to make higher dividend pay-outs. 
Bertrand et al. (2002) and Claessens et al. (2002) confirm the sharp discrepancy between 
controlling shareholders’ voting rights and their lower cash flow rights results in 
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tunneling activities. Volpin (2002) reports firms with many large shareholders tend to 
have higher firm value than those with just one large shareholder, indicating the positive 
monitoring role played by non-controlling large shareholders. Further, Gutierrez and 
Tribo (2004) show the evidence that the presence of other large shareholders squeezes the 
private benefits of control of the controlling shareholder. 
Tunneling methods (channels) have been another subtopic where mostly the relation 
between tunneling and firm value is examined. Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Bebchuk et al. 
(1999), Wolfenzon (1999) and Claessens et al. (2000) collectively show the expropriation 
of minority shareholders is more likely to take place by means of “intra-group transfers of 
assets and control stakes” in firms affiliated to a business group that is normally 
controlled by a controlling shareholder. Bertrand et al. (2002) confirm controlling 
shareholders of Indian business groups use the associated transactions between members 
of business groups to tunnel resources out of listed companies. Chang (2002) and Joh 
(2003) provide evidence of tunneling through associated transactions in Korean market.  
Some researches show controlling shareholders might use dividends as a tunneling tool. 
La Porta et al. (2000) find that under a common law system where shareholders are better 
protected, firms tend to issue higher dividends, which reduce insiders discretionary 
spending. Faccio et al. (2001) discover controlling shareholders of firms in East Asia 
issue lower dividends than firms in Europe. Instead, they prefer to carry out investments 
to gain private benefits of control. They argue the large scale of debts generated in these 
inefficient investments caused the 1997-1999 East Asia financial crisis. Furthermore, in 
order to continuously tunnel firm value, controlling shareholders might carry out earning 
management to conceal any negative effects tunneling caused and the private benefits of 
control. Leuz et al. (2003) show earning management is more prevalent in countries with 
poor investor protection. Jian and Wong (2003) provide evidence that earning 
managements are more likely to take place in group-controlled firms in China. 
On the other hand, Friedman et al. (2003) argue that theoretically in order to keep the 
firm in business and avoid a dramatic stock price decline, the controlling shareholder 
might prop up the listed firm by injecting own funds and resources. In some 
circumstances, rescuing behaviors by controlling shareholders send a signal of 
confidence to the market, so that more outside investors might get involved in the 
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troubled firm. Therefore, although the propping up by controlling shareholders mitigates 
the deterioration of the firm, there is a possibility that controlling shareholders benefit 
from increasing stock prices and the interests of minority shareholders are to be further 
expropriated. 
2.4.4 Tunneling in China 
It is believed that tunneling are more prevalent in emerging markets due to the lack of 
effective corporate governance mechanisms or strong legal protection of minority 
shareholders (Claessens et al., 2000). These emerging market economies are normally 
characterized by concentrated ownership structures, inactive external takeover markets, 
non-independent boards and low transparency and poor quality information disclosure. 
Johnson et al. (2000) argue the main reason for the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis is 
tunneling by controlling shareholders in these countries.  
Recent studies in corporate governance focus on expropriation of minority shareholders 
in China. Tang and Jiang (2002) find the expropriation of minority shareholders in 
China’s stock market is more severe than developed economies. Lee and Xiao (2002) and 
Qiao and Zhou (2003) respectively provide evidence of tunneling through earning 
management by controlling shareholders in China’s PLCs. Su and Zhu (2003) show that 
firms under the control of family business groups use the separation between voting 
rights and cash flow rights to expropriate other shareholders. Due to the tradability 
constraints, controlling shareholders might forgo profitable investments and issue high 
dividends to get cash flow in short period of time (Liu and He, 2005; Liu et al., 2004; 
Xiao, 2005). Li et al. (2004) argue that firms controlled by business group suffered more 
from the tunneling of funds extraction. Chen (2005) finds that although the number of 
associated transactions is negatively related to the proportions of independent directors 
on the board and the ownership of non-controlling large shareholders, the relations are 
not statistically significant. Qiu and Rao (2007) confirms the deterring role of 
independent directors and non-controlling shareholders against funds extraction from 
PLCs by controlling shareholders, and they also argue that PLCs located in areas with 
more effective law enforcement and less government interference suffer less from funds 
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extraction problem. Xiao Chen (2005) shows ownership concentration positively affects 
the scale of associated transactions. Yan Chen (2006) discovers positive relations between 
the separation between ownership and control and the scale of associated transaction and 
funds extraction by controlling shareholders. 
2.5 Determinants of Ownership Structure 
We have demonstrated the relation between firm value and corporate ownership 
(managerial ownership or ownership concentration). It still remains open whether there is 
an optimal arrangement of ownership structure in corporate governance. Bolton and von 
Thadden (1998) asserted, “the issue rather is how often and at what points in a company’s 
life ownership should be concentrated.” Some empirical studies (Himmelberg et al., 1999) 
argue it is due to unobservable heterogeneity of companies and potential endogeneity of 
ownership that the ambiguity of ownership structure on company performance is often 
empirically found. Specifically, these unobservable characteristics of companies affect 
both ownership structure and company performance. Omission of them may give rise to a 
spurious relation between ownership structure and company performance.  
Demsetz (1983) and Demsetz and Lehn (1985) regard ownership structure as 
endogenously determined. This strand of the literature on endogenous ownership 
(Demsetz, 1983; Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Himmelberg et al., 1999; Demsetz and 
Villalonga, 2001) tends to conclude that different companies can only identify their own 
optimal ownership structure by taking account of a company’s own characteristics, such 
as company size, the pressure of the competition and degree of regulation in the given 
industry, the marginal benefit of improving monitoring system of the company, and the 
uncertainty the company faces.  
As far as transition economies are concerned, researches on the endogeneity of 
ownership structure are especially important because these countries have experienced 
different reform policies and have been characterized by ownership transformations, 
company restructuring since the mid 1990s. The focal question is how to form an optimal 
ownership structure that provides effective monitoring mechanisms against agency 
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problems. Some researchers (Filatotchev et al., 2001) maintain that in transition 
economies, ownership structure might be an equilibrium outcome of different company-
specific factors, such as size, location, past performance, industry, development of the 
capital market, and political and economic environments. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) find 
an inverse U-shaped relation between ownership concentration and company size. 
Dunning and Lundan (1998) add that industry affiliation affects the direction of FDI, and 
knowledge intensive and high tech companies are most attractive industries to FDI. The 
results of Dyck (2000) indicate that investment opportunities play an important role in 
attracting outside investors. Aukutsionek et al. (1998), Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) 
point out that when it comes to privatization companies with better past performances are 
preferred by outsider investors. Consequently, when causality between ownership 
structure and company characteristics is being studied, panel data is preferred to cross-
section data as it provides a time series dimension of companies.  
Informational asymmetries have been regarded as another factor. Large and export-
oriented companies have the competitive advantage of having more transparent 
information and being more integrated into international business markets. These 
advantages will lower the transaction costs for the outside investors so that investment 
decisions are easier to make. Additionally, a company’s location also matters. For 
example, companies in coastal areas have more opportunities to communicate with 
prospective investors. 
On the other hand, the company itself might face much asymmetric information because 
of the underdeveloped capital market and its product market uncertainty. It is well 
accepted that underdeveloped emerging markets are usually characterized by high 
ownership concentration. However, as we mentioned before, it is due to the lack of 
effective protection of minority investors in transition economies that controlling 
shareholders can more easily obtain their private benefits by expropriation behaviors 
(tunneling) than in advanced economies. Some researchers even argue that the potential 
for obtaining different levels of private benefits might determine the optimal ownership 
structure (Grossman and Hart, 1988; Harris and Raviv, 1988). To put it another way, large 
outside investors will make investment decisions by estimating how much private benefit 
they can obtain by controlling the company. 
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2.6 Conclusion 
In the previous chapter, we state that the research question of this thesis is to discover 
the role of ownership structure in corporate governance of China. In this chapter, we 
review empirical studies of the relation between firm value and corporate ownership. 
Traditional agency problems arise because of the existence of interests conflicts between 
managers and shareholders. This problem is mitigated by using managerial shareholding 
as an incentive tool and the presence of large shareholders solves the free-riding problem 
between shareholders under a dispersed ownership. Nevertheless, due to the 
pervasiveness of concentrated ownership, the expropriation of minority investors by 
controlling shareholders has become the main agency problem in corporate governance 
around the world. Theoretically and empirically it is proved to be the case that private 
benefits of control generated in the separation between ownership and control motivate 
the tunneling behavior of controlling shareholders. Accordingly, various types of complex 
ultimate controlling structures and tunneling methods are used by controlling 
shareholders to tunnel private benefits.  
We particularly concentrated on reviewing empirical studies on managerial ownership 
and tunneling by controlling shareholders in China. Similar to researches on other 
markets, there is no conclusive result found on the relation between managerial 
ownership and firm value. Due to the limitation of the estimation methods used, most 
studies on the tunneling behavior of controlling shareholders fail to take account of the 
endogeneity of ownership structure and only reach preliminary results. There is a lack of 
empirical evidence taking firm-specific effects into account.  
In the next chapter, we will explain the institutional background of corporate 
governance in China, in the course of examining the problems of China’s stock markets, 





China’s stock markets were established to help state-owned enterprises raise capital and 
improve firm performance and value. The partial privatized economic environment and 
socialism ideology render a complicated ownership structure with different identities of 
shareholders and highly concentrated ownership and control. The spin-off formation of 
PLCs results in the strong incentive for controlling shareholders to pursue private benefits 
of control. In the absence of strong shareholder protection, agency cost caused by 
tunneling of controlling shareholders has been the main obstacle blocking the 
development of China’s capital market.  
Institutional background, such as the prevailing corporate governance system, political 
environment, and the legal system, is a crucial factor for us to understand controlling 
shareholder’s tunneling behavior. China is experiencing the transition from ex command 
economy to market economy, and its bottom-upwards gradual privatization and the 
involvement of governments have produced a unique corporate governance environment, 
under which tunneling of controlling shareholders are worthwhile studying.  
This chapter is organized as follows. In the second section, we first produce background 
review of China’s stock markets and PLCs’ ownership structure. The following section 
introduces the pervasiveness and forms of tunneling by controlling shareholders and then 
analyzes the institutional reasons for tunneling.  In the fourth section, we focus on the 
main tunneling form, funds extraction by controlling shareholders. We then explored the 
accounting measurement of funds extraction through loans, and a case study is provided 
at the end of the section. Finally, the fifth section concludes the chapter. 
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3.2 Stock Markets in China 
3.2.1 The Establishment and Development of Stock Markets 
China started its reform at the end of the 1970s. As the reform proceeded to the 
transition from a central command economy to a market economy from the early 1990s, 
problems of low efficiency, over-staffing, and low profitability of SOEs (state-owned 
enterprises) became urgent. With more and more non-performing debt, China’s banking 
system struggled to financially support SOEs. As a result, the Chinese government 
founded the Shanghai Securities Exchange (SHSE) in December 1990 and the Shenzhen 
Securities Exchange (SZSE) in July 1991 so as to help SOEs raise money from the 
market. In terms of regulations and legislation, there is no fundamental difference 
between these two exchanges and both are supervised by the Chinese Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC). Between 1992 and 1998, the number of PLCs had 
grown by more than 60% annually.  By the end of 2005 there were 1452 companies listed 
on the two exchanges and China’s stock markets have become the eighth largest in the 
world with market capitalization of more than US$ 500 billion.  
3.2.2 Concentrated Ownership Structure of PLCs 
According to the Chinese official shareholding classification, there are five types of 
shareholders in the market: the state; legal persons; employees; owners of public tradable 
A shares, and owners of B and H shares not for domestic issue (foreign companies or 
individuals). This complicated classification of shareholders in this share issuing 
privatization process (SIP) reflects the partial privatization economic environment 
resulting from the bottom-upwards gradual privatization in China.  The state, legal 
persons, and tradable A share owners are the three main shareholders, accounting for 46%, 
18% and 25% of total shares respectively in 2001 (Liu and Sun, 2005). Notably, because 
of socialism ideology, shares held by the state are predominant in the market and shares 
held by both the state and legal person owners are non-tradable shares. In other words, 
shares held by state and legal persons are not allowed to be traded in the public stock 
market, but can only be transferred at negotiated prices with permission from relevant 
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authorities. As a whole, two thirds of PLCs’ total shares are non-tradable.  As a result, 
the artificial division of shares in tradability results in a highly concentrated and 
persistent ownership structure in China. The five largest shareholders account for 60.6% 
of equity, compared with 25.4% in the United States and 33.1% in Japan. On average, the 
largest shareholder holds more than 40% of the equity in China.  
3.2.3 Ultimate Controlling Shareholder 
Although there are five types of shareholders, from the ultimate controlling shareholders 
perspective, the state predominantly controls over 80% of PLCs in the market and its 
ultimate control of PLCs are achieved mainly by pyramid shareholding (Liu and Sun, 
2005). Specifically, the state directly controls some PLCs through government 
departments, such as the state assets management bureaus, and indirectly controls some 
PLCs through state agencies including state-controlled corporations, state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs), and state assets investment and management institutions. Among the 
assets of these state agencies, SOEs are the major source of PLCs’ controlling 
shareholders. In 2001, nearly 60% of PLCs in China’s market were directly controlled by 
SOEs. This can be explained by the fact that many SOEs spin off their profitable assets to 
form PLCs so as to raise capital. SOEs left with non-profitable assets and over manning 
serve as controlling shareholders of these PLCs. 
3.3 Tunneling by Controlling Shareholders in China 
3.3.1 The Pervasiveness and Consequences of Tunneling  
In the absence of strong protection of minority shareholders, the highly concentrated 
ownership in China’s stock market is plagued with expropriation of minority shareholders 
by controlling shareholders alongside other problems such as high volatility, high 
speculation, and low information transparency. There are three forms of tunneling 
controlling shareholders carried out to expropriate minority shareholders: funds 
extraction from PLCs through irregular corporate loans, associated transactions on non­
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market prices, and irregular associated guarantees.  
Specifically, the spin-off formation of PLCs determines their close relations with their 
controlling shareholders. It is a rather common scenario: controlling shareholders directly 
“borrow” funds from PLCs and use them for a long time as free loans, delaying 
repayment when requested. Many SOE controlling shareholders of PLCs do not even 
have operational assets to make profits to keep their over-staffed organizations in 
operation, so they can only manage to do so by using PLC loans. Controlling 
shareholders can also tunnel resources out of PLCs through buying from PLCs at lower­
than-market prices and selling to PLCs at higher-than-market prices. Noticeably, in order 
to prevent the PLC from being delisted or get new shares issuing rights, without injecting 
actual funds into the PLC, sometimes the controlling shareholder buys from the PLC at 
higher-than-market prices, and sells to the PLC at lower-than-market prices. Besides, 
PLCs sometimes make loan guarantees for controlling shareholders and their associated 
parties, so that PLCs will have to bear the financial risk and even pay the loan themselves 
once the actual borrowers cannot pay back the loan. 
In practice, the latter two forms of tunneling often eventually result in the situation that 
controlling shareholders owe money to PLCs and the possibility to pay back this loans 
become slimmer as time goes. As such, it has been widely believed that corporate loans 
between controlling shareholders and PLCs is the main channel for controlling 
shareholders to tunnel resources out of PLCs in China’s stock market. 
The detrimental consequences of tunneling by controlling shareholders have become 
increasingly obvious. Tunneling has been regarded as one of the fundamental reasons for 
highly volatile stock prices. Tunneling impairs investors’ ability to make rational 
decisions so that speculation dominates the market. As a whole, an epidemic of tunneling 
in China had profoundly negative impacts on the investors’ confidence and the credibility 
of the stock market. PLCs suffering from tunneling witness a loss of investment 
opportunities and a loss of sustainable development capacity, which will have a 
disastrous influence on their growth prospects. In order to escape from being delisted, 
controlling shareholders manipulate PLCs’ profits and earning to conceal these negative 
effects their tunneling caused to PLCs. In some of the worst cases the PLCs involved 
have had to be delisted because they could not recover and so manage to make profits in 
43 
the three years after tunneling took place.  
3.3.2 Reasons for Tunneling in China 
The artificial division of shares by tradability, as a result of China’s partial share issue 
privatization, is widely believed as the fundamental reason why the expropriation of 
minority shareholders is so pervasive in China’s stock markets. First, it gives rise to a 
highly concentrated and persistent ownership and control structure within PLCs (Liu, 
2005). The illiquidity of large shareholder’s equity consolidates the controlling 
shareholder’s controlling status since it creates institutional barriers for both internal take 
over by other large shareholder’s and the external take-over market. As a result, the 
controlling shareholders become more entrenched and enjoy a higher degree of control 
than their actual ownership. On the other hand, atomistic shareholders have the right to 
trade their shares in the market. But because there are almost no representatives for 
minority shareholders in any PLC’s board, in practice they cannot effectively gain enough 
power to vote down the controlling shareholders’ non-profit-maximizing decisions, and 
so protect themselves. In addition, the institutional division in tradability heightens 
interest conflicts between large shareholders and atomistic shareholders. The market 
value of minority shareholders’ equity will increase as firm value increase, whereas large 
shareholders’ equity can only increase through an increase of net assets of the PLC, since 
prices of equity transference are based on the net assets of the PLC. Different objectives 
between large shareholders and minority shareholders make it more difficult to align 
large shareholders’ interests to maximizing firm value.  
The second reason for the epidemic of tunneling in China reflects the formation of PLCs.  
Most PLCs were formed from profitable assets that were spun off from their previously 
SOE owner, whereas SOEs retain the rest of the necessarily worse quality and non­
operating assets to form holding companies as the controlling shareholders of these PLCs. 
The assets left with SOEs are normally characterized by their non-profitability, over­
staffing and hence overlarge social obligations, and even high liabilities. Besides, it is the 
case that dividends are quite low in China, and these SOE controlling shareholders cannot 
obtain funds by liquidating their shares thanks to the tradability constraints. Consequently, 
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when controlling shareholders badly need funds to maintain their operation, they quite 
commonly turn to the expropriation of minority shareholders of PLCs by carrying out 
different tunneling activities. On the other hand, PLCs might have to depend on their 
former SOE owner. Although PLCs are legally independent entities in the market, the 
spin-off formation of PLCs mostly generate incomplete asset structures, so that the daily 
operations of these PLCs have to rely on associated transactions to obtain production 
materials or sell products. As a result, these transactions between PLCs and their 
controlling shareholders and their associated companies give rise to many opportunities 
for controlling shareholders to tunnel resources out of PLCs. Cheung et al. (2005) 
examine associated transactions between China’s PLCs and their controlling shareholders, 
and find associated transactions will cause more damage to firm value and interests of 
minority shareholders when the controlling shareholder is state-owned.  
The third reason comes from ideological factors. As a legacy of the ex-central command 
economy, apart from generating profits, Chinese SOEs have to assume social obligations, 
such as reducing unemployment and keeping social stability. Under “administrative 
governance” from local governments, fulfillment of these obligations has always been 
one of the indispensible performance indicators of SOEs’ top managers, whose 
appointment can effectively be affected by the central or local governments. Chen et al. 
(2004) report that almost half of directors in their sample are appointed by state 
controlled owners and one third of directors are affiliated to different levels of 
government agencies. They also conclude that politically connected CEOs tend to focus 
on the fulfillment of their political aims, instead of improving firm value. However, as the 
transition towards a market economy proceeds, these social obligations have severely 
hampered the efficiency and profitability of SOEs. The contradiction between firm 
performance and fulfillment of social obligations becomes especially intensified for those 
SOEs that spin off good assets to form PLCs. With non-profitable assets, these SOEs 
struggle to generate profits and raise money from banks. In order to fulfill social 
obligations to secure their future promotion, managers of these SOEs and even some 
officials of local governments tend to “justify” their behavior of tunneling funds from 
PLCs by regarding it as “politically” correct.  Many managers even still think of PLCs as 
subsidiaries of SOEs, instead of companies jointly owned by the public and large 
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shareholders. In many cases, these managers tend to give state assets superior status to 
private assets. Actually, as a socialist country with an underdeveloped social safety net, 
China is facing a dilemma between getting its PLCs on the right development track and 
maintaining social stability by avoiding too much unemployment. 
Political factors are the fourth reason. The majority of PLCs listed in China are under 
the control of their former SOE owners, which in turn are ultimately controlled by the 
central government or local governments. Table 3.1 below shows the distribution of 
ultimate controllers of China’s PLCs between 2001 and 2003. As we can see, the central 
government controls 23% of PLCs, whereas over half (53%) of PLCs are ultimately 
under the control of local governments. Different levels of governments are all facing 
multiple targets. From the central government perspective, although the SOEs it controls 
might irregularly extract funds from PLCs, its ultimate target is to keep a balance 
between the sustainable development of the capital market and reduction of 
unemployment and salary and pension arrears in SOEs. Besides, the protection of 
minority shareholders is also crucial to China’s social stability because the public have 
been heavily involved in the stock market since it was established (Liu, 2005). However, 
the target set by the local governments might not be the same as that for the central 
government. Under a one-party political system, local governments in China are normally 
competing with peers at the same level, and officials in such a system really must show 
outstanding political performance in order to get rapid promotion. Given the fact that the 
political performance of local governments is primarily based on the survival of the large 
SOEs in their jurisdiction, local officials might sometimes disregard the interests of 
minority shareholders of PLCs by providing inactive supervision on tunneling. In order to 
meet some regulations stipulated by the central government, some local government 
agencies even actively facilitate local listed firms to conduct earning management 
through favorable asset-related transfers (Chen et al., 2003).   
Actually, local governments are normally reluctant to severely penalize a SOE that is 
involved in tunneling. In China’s unique political system, local courts are controlled by 
local governments since the judge is elected by the local people’s congress, and the local 
court is supervised by the local people’s congress. This institutional arrangement results 
in a lack of effective enforcement at local levels in the law system. It is quite rare for the 
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central government to penalize officials of local governments for their inactivity on such 
occasions, unless concrete evidence of corruption is found.  
Table 3.1 Ultimate controllers of China’s PLCs between 2001 and 2003 
Ultimate Controller Number of PLCs Proportion  
Non-government 540 21% 
Central government 577 23% 
Local governments 1426 56% 
Data Source: the table is extracted from Xia Li-jun and FangYi-qiang (2005), “Government 
Control, Institutional Environment and Firm Value: Evidence from the Chinese Securities 
Market”, Journal of Economic Research, 5. 
Last but not the least, the low legal penalty for tunneling is another crucial reason why 
tunneling is pervasive in China. First, other large shareholders and minority shareholders 
play rather limited roles in deterring controlling shareholders’ tunneling behavior. The 
tradability constraint inevitably generates conflicts of interest between other large 
shareholders and minority shareholders. So far due to the limitations in civil law and to a 
lack of punishment spectrum in current securities laws, minority shareholders cannot take 
either the PLC or its controlling shareholder to court. MacNeil (2002) maintains that 
China’s courts traditionally tend to protect State interests and lack experience to deal with 
private plaintiff-driven litigations. The first case of such litigation accepted by courts in 
China dates from July 8th 2004 when a minority shareholder of Lianhuaweijing (PLC 
stock code: 600186) took the controlling shareholder, Lianhuaweijing Group, to the local 
court to protest the latter’s extraction of the PLC’s funds. This weak internal and external 
monitoring increases controlling shareholders’ incentives to carry out tunneling through 
various channels. Second, generally speaking, regulations CSRC launched to deter large 
shareholders’ tunneling are not practically enforceable since most of these regulations and 
notices are qualitative and lack specified quantitative criteria. Pistor and Xu (2005) note 
that both private and public enforcement of investor rights and contractual disputes are 
extremely weak in China. Third, few regulations or laws specifically directly constrain 
controlling shareholders and their managers involved in tunneling. It should be noted that 
CSRC does not have the legal right to directly investigate PLCs’ bank accounts, let alone 
investigate PLCs’ controlling shareholders’ bank accounts. Even if controlling 
shareholders of PLCs are caught breaking regulations, some penalties, such as 
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rectification within a certain amount of time, internal censure, public censure, or 
restriction on issuing new shares, are normally applied to the PLCs, instead of their 
controlling shareholders. Even if courts identify tunneling problems, the poor quality and 
non-operating assets retained by SOEs impair their ability to fulfill court decisions. Liu 
(2005) argues some government regulations that are asymmetrically in favor of SOEs 
give rise to many problems in China’s stock markets. Fourth, in China the supervision of 
auditing and accounting firms so weak that transparency in the market is extremely low. 
By studying China’s PLCs annual reports between 1999 and 2001, Liu and Zhou (2005) 
find no correlation between employment of high quality auditing firms (Big Five audit 
firms) and the quality of these reports. Allen et al. (2004) suggest overall weak auditing 
in China hampers the growth of listed firms. Furthermore, Defond et al. (1999) find when 
more rigorous auditing standard are newly launched, PLCs might change their auditors 
from high quality to low quality ones so as to avoid negative comments in their annual 
reports. Given the fact that business opportunities with PLCs are quite valuable in a fierce 
competition environment, and there is no particular law or regulations clearly stipulating 
their legal responsibilities regarding auditing tunneling, auditing and accounting firms are 
more likely to please their existing PLC customers or inactively implement their 
supervision. As tunneling methods have become increasingly concealed, the market and 
the authorities have to rely on precise accounting and auditing information.   
So, a complete solution to tunneling problems by controlling shareholders requires 
systematic transformations in institutional barriers, ownership structure, and the legal 
system. The high occurrence and persistence of tunneling in China suggests this is a time-
consuming process. After all, it is not only about finding China’s own “optimal” 
ownership structure for PLCs, but also working out an effective system against such 
behavior throughout the whole economy.  
3.4 Funds Extraction by Controlling Shareholders 
3.4.1 Pervasiveness of Funds Extraction 
According to the Notice of CSRC and the SASAC (State-owned Assets Supervision and 
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Administration Commission) of the State Council “Concerning Some Issues on 
Regulating the Funds between Listed Companies and Associated Parties and Listed 
Companies’ Provision of Guaranty to Other Parties”, in China funds extraction by 
controlling shareholders is the most widely used tunneling method to transfer assets and 
profits out of PLCs. According to relevant regulations by CSRC, the extraction of PLC’s 
funds by controlling shareholders includes the controlling shareholder “borrows” PLC’s 
funds, the controlling shareholder makes the PLC entrust its funds to it for future 
investment, the PLC repays loans for its controlling shareholder, the PLC produces non-
transaction-involved commercial acceptance to its controlling shareholder, the PLC pays 
staff salary, welfare and insurance, and advertisement fees for the controlling shareholder, 
and the controlling shareholder gets loans from banks by using loan guarantees provided 
by the PLC. 
From a legal perspective, these expropriation of PLC’s funds are wrongdoings of 
controlling shareholders. Although CSRC launched regulations and notices against 
controlling shareholders’ funds extraction from PLCs through irregular corporate loans, 
such supervisions are normally “in principle” and lack quantitatively enforceable criteria. 
The newly revised Company Law, Securities Law and Criminal Law in 2005 added terms 
regarding the expropriation of shareholders and stipulate that any expropriation of 
shareholders by controlling shareholders or managers should be prohibited and 
compensation must be made according to the loss it causes. But the scope of the loss 
caused by the expropriation remains unclear. Duan Yalin (2001) and Xiong Zhewen 
(2006) have found that funds extracted by controlling shareholders are reaching almost 
epidemic proportions.  
Table 3.2 below illustrates how fast this problem has grown between 2002 and 2005. As 
we can see, each year large numbers of funds were extracted to controlling shareholders’ 
hands. The proportion of PLCs suffering from fund extraction by controlling shareholders 
has been large throughout these years, and even almost reached 60% in 2002. Noticeably, 
this proportion fell remarkably from almost 50% to less than 30% in 2004 and 2005 
thanks to the increasingly strict supervision. But the level of funds extracted, as shown in 
the last column, did not reduce dramatically, and they still accounted for a high 
proportion of total capital raised each year in China’s stock market. Take 2002 as an 
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example. Around 96.7 billion of RMB has been extracted from PLCs and used by their 
controlling shareholders and it almost equals the total amount of new capital raised in the 
stock market that year (RMB 96.175 billion). 
Table 3.2 Funds Extraction of China’s PLCs 
Year Problematic PLCs / Total number 
of PLCs Listed in the year 
Funds Extracted 
(billion of RMB) 
2002 57.53% ( 676/1175) 96.7 
2003 49.44% (623/1260) 57.7 
2004 29.41% (405 / 1377) 50.9 
2005 27.67% (396/1431) 45.6 
Data source: Information is extracted from China’s Security and Bond Market Research 
Database (2005), GTA. 
3.4.2 A Case of Fund Extraction by Controlling Shareholders 
Case Background   
We take Lianhuaweijing (stock code: 600186) as an example (source: 
www.business.sohu.com 20 May, 2005). Lianhuaweijing is a renowned state-owned 
enterprise in China’s glutamate industry and was the second largest glutamate provider in 
the world. Its annual production capacity reaches 300 thousand tons of glutamate and it 
controls 40% of the domestic market. Soon after Lianhuaweijing was listed in 1998, 
Lianhuaweijing Group, which controls over 50% shares of the PLC, started to make long-
term free use of the PLC’s funds. At the beginning of 2003 the funds used by the 
controlling shareholder was RMB 224 million. Despite a notice of rectification within a 
certain amount of time received in August from CSRC, funds extracted by the controlling 
shareholder still rocketed to RMB 698 million at the end of 2003. The number further 
increased by RMB 251 million in the first quarter of 2004, reaching RMB 949 million. 
The quarterly report of Lianhuaweijing showed that up to the end of Sep 2004, the funds 
extracted by its controlling shareholder had reached RMB 1001 million.  Consequently, 
due to lack of investment funds and operating capital, the fixed cost of unit glutamate 
increases, which dramatically squeezes profits of the core business, and staff salaries and 
pensions were also severely in default. With soaring trade and non-trade receivables, the 
PLC started to run a deficit in 2003 and can only manage to operate with short-term loans 
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from banks. The situation continued for the first three quarters of 2004, and the loss 
reached RMB 71.61 million. At the end of 2004, it barely escaped the labeling of “ST” 
(special treatment) by CSRC thanks to its fairly low earnings of RMB 0.005 per share. 
Case Analysis 
Lianhuaweijing Group, as the controlling shareholder of Lianhuaweijing, has always 
held more than 50% of the PLC’s shares. Its control is further solidified by placing its 
directors, supervisors and managers in Lianhuaweijing. With majority voting rights and 
insider control, Lianghuaweijing Group becomes quite entrenched and extracts funds of 
RMB 1 billion through various means.   
We have already noted that according to the Notice of CSRC and the SASAC (State­
owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission) of the State Council 
“Concerning Some Issues on Regulating the Funds between Listed Companies and 
Associated Parties and Listed Companies”, controlling shareholders must not expropriate 
other shareholders of PLCs. The revised Company Law, Security Law, and Criminal Law 
have stipulated that compensation must be made according to the size of the 
expropriation. Thus the loan of RMB 1 billion should be required to be paid back by 
Lianhuaweijing Group within a specified time. But these laws should have taken indirect 
detrimental consequences of this expropriation into account as well. Additionally, 
minority shareholders should be given legal rights to litigate the controlling shareholder 
once they reckon it is necessary.  
To mitigate these tunneling by controlling shareholders, it is also necessary to enhance 
the internal monitoring forces. First, there should not be overlapping personnel 
arrangement between the PLC and the controlling shareholder. Second, independent 
directors should be appointed independently of controlling shareholders. At least, the 
interests of independent directors should not lie in the controlling shareholder’s hand. 
Third, other large shareholders, especially institutional ones, should be introduced into 
the ownership of the corporation. 
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3.4.3 Accounting Measurement of Funds Extraction  
According to accounting practice, there are two types of loans between controlling 
shareholders and PLCs: loans generated through ordinary transactions and loans 
generated through non-operational processes. The former type of loans is regular trade 
borrowings and recorded in PLC’s “Accounts Receivables” and “Advances to Suppliers”. 
It is rather difficult to tell if the loan is irregular unless detailed relevant transaction is 
disclosed. On the other hand, the latter type of loans is borrowings unrelated to ordinary 
trades and recorded in PLC’s “Other Receivables”. In the accounting standard, “Other 
Receivables” normally records non-operational receivables, such as compensation 
receivables, and prepaid deposits. Under normal circumstances, the balance of “Other 
Receivables” should not be large. In practice, however, many PLCs use this accounting 
item to record non-transaction-involved loans borrowed by their controlling shareholders. 
This might be because in the annual report it is only required to disclose “Other 
Receivables” balances at the beginning and the end of the year. Given the loose 
supervision from independent directors and weak regulatory enforcement, “Other 
Receivables” has been increasing dramatically and become a major channel for 
controlling shareholders to carry out irregular borrowings, embezzlement and 
misappropriation of funds from PLCs. As such, “Other Receivables” more effectively 
reflects the funds extraction by controlling shareholders than “Accounts Receivables”. 
Table 3.3 below shows loans between PLCs and controlling shareholders between 2001 
and 2005. The loans generated in ordinary transactions between PLCs and controlling 
shareholders and the number of PLCs involved are relatively stable. Since 2002 the 
transaction-based loans controlling shareholders owe PLCs have gradually increased, 
even in 2003 when SOEs in China witnessed a fast growing period due to the market’s 
increasing demand for production materials. Whereas non-transaction-involved loans 
between PLCs and controlling shareholders and the number of PLCs involved have large 
deviations during these years. This reflects the flexibility in controlling shareholders’ use 
of Other Receivables. Given the fact that controlling shareholders can extract and use 
funds of PLCs in the middle of an accounting year, the cumulative extraction of funds 
through non-transaction-involved loans should be much larger.  
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(billion of RMB) 
Num. of PLCs 
Affected  
Other Receivables 
(billion of RMB) 




9.660 197 1.359 26 
2002 
(1130) 
6.834 188 19.450 415 
2003 
(1260) 
7.732 241 2.120 42 
2004 
(1377) 
8.848 268 23.864 407 
2005 
(1431) 
8.891 249 2.317 380 
Data source: China’s Security and Bond Market Research Database (2005), GTA. 
A convincing evidence of using other receivables as a good proxy of tunneling can be 
found from Table 3.4 below, which illustrates the correlation between firm performance 
ROA (return on assets) and balances of their other receivables accounting item in the 
previous year by using our sample.  
Table 3.4 Correlations between ROA and Other Receivables
 ROAt ORt-1 DARt-1 SIZEt-1 
ROAt 1.00 
ORt-1 -0.19 1.00 
DARt-1 -0.15 -0.07 1.00 
SIZEt-1 -0.17 -0.09 0.13 1.00 
Note: ROAt-1 is the return on assets of the current year; ORt-1, DARt-1, and SIZEt-1 are the 
proportion of the amount of other receivables due from controlling shareholder and its affiliates in 
total asset, total liability, and logarithm of total asset in the previous year respectively. 
Data Source: Author 
The negative correlation between ROA in the current year and other receivables in the 
previous year shows impairing economic consequences to firm performance caused by 
irregular funds extraction conducted by the controlling shareholder and its related parties. 
Although the absolute magnitude is not very high, it still outperforms total liabilities in 
the previous year, a standard indicator, to predict firm’s future ROA. It should be noted 
that this might just be the case only in China and other emerging markets where stock 
markets are underdeveloped and effective institutional setting is lacking.  
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Furthermore, taking the year 2002 for instance, if we rank PLCs according to ratios of 
the total other receivables to total assets, we have the top ten PLCs as follows: 
Changchun Gaoshida (stock 600670), Guangdong Weida (stock 000603), Jiangxi Zhiye 
(stock 600053), Meihang Group (stock 600700), Maikete Group (stock 000150), Meierya 
group (stock 600107), Sichuan Dingtian (stock 600139), Datong Cement Group (stock 
000673), Changling Huanghe (stock 000561), and Shandong Tongren (stock 000509). 
Averagely, the ratio of total other receivables to total assets reaches 49.2%, which is 
abnormally high taking into account the accounting nature of other receivables item. 
What’s worse, the proportion of the amount of other receivables due from the controlling 
shareholder in total other receivables reaches an average of 57.3%. For the top twenty 
PLCs in the rank, the above two percentages reach 40.44% and 51.46% respectively. As a 
consequence of severe irregular funds extraction through other receivables, six of top ten 
(twelve of the top twenty) PLCs in the rank had witnessed very poor performance in the 
past three years and were labeled “ST” (special treatment) by CSRC in 2002. Five of top 
ten (fourteen of top twenty) PLCs in the rank were given “Unclean” comments by 
auditing firms in their annual reports.  
As such, although tunneling by controlling shareholders globally has been carried out 
through various channels, it is rather evident that controlling shareholders of China’s 
PLCs use other receivables as one of their major tunneling channels to extract funds out 
of listed companies. It is practically plausible to employ “other receivables” as an 
indicator for tunneling by controlling shareholders in China’s stock markets.  
3.5 Conclusion 
The fast development of China’s stock markets has been overshadowed by the 
predominance of state ownership, which is mostly fulfilled by state-owned institutions 
through pyramid controlling structures. SOEs controlled listed firms have a tradition of 
low managerial ownership, which is a legacy of share issuing privatization. On the other 
hand, the predominance of state ownership gives rise to a highly concentrated corporate 
ownership structure. As a result, the main conflicts of interest arise between controlling 
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shareholders and minority shareholders, which is the main agency problem negatively 
affecting the ownership-and-firm value relation.  
Controlling shareholders carry out various types of tunneling activities through different 
channels to extract private benefits of control.  The “carve-out” forming process of 
China’s PLCs and the tradability constraints imposed on shares held by the state and legal 
persons turn out to be the fundamental reasons for the epidemic of tunneling. Other 
institutional arrangements, such as legal system and ideological reasons, are also 
important factors for the epidemic tunneling in China’s stock markets.  
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Chapter 4 
Methodology, Data and Variables  
4.1 Introduction 
This thesis focuses first on the relation between firm value and corporate ownership, 
especially the ownerships of two agents (managers and the largest shareholder) in 
corporate governance. Theoretical and empirical literature suggests the ultimate influence 
of the largest shareholder’s ownership on firm value will be determined by the dynamic 
dominance between the incentive alignment effect and the entrenchment effect over 
different ownership levels. Therefore, we employ a firm value model that is a cubic 
function of managerial ownership and quadratic function of the largest shareholder’s 
ownership to capture the non-linear pattern of influence of corporate ownership. A 
potential fraught problem with this firm value model lies in the endogeneity of ownership 
variables. Facing the difficulty of finding good quality instruments and the possibility of 
correlation between unobserved firm-specific characteristics and endogenous ownership 
variables, two-stage panel data methods are applied in a simultaneous equation model. 
The second objective of this thesis is to further examine how the expropriation of 
minority shareholders by the largest shareholder (tunneling) takes place in China’s PLCs. 
We modify the Allingham-Sandmo (1972) income tax-evasion model that is well known 
in public economics, to integrate factors of listed companies. Hypotheses are generated 
from the tunneling motivation analysis. We then choose the estimation method by first 
rejecting static models due to the high persistence in tunneling decision making. Among 
dynamic models, allowing for not only the correlation between the unobserved 
heterogeneity and explanatory variables, but also the initial conditions problem, we 
finally choose a dynamic random effects probit model.  
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section develops the firm value 
model and corporate ownership models respectively and the hypotheses these models 
implied. In section 3 we modify the Allingham-Sandmo (1972) income tax-evasion 
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model by taking into account different factors of listed companies. Data and variables are 
presented accordingly in the fourth section, where descriptive statistics and analysis of 
variables are also provided. Section 5 concludes the chapter. 
4.2 Ownership and Firm Value Relation 
4.2.1 Firm Value Model and Hypothesis 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) advocate the ‘convergence of interests’ hypothesis that 
under a dispersed ownership structure, firm value is a monotonically increasing function 
of managerial ownership, suggesting managerial ownership as a way to mitigate 
principal-agency problems caused by unaccountable managers. Fama and Jensen (1983), 
however, produce the entrenchment hypothesis that with high level managerial shares, 
managers have more control of the firm to pursue self interest maximization by carrying 
out entrenchment activities, so that firm value decreases when managerial ownership 
increases. Morck et al. (1988) use Tobin’s Q and return on equity as measures of firm 
performance, and shares held by directors as a measure of managerial ownership. They 
find a curvilinear function with a positive relation at low (below 5%) and high 
shareholding levels (over 25%) and negative association at intermediate shareholding 
levels. Morck et al. (1988) believe the manager operates with two conflicting incentives: 
to maximize firm value and collectively benefit other shareholders, and to pursue his own 
interests.  
On the other hand, the influence of largest shareholders on firm value is of a pattern 
similar to an interactive process between the interests alignment effect and the 
entrenchment effect. A non-linear relation between firm value and a controlling 
shareholder’s ownership has been widely reported (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; La Porta et 
al.1997, 1999, 2000; Bertrand, Mehta and Mullainathan, 2002). Specifically, at a low 
level of ownership, the largest shareholder does not have absolute control of the firm and 
is constrained by other shareholders and the market. At high ownership levels, however, 
the largest shareholder becomes more influential and entrenched in the firm, and starts to 
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pursue private benefits by carrying out “tunneling” activities, such as managing the firm’s 
earnings to steal profits, transferring assets and making transactions at non-market prices 
with related companies, unreasonable loan guarantees, excessive executive compensation, 
and diverting investment opportunities to related companies where they have higher cash 
flow control. In recent corporate governance literature the expropriation of minority 
shareholders by controlling shareholders is shown to be the current central agency 
problem in corporate governance across the world (La Porta et al. 1999).  
Since the 1980s the convergence of interests hypothesis and the entrenchment 
hypothesis have been the fundamental hypotheses for a series of empirical studies with 
different samples and estimation methods. Therefore, the ultimate influence of 
managerial ownership and the largest shareholder’s ownership on firm value will be 
determined by the dynamic dominance between the incentive alignment effect and the 
entrenchment effect over different ownership levels. As such, we develop the first 
hypothesis of this thesis as follows: 
  Hypothesis 1: Firm value is a cubic function of managerial ownership and a quadratic 
function of the largest shareholder’s ownership. As ownership increases, firm value first 
increases, then decreases, finally increases.  
Short and Keasey (1999) study managerial ownership and firm value relation using the 
following cubic function, which is a general extension of Morck et al.’s curvilinear model: 
Performance =α +α MO +α MO2 +α MO3 + βControlVariables + ε (4.1)0 1 2 3 
MO stands for managerial ownership. In order to examine how the whole corporate 
ownership affects firm value, we integrate the largest shareholder’s ownership terms into 
the above model, giving: 
2 3 2Performance = α 0 +α1MO +α 2 MO +α 3 MO +α 4 LS +α 5 LS + βControlVar iables + ε              (4.2) 
MO  and LS are managerial ownership and largest shareholder’s ownership respectively. 
The coefficients of MO ( α1 ) and of MO3 (α 3 ) are expected to be positive if the interests 
alignment effect dominates at low and very high levels of managerial ownership and the 
coefficient of MO2 (α 2 ) is expected to be negative if the entrenchment effect dominates 
at the intermediate levels of managerial ownership. On the other hand, the coefficient of 
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LS ( α 4 ) and the coefficient of LS2  ( α 5 ) are expected to be positive and negative 
respectively if the interests alignment effect dominates the entrenchment effect at low 
levels of the largest shareholder ownership and vice versa at high levels of the largest 
shareholder’s ownership. These coefficients of ownership can endogenously determine 
inflection points in the managerial ownership and firm value relation. As for control 
variables, we introduce them in the later part of this chapter. 
4.2.2 Determinants of Ownership Structure  
A potential problem of the above specification is the endogeneity of managerial 
ownership and the largest shareholder’s ownership. Demsetz (1983) argues that 
theoretically corporate ownership is jointly determined by firm external environment, and 
internal characteristics such as industry affiliation, investment opportunity, growth 
potential, and asymmetric information. His study finds supports from further researches 
by Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Kroszner and Sheehan (1999), Himmelberg et. al (1999) 
and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) respectively. Endogenous ownership in the firm 
performance model means the disturbance term ε i in Eq. 4.2 not only affects firm 
performance but reflects factors that cause changes in ownership variables (MO and LS). 
If this is the case, the OLS results are no longer consistent and therefore conventional 
statistic tests are not valid. Consequently, this will make it impossible to isolate the 
influence of corporate ownership variables on firm performance.  
There are two main sources of the endogeneity of ownership variables. First, the 
simultaneity problem exists between firm value and key ownership variables. In other 
words, firm value and key ownership variables might be jointly determined. Thus single 
equation analysis studying the causality from ownership to firm value, even with good 
instruments, will not properly solve the endogneity problem of ownership variables. 
Second, unobserved firm-specific effects affect a firm’s ownership structure. Therefore, 
OLS estimations of the firm value model that do not allow for unobserved firm 
heterogeneity will inevitably suffer from endogeneity problems. Panel data models can 
mitigate the endogeneity problem by taking into account unobserved firm-specific effects. 
As such, controlling these two sources of endogeneity of ownership variables, 2SLS 
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applied in a simultaneous equation system using a fixed effects model is the most suitable 
way to more consistently estimate the relation between ownership variables and firm 
value. 
  In terms of choosing instruments, each instrument should be individually correlated with 
the endogenous ownership variable, and uncorrelated with the error termε i . Any linear 
combination of these instruments will produce consistent estimates. Since we are using 
2SLS in a simultaneous equation framework, apart from potentially endogenous 
ownership variables (MO and LS), we treat all other regressors in the above firm value 
model as exogenous variables. Moreover, to control for the simultaneity problem, we 
integrate firm value (Tobin’s Q) into the corporate ownership equation. So we have 
For the managerial ownership equation:  
MO = θ +θ Q +θ ControlVariables +υ (4.3)i 0 1 2 i 
For the largest shareholder’s ownership equation: 
LS = φ +φ Q +φ ControlVariables + ∂ (4.4)i 0 1 2 i 
  Control variables included in the above two ownership equations are empirically 
important determinants of corporate ownership structure. However, it should be noted 
that they also serve as control variables in the full firm value model. Loosely, in a single 
equation analysis, instruments should be variables that affect the endogenous variable but 
do not affect the dependent variable other than through their effects on the endogenous 
variable. In other words, if an exogenous control variable is chosen to be an instrument 
for endogenous ownership variables, it cannot appear in the firm performance model at 
the same time. But under a simultaneous equation model, all presumably exogenous 
variables in the whole equation system will be used to estimate predicted values of 
Tobin’s Q and two potentially endogenous variables, MO and LS, although for 
identification reasons each equation in the simultaneous equation system does not 
necessarily include the exact same group of regressors. The majority of regressors 
included in control variables in Eq. 4.3 and 4.4 will be the same. But there are slight 
differences due to the control factors’ closeness to ownership variables and to firm value, 
even between two ownership variables. These differences will be shown in the estimation 
process. 
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4.2.3 The necessity for a Panel Data Model
     In the previous subsection, we have identified the endogeneity of managerial ownership 
and the largest shareholder’s ownership in the firm performance model. A few observable 
firm characteristics are excluded from the full firm performance model as instrumental 
variables to deal with the endogeneity problem. However, good quality data for these 
instruments does not seem easy to find. Following Demsetz (1983), Himmelberg et al. 
(1999) argue that managerial ownership is endogenously determined by the contracting 
environment, which can differ across firms in both observable and unobservable ways. In 
order to further mitigate the endogeneity problem of managerial ownership, unobserved 
firm heterogeneity, such as organization culture and efficiency, access to new monitoring 
technologies, and skill and quality of firm’s personnel, needs to be controlled for as well. 
Besides, Lee and Ryu (2003) note that the history of managerial ownership needs to be 
taken into account since it is regarded as an effective signal to outside investors in an 
inefficient financial market that is full of asymmetric information. As such, panel data 
approach is better suited than the cross-sectional methods that are traditionally adopted 
by Morck et al. (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990) respectively. 
The fixed effects model of the firm value can be written as follows: 
Q = α +αOwnershipVariable + βControlVariables + μ + ε           (4.5) it 0 it it i it 
μ i is a firm-specific effect, and uit is a white noise error term. As we can see, the 
endogeneity in the cross-section model can come from either the correlation between the 
ownership and unobserved firm-specific effects μ i s or the correlation between the 
ownership and uit . Fixed effects models mitigate the endogeneity problem by allowing 
for the former correlation. Under the fixed effects model framework we can even apply 
instrumental variables (2SLS) estimation to further attack endogeneity problems caused 
by the latter correlation in the model. Nonetheless, to fulfill this, good quality instruments 
are a precondition. Furthermore, using two-stage panel data methods under a 
simultaneous equation framework combining firm value model and ownership equations 
tackle both two sources of endogeneity problem, the unobserved firm heterogeneity and 
the simultaneity problem, so that more consistent estimates are provided. 
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4.3 Tunneling by Controlling Shareholders 
4.3.1 Tunneling Model and Hypotheses Development 
The background review of tunneling behavior has shown us how severe the problem is 
globally, especially in emerging market. Now to understand how the decision to tunnel is 
made and the factors that affect it is on our agenda.  In this section, we will modify the 
Allingham-Sandmo income tax evasion model (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972) by 
integrating listed-firm factors, and model the decision to tunnel as a non-truth telling 
behavior with risks. 
In order to obtain private benefit, the controlling shareholder starts to manipulate the 
profits of the listed firm. The actual profit of the firm is Y . To obtain private benefits, the 
controlling shareholder tunnels profits T  (T ≥ 0) out of Y and underreports the profit of 
the firm as Y − T . The private profits come from the unpaid tax, Tt , and unpaid 
dividends to the other investors,Ti(1 − s) , where t, i and s are the tax rate, dividend ratio 
and the percentage of the firm’s ownership held by the largest shareholder respectively. In 
this case, i and s are the parameters applicable to listed firms that we integrate into the 
Allingham-Sandmo model. Noticeably, apart from tax and dividends, as a normal 
operational practice, there should be some retained profits for the firm to undertake future 
investments. Obviously, although tunneling by the controlling shareholder will 
undoubtedly reduce the retained profits of the listed company, the only thing the tunneler 
cares about is his private profits. 
On the other hand, there are some risks (or punishments) to be borne with tunneling, 
such as public criticisms, fines and delisting. It is understandable that whether caught or 
not, the controlling shareholder has to put effort into concealing tunneling behavior by 
managing accounts, bribing, and even opening a new related company. So we integrate 
concealment cost C into Allingham-Sandmo model. It is plausible to assume that C is a 
function of a relative strength factor measured by the ratio of shares held by the tunneling 
controlling shareholder ( s ) and those held by other large shareholders who can serve as 
internal monitoring ( k ), the seriousness of tunneling measured by the ratio of T and 
' ' ' 'firm’s total assets ( A ). Realistically, we assume Cs < 0 , Cs / k < 0 , CT > 0 and CT / A > 0 . 
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  Note that C should include the negative impacts the reduction of profits has on the 
company’s stock price. However, given the fact that only one third of total shares are 
tradable on the Chinese stock market and these price change impacts can hardly draw as 
much attention as from large shareholders on other stock markets, since their shares are 
not tradable on the market. Generally speaking, stock prices in China’s stock market, 
unlike stock markets in other countries, do not necessarily reflect the performance and 
quality of PLCs, since PLCs are under control of large shareholders, and minority 
investors are powerless and lack the necessary information that should have been 
disclosed for them to make rational investment decision. As a result, speculation, instead 
of middle and long run rational investment, dominates minority investors’ minds. Such 
irrationality sometimes gives rise to a strange situation where a PLC plagued by 
tunneling problems by the controlling shareholder might see price go up. Thus, due to 
their irrationality our model leaves the stock price out on this occasion.  
Thus, if the controlling shareholder tunnels without being caught, the private benefit he 
can obtain is: 
M nc = T + (Y − T )(1− t)is − C            (4.6) 
where Y , T  and C are the actual profits of the firm, profits tunneled by the controlling 
shareholder, and the cost to the controlling shareholder caused by the concealment of 
tunneling respectively, and t , i , and s are the tax rate, dividend ratio and the percentage 
of the firm’s ownership held by the controlling shareholder respectively. 
If the controlling shareholder is caught tunneling, on the other hand, the final result he 
will get is: 
M c = Y (1− t)is − FT − C              (4.7) 
where all parameters are the same as in Eq. 4.6, except F is a fine rate imposed on the 
evaded profit T , and F  > t . F is greater than t indicates that once the tunneling is 
detected, its illegal private benefits Tt will be confiscated and meanwhile there will be a 
penalty (F − t)T  imposed. Besides, C will inevitably take place in both states of 
tunneling. 
It is reasonable to assume that the controlling shareholder derives standard utility 
U (M ) mainly from his monetary income and is risk averse ( U '(M ) > 0 > U ' '(M ) ), 
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although there might be some other factors like fairness, and less important forms of 
benefits such as rewarded housing, advanced transportation tools and VIP treatments, and 
political and social honors. According to expected utility theory, the expected utility of 
the controlling shareholder facing on uncertain income can be expressed as follows: 
E[U (M )] = (1− p)U (M nc ) + pU (M c )                                   (4.8) 
where p  is the possibility of being caught.  The choice facing the controlling shareholder 
to maximize the above expected utility is to decide the amount of profit he wants to 
tunnel, i.e. T . The first order condition with respect to T  as an interior solution is:  
∂(E[U (M )]) = (1− p)U '(M nc )[1− (1− t)is − CT '] − pU Mc '(M c )(F + C ') = 0            (4.9) nc∂T M T 
We then differentiate the above first order condition with respect to p, F, t, i, and s 
respectively. 
∂ 2 (E[U (M )]) = −U M '(M nc )[1− (1− t)is] −U M '(M c )F < 0 (4.10)nc c∂(T )∂( p) 
∂2 (E[U (M )]) = − pU ' (M ) < 0             (4.11) 
c∂(T )∂(F ) M c 
∂ 2 (E[U (M )]) = (1− p)U M nc '(M nc )is > 0               (4.12) ∂(T )∂(t) 
∂2 (E[U (M )]) = −(1 − p)U ' (M )(1 − t)s < 0            (4.13) ∂(T )∂(i) M nc nc 
∂ 2 (E[U (M )]) = −(1− p)U '(M )[(1− t)i + C ']− pU '(M )C '            (4.14) M nc Ts M c Tsnc c∂(T )∂(s) 
Above Eq. 4.10 to Eq. 4.13 show us some insightful implications of how changes in 
legal system, capital structure and ownership structure can affect the controlling 
shareholder’s tunneling behavior. Specifically, the tunneling model suggests with more 
effective monitoring systems ( p ) and a more rigorous legal system ( F ), the incentive 
for the controlling shareholder to tunnel is expected to be reduced. The dividend policy is 
also expected to affect controlling shareholders’ incentive to carry out tunneling. 
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Increasing dividends ( i ) might serve as a substitute to the private benefits obtained by the 
controlling shareholder through tunneling. On the other hand, a higher tax rate ( t ) might 
give rise to more tunneling behavior because this increase will inevitably squeeze the 
profits set that could be potentially tunneled by the controlling shareholder. Finally, in Eq. 
4.14, the shares held by the controlling shareholder ( s ) do not have an unambiguous 
direction of effects on tunneling. As reflected by aforementioned empirical studies, the 
effects of ownership concentration on agency problem and firm performance take various 
patterns under different corporate governance systems. In other words, in some way this 
is an empirical issue. 
In order to examine the occurrence of tunneling, we adopt the following dynamic binary 
choice model on our panel sample data.  
Pr(TUNNEL = 1) = Φ(z β +α TUNNEL + μ + u > 0) (4.15)it it 1 it−1 i it 
X ≡ (z ,TUNNEL )it it it−1 
where Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. zit  includes explanatory 
variables listed in Table 4.1. μi is a time-invariant-and-firm-specific unobserved effect 
(unobserved persistent heterogeneity, such as managerial quality, and organization 
efficiency) and μi is uncorrelated across firms. uit is the idiosyncratic error terms that 
captures shocks to the occurrence of tunneling and it will change across t as well as i. 
Both μi  and uit  are normally distributed.  
Accordingly, we have the following two hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 2: increasing the tax rate, decreasing the dividend payout rate, a less 
efficient auditing system and decreasing the penalty rate will make tunneling more likely.
  Hypothesis 3: more concentrated ownership measured by the shares held by the 
controlling shareholder does not necessarily give rise to more tunneling. 
These two hypotheses are both related to the occurrence of tunneling, no matter whether 
the underlying controlling shareholder is tunneling for the first time or not. On the other 
hand, if we regard tunneling as a crime committed by controlling shareholders, it is 
plausible for us to assume that there is high persistence of tunneling behavior. Thus we 
have the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 4: there is a high propensity for a controlling shareholder who tunneled in 
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the previous year to tunnel again this year. 
4.3.2 Econometric Methods for Tunneling Model 
As far as estimation of the above dynamic model is concerned, the choice of 
econometric methods will first depend on the relation between μi and the independent 
variables. In our dynamic binary choice model, the unobserved persistent heterogeneity 
μi can be correlated with independent variables X it . Unobserved firm-specific effects, 
such as managerial skill and quality, and organization efficiency and culture, can 
reasonably be assumed to be correlated with some explanatory variables, like firm 
performance, i.e. COV (zit ,μi ) ≠ 0,t = 0,1,2,...,T . Furthermore, although these unobserved 
effects cannot be directly observed by or reported to outside investors (the market) and 
authority in the annual report, yet there is no doubt that the PLC’s largest shareholder is 
familiar with them in a subtle way. In a dynamic unobserved effects model, even if there 
is no serial correlation in uit , the unobserved firm-specific effect, μi , is necessarily 
correlated with the lagged dependent variable, which appears as an endogenous 
independent variable in the equation. In terms of our model, μi  is correlated with 
TUNNELit-1, i.e. COV (TUNNELit ,μ ) ≠ 0 , since in the period t-1, TUNNELit-1 is the−1 i 
dependent variable on the left side of the equation. Besides, we also use lagged terms of 
some explanatory variables, DIVIDENDit-1, ROAit-1, and AUDITit-1, to see if they affect 
TUNNELit-1directly or through TUNNELit-1. 
In order to test the above perception of correlation between μi  and X it , two Hausman 
specification tests using logit on the balanced panel sample, with and without lagged 
dependent variable in X it , are performed to compare fixed effects model and random 
effects model, and both tests strongly reject the appropriateness of the standard (pure) 
random effect specification with χ 2 statistic values of 547.67 and 531.3 respectively. 
On the other hand, fixed effects specification has its own drawbacks. First, it will drop 
all time-invariant variables, which include some observable ones that are of interest, such 
as industry (INDUSTRY), identity of largest shareholder (STATE), and location 
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(LOCATION). Secondly, as the number of sample units (N) is large, a fixed effects 
specification will lose many degrees of freedom.  Thirdly, when the number of units is 
large and the number of years is small, using fixed effects model for dynamic models 
tends to generate inconsistent estimates (Stephen, 1981; Hsiao 1986; Bernard and Jensen, 
2004). The consistency of a fixed effects model relies on the number of periods lagged to 
do the differencing, which means it needs longer panel data. Take Arellano-Bond (1991) 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator as an example. It uses lagged terms 
of explanatory variables (level) and lagged difference of them as instruments in a first-
difference (linear) specification and allows for dynamics in the model (lagged dependent 
variable). The appropriateness of GMM application crucially relies on the validity of the 
assumption that the lagged differences of explanatory variables are uncorrelated with the 
residual, which is difficult to meet. Furthermore, when doing the first difference, GMM 
not only removes observed time-invariant variables but reduces the sample size 
considerably. This is obviously not suitable for our short panel sample (T = 4).  
As such, we have to choose another econometric method. In order to relax the 
assumption of independence between the individual effects and explanatory variables, we 
introduce the Mundlak-Chamberlain Random Effects Model (Mundlak, 1978; 
Chamberlain, 1984), which, unlike the standard (traditional) random effects model, 
allows for the correlation between the μi and X it by introducing time means of time-
variant variable(s) xi to control for individual effects correlated with X it . And it is 
plausible for us to chose time means of return on assets (ROA) and the dividend ratio 
(DIVIDEND) as vector xi , since both performance indicators are expected to be good 
proxies for (or closely related to) the unobserved effects affecting tunnel decision, such as 
management quality, and organization efficiency. Noticeably, this method comes with an 
assumption that the regression function of μi is linear either in all time means of time-
variant variables or a combination of their lags and leads (Propper and Burchardt, 1999; 
Arulampalam et al., 2000; Propper, 2000).  
μ = k + k ' x +η               (4.16) i 0 1 i i 
where ηi  ~ (0, ση 2 ) and it is independent of X it  and uit for all i and all t. k0  is the 
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intercept and vector xi includes time means of time-variant variables. So Eq. 4.15 
evolves into:  
Pr(TUNNEL = 1) = Φ(z β +α TUNNEL + k ' x +η + u > 0) (4.17)it it 1 it−1 1 i i it 
where k0 is taken into β , and ηi  is uncorrelated with other explanatory variables. 
As we can see from Eq. 4.17, in order to capture state dependence in tunneling, by 
including the lagged dependent variable (TUNNELt-1) in the above Mundlak-
Chamberlain Random Effects Model, we are actually using a dynamic random effects 
probit model, which has been used in empirical research (Orme, 1996; Arulampalam et 
al., 2000; Propper, 2000).  In a dynamic panel model with a relative short observation 
period like ours (T = 4), however, the endogeneity of the initial conditions can be crucial 
to the entire outcome (William H. Greene, 2003). The initial conditions can only be 
regarded as exogenous if the stochastic process generating tunneling starts accidentally in 
the same year as our observation of tunneling starts for each individual. This is obviously 
not the case in our sample. As a matter of fact, the stochastic process generating tunneling 
in China’s PLCs started before the year 2000. As a result, the dynamic panel model 
suffers from this endogeneity problem called the initial conditions problem caused by the 
correlation between unobserved effects and the initial observation (Hsiao, 1986). In our 
case that is the correlation between ηi  andTUNNELi0 . If a really strong assumption that 
the initial observation is exogenous is made, like the pooled probit models we will tend to 
overestimate the degree of state dependence α1  (Propper, 2000; Stewart, 2006). 
As a result, in order to fix this endogeneity problem, following Heckman (1981a; 1981b) 
we estimate a reduced form equation for the initial observation ( RELOCCi0 ) as follows 
RELOCC = λ' q +ε (4.18)i0 i i 
where qi is a vector of strictly exogenous instruments, including not only explanatory 
variables related to starting period (t = 0), time means xi but also some additional 
“presample information” suggested by Propper (2000) and Arulampalam et al. ( 2000) 
respectively. ε i , with the variance of σε2 i , is uncorrelated with uit for t ≥ 1 , but is 
correlated with ηi  (corr (ηi , ε i ) = ρ ) following the linear specification ε i = θηi + ui0 , 
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where ηi  and ui0 are constructed to be orthogonal to each other. Then Eq. 4.18 changes 
into 
TUNNEL = λ' q +θη + u (4.19)i0 i i i0 
It is assumed TUNNELi0 is uncorrelated withuit  for t ≥ 1, and all regressors except lagged 
dependent variables, including X it  and xi , are uncorrelated with ui0  across all i and t.  
Equation 4.17 and 4.19 can then be estimated using a Heckman’s estimator for a 
dynamic random effects probit model. Simplifying the estimation into two probit models, 
one for the model of interest and one for the initial conditions, Heckman two-step method 
avoids some complicated computations that might not be solved analytically, for example 
multiple integral computations. Taking account of the correlation between unobserved 
effects and explanatory variables (including the lagged dependent variable) and 
correlation between unobserved effects and initial conditions (i.e. the initial conditions 
problem), Heckman estimator is expected to be the most suitable method to estimate a 
panel data with much persistence in the dependent variable like ours.   
To sum up, in this section we first rule out static models by identifying the persistence in 
tunneling decision making. Second, among dynamic models, allowing for not only the 
correlation between the unobserved heterogeneity and explanatory variables by including 
instrument variable(s) xi , but also the initial conditions problem, we come to choose a 
dynamic random effects probit model (Eq. 4.17 and 4.19). Finally, in order to avoid 
adding a heteroskedastic error term, we decide to use the Heckman estimation command 
in Stata to estimate our dynamic random effects probit model. 
4.4 Data and Variables 
4.4.1 Data Source 
All the data is based on the audited Annual Reports of all PLCs and comes from GTA IT 
Co., Ltd, which is a leading data vendor on Chinese PLCs. Its database records basic 
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information and trading data in different intervals for all listed bonds in the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange since 1996. GTA is also a data vendor 
of WRDS (Wharton Research Data Service) and is the unique China data vendor selected 
by MSCI-Barra’s headquarters (US) and Asia Pacific headquarters (HK). Basically, the 
data from GTA is internationally recognized. 
Data for ownership-and-firm value relation and data for ultimate ownership are from 
China Listed Corporate Governance Research Database, and data for tunneling is from 
China Listed Corporate Associated Transaction Database. Both databases are parts of 
GTA’s CSMAR database.   
Finally, city level fiscal and unemployment rate information comes from various issues 
of Chinese Statistics Yearbooks between 2001 and 2005. 
4.4.2 Sample Selection 
In 1999, a new version of Company Law was launched by the Chinese government, and 
this led to many changes in the PLCs’ information collected. Thus, in this thesis we select 
2001- 2004 panel data on PLCs that issued A shares before the end of 2004 on the 
Shanghai Securities Exchange and the Shenzhen Securities Exchange.  Because their 
operations are very different from PLCs our data excludes fund management companies 
as cross-sectional units. But they might appear as an institutional investor, or even the 
largest shareholder for a PLC. We also exclude firms that just issue H shares since the 
number of them is quite small. Observations on PLCs with missing values were also 
removed from the dataset. Finally, firms with Tobin’s Q larger than 4 were removed since 
these outliers would affect the estimation of the relation between firm value and corporate 
ownership. 
As for ownership and firm value relation, observations for each firm start from the year 
of 2001 (a common date of entry) for the initial conditions, whereas the firm was not 
removed from the sample until it exited from the stock market before 2004. In other 
words, no new companies enter our sample between 2001 and 2004. As such, for we have 
a balanced panel data sample with T = 4 and N = 717.  
As for the tunneling study, observations between 2001 and 2004 are used for each firm. 
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In total, during the sample years, we have an unbalanced dataset containing 2914 
observations. 
As for ultimate ownership, within our sample period we only have data for 2004, which 
comprises 1149 listed companies.   
4.4.3 Variables 
The above ownership and firm value model includes firm value, managerial ownership, 
the largest shareholder’s ownership, and control variables that could potentially affect 
firm performance. Taking into account empirical studies and China’s political and 
economic environment, we summarize the definition and description of variables in Table 
4.1. As mentioned before, most explanatory variables included in the firm value model 
and ownership equations also appear in the tunneling model since these firm 
characteristics observed by the market are also observed by the largest shareholder when 
he makes the decision about tunneling.  
Table 4.1 Description of Variables 
Variables Model Description 
Dependent 
Variables 
Tobin’s Q Firm Value Model (FVM 
hereafter) 
The ratio of market value of firm equity to 
book value of firm total assets. Tobin’s Q 
= (Market Value of All Shares + Book 
Value of All Debts)/Total Assets 
TUNNEL Tunneling Model (TM hereafter) Binary choice variable that equals one if 
there are funds extracted by the largest 
shareholder and its affiliates through other 
receivables, and equals zero otherwise.  
Independent 
Variables 
LS Ownership structure; 
Appears in both FVM and TM 
The ownership of the largest shareholder 
measured by the proportion of shares held 
by the largest shareholder to the total shares 
of the firm 
MO Ownership structure;
 Appears in FVM 
Managerial ownership measured by the 
proportion of shares held by all directors in 
the board to total shares of the firm. 
STATE Ownership structure; 
Appears in both FVM and TM 
A dummy variable characterizes the 
involvement of state ownership in the 
company, i.e. equals one if the largest 
shareholder is the state, and zero otherwise. 
TOP5LS Ownership structure (Internal The cumulative ownership from the second 
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monitoring system); 
Appears in both FVM and TM 
largest to the fifth largest shareholder, 
measured by the sum of shares held by 
them. 
INDIR Internal monitoring system; 
Appears in both FVM and TM 
The proportion of independent directors in 
the board. 
AUDIT External monitoring system 
Appears in both FVM and TM 
Dummy variable that equals one if the 
comments from auditing firm in the annual 
report are ‘non standard comments’ and 
equals zero otherwise. 
ROA Appears in TM Return on assets to measure the 
performance of the listed firm 
ROA = net profit/ total assets at the end of 
the year 
RISK Appears in FVM Volatility of the firm’s stock price measured 
by standard deviation of its annual stock 
price 
DIVIDEND Appears in both FVM and TM Dividends payout rate, which is cash 
dividends per share 
INTANGIBLE Appears in both FVM and TM Intangible assets as a proxy for R&D and 
advertising expenditure.  
SIZE Appears in both FVM and TM Firm size measured by the natural 
logarithm of the company’s total assets.  
SIZE = ln (Total Assets) 
AGE Appears in both FVM and TM The number of years since the firm got 
listed 
DAR Appears in both FVM and TM Debt /Asset ratio 
DAR = Annual Debt/ Total Assets 
LOCATIONE Appears in both FVM and TM Location dummy variable equals one if the 
listed company is located in eastern coastal 
areas of China, and equals zero otherwise. 
LOCATIONW Appears in both FVM and TM Location dummy variable equals one if the 
listed company is located in western areas 
of China, and equals zero otherwise. 
LDEFICIT Appears in TM Fiscal deficit per capita of the city where 
the underlying PLC is situated and 
politically affiliated to.  
RREVENUE Appears in FVM Fiscal revenue per capita of the city where 
the underlying PLC is situated and 
politically affiliated to. 
UNEMPLOY Appears in both FVM and TM Unemployment rate of the city where the 
underlying PLC is situated and politically 
affiliated to. 
SOEWORK Appears in FVM The proportion of SOE workers in total 
workforce of the city 
DYEAR Appears in both FVM and TM Year dummy variables equal one in the 
underlying year, and zero otherwise. Data 
is from 2001 to 2004, so we use three year 
dummy variables. 
DINDUSTRY Appears in both FVM and TM Industry dummy variable equals one if the 
listed company is in the underlying 
industry and zero otherwise. There are a 
total of twelve industries, so we use eleven 
dummy variables. 
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Firm Value (Dependent Variable) 
There are some accounting-based firm performance indicators, like ROE (Return On 
Equity). These measures are mainly focused on a firm’s operating and financial 
performance, which is expected to be positively related to the firm’s stock-market 
performance in well developed stock markets with higher transparency level and less 
information asymmetry. However these accounting-based measures of firm performance 
are more likely to be manipulated, especially in underdeveloped stock markets. Liu (2005) 
points out that between 1999 and 2001, ROEs reported by China’s PLCs 
disproportionately gather slightly over 0, 6 and 10 percent, indicating two main 
incentives of earning management: avoiding losses and gaining the right to issue new 
shares. Jian and Wong (2004) provide more evidence of earning management in China.  
We use Tobin’s Q to measure firm value, firm’s stock-market performance. Tobin’s Q is 
a widely used market-based firm performance indicator and is defined as the ratio of the 
market value of equity to the book value of the fixed assets of the firm. Due to the 
difficulty of obtaining the replacement cost of fixed assets, we use the following 
approximate formula from Chung and Pruitt (1994) to calculate Tobin’s Q.  
Tobin’s Q = (Market Value of All Shares + Book Value of All Debts)/Book Value of  
Total Assets 
Short and Keasey (1999) suggest Tobin’s Q has the advantage of combining both 
investment (book value of total assets) and future income generated through these 
investments (market value of equity). Besides, unlike accounting-based performance 
indicators that are purely based on events occurred, Tobin’s Q has the good merits of also 
allowing for future expectations, including those on firm’s intangible value improvement 
(like R&D) and future development strategies. More recent research tends to use Tobin’s 
Q as a measure of listed firm performance.  
Tunneling Variable (Dependent Variable) 
As we mentioned before, funds extraction through irregular loans by controlling 
shareholders is the most pervasive tunneling activity in China. According to 
aforementioned institutional background, we set latent variable RELOCC to represent the 
funds extracted particularly by the controlling shareholder and its affiliates, which are 
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specifically noted and recorded as a proportion of the balance of “Other Receivables” in 
the PLC’s financial annual reports. It should be noted that it is not the whole balance of 
“Other Receivables” but only the proportion of funds due from PLCs’ largest 
shareholders and their affiliates. The dependent variable TUNNEL is a binary discrete 
variable which equals one if funds extraction by the largest shareholder and its affiliates 
through other receivables account takes place (RELOCC > 0), and equals zero otherwise.  
Ownership Structure 
Recent empirical studies show that ownership structure has non-linear effects on firm 
value. We include the proportion of shares held by managers (board-level directors) to 
total shares (MO) and the proportion of shares held by the controlling shareholder to total 
shares (LS) to capture the influence of ownership structure. Their square terms and cubic 
terms are included to examine the non-linear effects of ownership structure on firm value. 
In addition, we also use a dummy variable (STATE) to characterize firms with the state or 
state-owned institution as the largest shareholder in the company. Both empirical studies 
and hypotheses mentioned above indicate that ownership structure, as an internal 
mechanism of corporate governance, plays an indispensible role in mitigating agency 
problems caused by incompetent managers and controlling shareholders.  
Monitoring Forces against Agency problems  
We employ three variables to proxy internal monitoring forces against agency problems. 
First, in order to measure the role other large shareholders played in monitoring the 
behavior of the largest shareholder, we set a variable TOP5LS, which equals the sum of 
ownerships of the second largest to the fifth largest shareholder. Second, we also take 
account of the proportion of independent directors on the board, which is denoted as 
INDIR. 
As far as external monitoring forces are concerned, we use the auditing comments made 
by independent auditing firms in PLCs’ annual reports. A dummy variable named 
AUDIT is set to equal one if the comments are “non standard comments” and zero 
otherwise. When we say “non standard comments”, we mean an abnormal significant 




The literature shows the different directions of influence leverage has on firm value. On 
the positive side, Jensen (1986) suggests that debts can constrain managers from 
discretionary spending over free cash flows. Myers (1977), on the other hand, argues 
debts limit firms from future profitable investments. Further, Stulz (1988) maintain debts 
reduce firm’s pressure from the takeover market in a sense that debts make the firm’s 
ownership more concentrated. We include the debt-asset ratio (DAR) to capture effects of 
leverage on firm value. 
R&D and Advertising  
Since China’s accounting system records R&D and advertising expenditure directly in 
administration expenses, it is impossible for us to get a separate value for these activities. 
Instead we can only use intangible assets (INTANGIBLE) as proxy for R&D activities 
and advertising expenditure. R&D and advertising activities are expected to increase firm 
value through improving a firm’s innovation capacity and profitability. On the other hand, 
Himmelberg et al. (1999) use intangible assets to measure the scope of managers’ 
discretionary spending. In our case of two agents, managers and the largest shareholder, 
we could extend intangible assets to measure the discretionary spending scope of both 
insiders in China’s PLCs. 
Liquidity 
Free cash flow is used as a proxy for the firm’s liquidity (LIQUIDITY). More cash flow 
means the firm is more capable of repaying its debts and carrying out future investment. 
Nonetheless, Jensen (1986) argues that firms with too high free cash flows tend to 
overinvest. 
Risk 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Himmelberg et al. (1999) use the volatility of the firm’s 
stock price to measure the risk and uncertainty the firm is facing. We use the standard 
deviation of daily stock prices in the year as a proxy of risk. We expect firms with highly 
volatile stock prices to have lower firm value.  
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Firm Size   
Generally speaking, larger firms tend to have more advanced management systems. 
These large firms, however, can be easily plagued with low efficiency and lack of 
transparency. Himmelberg et al. (1999) indicate larger firms are more hampered by agency 
problems. Nonetheless, Short and Keasey (1999) suggest economies of scale give a larger 
firm the advantage of low average product cost to create barriers for new entry and 
eventually improve the firm’s performance. We include the natural logarithm of the firm’s 
total assets (SIZE) as a proxy for firm size.  Furthermore, larger SOEs in China are 
normally under some social obligations, such as reducing local unemployment. In this 
case, administrative interference under these circumstances will negatively affect firm 
performance.  
Firm Age 
Younger firms are expected to more easily take in new technologies and have more 
potential to grow, so one would expect a negative relation between firm age and firm 
value. Old firms, however, have advantages in more experience and knowledge of the 
market. Their connections developed through the years with different parties they are 
dealing with will count, especially in China. We use the number of years the firm has 
been listed (AGE) as a proxy for firm age. 
Growth  
A firm with greater growth prospects will attract more investors so that its market value 
is expected to be higher. We include growth rate of firm’s net profit (GROWTH) as a 
proxy for the firm’s growth.  
Fiscal Deficit 
Due to China’s unique economic and political environment, many PLCs are controlled 
by SOEs, which are commonly under social obligations and intervened by local political 
authorities. Besides, tradability constraints imposed on shares held by the state and legal 
persons make the permission of authorities crucial to the success of transferring these 
shares among owners. As a result, we include city level fiscal deficit (LDEFICIT) per 
capita and city unemployment rate to capture the political pressure of privatization from 
the local authorities, to which these PLCs are politically affiliated.  
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Industry & Year 
Under a transition economy, different sectors in China undergo different levels of 
competition, liberalization, and probably different development prospects. Also, due to 
different strategic values and development priorities, the government applies different 
policies to regulate different sectors during the sample period. Thus, it is crucial to 
include industry affiliation and year dummies to capture industry and policy effects. 
4.4.4 Descriptive Statistics of Variables  
4.4.4.1 Descriptive Statistics  
Table 4.2 presents descriptive statistics of variables included in the ownership-firm 
value model and the tunneling model. We find between 2000 and 2004 the ownership  
Table 4.2 Descriptive Statistics of Variables           
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Tobin’s Q 1.8768 1.1736 0.9747 3.9964 
RELOCC 0.0447 0.1151 0 1.0452 
ROA 0.0033 0.1038 -1.4124 0.1643 
LS 0.4088 16.3561 0.0697 0.8205 
MO 0.0011 1.5276 0 0.3796 
TOP5 0.5555 12.9084 0.1219 0.9507 
TOP5LS 0.1501 12.3052 0.0019 0.5884 
INDIR 0.1805 5.4415 0 0.4286 
LIQUIDITY 0.1388 0.2966 0 7.6737 
INTANGIBLE 0.0413 0.0613 0 0.7953 
DIVIDEND 0.1373 0.132835 0.005 1.2 
GROWTH -2.5580 16.7729 -90.0748 18.99658 
RISK 1.2382 0.9329 0.2032 10.5496 
AGE 7.8591 2.0971 4 14 
SIZE 21.2657 0.8862 17.4965 24.1711 
DAR 0.5172 0.1823 0.0081 0.9702 
Note: Year, industry, and location dummies are left out here.   
concentration level (LS) has been kept at a quite high average level (40.88%) in China’s 
stock market. The ownership concentration level will become even higher if we measure 
it by the top five large shareholders (55.55%). The high average of 31.65% confirms the 
fact that the stock markets were originally established to financially support SOEs. State 
ownership still has a huge influence in corporate governance of China’s PLCs, such that 
in many PLCs state and state-owned institutions serve as the largest shareholders. 
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Nonetheless, the cumulative ownership from the second to the fifth shareholder (TOP5LS) 
only reaches an average of 15% of the listed company, which is less than half of the 
largest shareholder’s ownership. The average number of independent directors (INDIR) 
accounts for almost one fifth of the board.     
Apart from ownership variables, statistics on firm value (Tobin’s Q), the latent tunneling 
variable RELOCC, and other control variables are also presented in Table 4.2 
respectively. Dummy variables are not reported.    
4.4.4.2 Managerial Ownership 
Table 4.3 summarizes the information on managerial ownership between 2001 and 2004. 
The selected sample of 717 firms is divided into four ranges by managerial ownership 
levels. For each year, nearly 90% of firms have managerial ownership below 0.1%, 
whereas firms with managerial ownership over 10% are hardly found. Through sample 
years, the number of firms in each ownership range is relatively stable. As a whole, we 
find managerial ownership levels in China’s PLCs are averagely much lower than those 
in other economies.  
Table 4.3 Breakdown of the selected sample by managerial ownership 
Managerial 
Ownership 
2001 (717) 2002 (717) 2003 (717) 2004 (717) 
0 ≤ MO<0.1% 637 (88.84%) 650 (90.65%) 657 (91.63%) 661 (92.19%) 
0.1% ≤ MO<1% 74 (10.32%) 62 (8.65%) 56 (7.81%) 51 (7.11%) 
1% ≤ MO<10% 5 (0.70%) 4 (0.56%) 4 (0.56%) 3 (0.42%) 
10% ≤ MO 1 (0.14%) 1 (0.14%) 0 (0%) 2 (0.28%) 
Note: percentages of the number of firms in each category are included in parentheses. 
 Data Source: Author 
As far as the changes of managerial ownership are concerned, Table 4.4 reports absolute 
values of yearly within-firm percentage changes in managerial ownership of our selected 
sample. There are totally 2151 observations of yearly changes. We find 64% of 
observations have their managerial ownership changed less than 10%, and many of them 
have just changed marginally or have not changed at all during sample years. Besides, 
12% of observations have witnessed changes in managerial ownership over 100%. 
Nevertheless, the numbers of observations between 10% and 100% are all quite small. 
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Specifically, the last three columns of Table 4.4 present the number and proportion of 
firms for each ownership range in each year. 
Table 4.4 Within-firm changes in managerial stock ownership 
Yearly Percentage Change 
of Managerial Ownership 








0 1/ −≤ Δ tt MOMO <10% 1381 (64.20%) 423(58.60%) 435(60.67%) 523(72.94%) 
10% 1/ −≤ Δ tt MOMO <20% 71 (3.30%) 29 (4.04%) 25 (3.49%) 17 (2.37%) 
20% 1/ −≤ Δ tt MOMO <30% 112 (5.21%) 52 (7.25%) 32 (4.46%) 28 (3.91%) 
30% 1/ −≤ Δ tt MOMO <40% 100 (4.65%) 38 (5.30%) 38 (5.30%) 24 (3.35%) 
40% 1/ −≤ Δ tt MOMO <50% 26 (1.21%) 10 (1.39%) 11 (1.53%) 5 (0.70%) 
50% 1/ −≤ Δ tt MOMO <60% 127 (5.90%) 46 (6.42%) 51 (7.11%) 30 (4.18%) 
60% 1/ −≤ Δ tt MOMO <70% 39 (1.81%) 16 (2.23%) 12 (1.67%) 11 (1.53%) 
70% 1/ −≤ Δ tt MOMO <80% 17 (0.79%) 9 (1.26%) 7 (0.98%) 1 (0.14%) 
80% 1/ −≤ Δ tt MOMO <90% 12 (0.56%) 8 (1.12%) 2 (0.28%) 2 (0.28%) 
90% 1/ −≤ Δ tt MOMO <100% 4 (0.19%) 0 2 (0.28%) 2 (0.28%) 
100% 1/ −≤ Δ tt MOMO 262 (12.18%) 86 (11.99%) 101(14.09%) 75 (10.46%) 
Note: percentages of number of firms in each category are included in parentheses.  
Data Source: Author 
  Overall, we find managerial ownership of China’s PLCs is at quite a low level, and most 
firms change it slowly over the sample period.  
4.4.4.3 The Largest Shareholder’s Ownership 
In this thesis, we use the largest shareholder’s ownership to measure ownership 
concentration. Table 4.5 below shows the evolution of the largest shareholder’s 
ownership in the original data sample between 2001 and 2004. We find vertically during 
these years there is a slight downward trend in the average shares held by the largest 
shareholder. The large standard deviation in each year indicates that the largest 
shareholder’s ownership can change a lot in a cross-sectional way. Nonetheless, corporate 
ownership of China’s PLCs has always been highly concentrated. To this effect, some 
institutional background is worth recalling. Since the beginning of the reform from ex 
central planned economy to market economy China’s bank system has been struggling to 
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financially support overstaffed, inefficient and non-profitable SOEs, so that by the early 
nineteen nineties many large SOEs were turning to the newly established stock market to 
raise money. However, because of the artificial tradability constraints, shares of China’s 
PLCs are divided into non-tradable shares that are held by the state and legal persons and 
tradable shares that are held by the public. As a whole, the former accounts for two thirds 
of total shares and is only transferrable between its holders during the sample period. As a 
result, with much control of the board and little pressure from external take over market, 
insiders of China’s PLCs became more sluggish and entrenched so that ownership 
concentration tends to be more persistent compared with other market economies.  
Table 4.5 The average share of largest shareholder of Chinese Listed Companies 
2001 2002 2003 2004 
Minimum 0.0697 0.0702 0.0702 0.0702 
Maximum 0.8205 0.8205 0.8205 0.8205 
Mean 0.4226 0.4126 0.4018 0.3980 
Median 0.4409 0.4387 0.4163 0.3999 
Std. Dev 16.5933 16.4381 16.2802 16.0288 
Num. of firms 1043 1088 1062 1209 
Data Source: author 
We also find the number of listed firms gradually increases, reflecting the market’s slow 
development over the sample period. In the 1990s, the stock market was growing fast 
because China’s underdeveloped financial market could not provide enough advanced 
investment services and tools, so that people’s saving could only be invested in the stock 
market. However, without effective monitoring mechanisms and a strict law enforcement 
process to protect minority investors, the expropriation of minority investors by 
controlling shareholders became so pervasive that insiders in PLCs tend to use the listed 
company as a free cash machine where they can take money for granted. Besides, the 
market confidence was severely damaged by Asian financial crisis in late nineties that is 
mainly caused by irresponsible behavior of controlling shareholders.  
The persistence of ownership concentration is further displayed by the following Table 
4.6, which reports yearly within-firm changes in the largest shareholder’s ownership of 
717 firms selected during the sample years. Similar to yearly within-firm changes of 
managerial ownership reported in Table 4.4, the vast majority of firms change their 
largest shareholder’s ownership less than 10% between 2001 and 2004, whereas the 
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number of firms experiencing remarkable ownership concentration changes is negligible.  
Table 4.6 Within-firm changes in the largest shareholder’s ownership  
Yearly Percentage Change 
of Managerial Ownership 








0% 1/ −≤ Δ tt LSLS <10% 1924 (89.45%) 634(88.42%) 636(88.70%) 654(91.21%) 
10% 1/ −≤ Δ tt LSLS <20% 90 (4.18%) 34 (4.74%) 34 (4.74%) 22 (3.07%) 
20% 1/ −≤ Δ tt LSLS <30% 42 (1.95%) 15 (2.09%) 14 (1.95%) 13 (1.81%) 
30% 1/ −≤ Δ tt LSLS <40% 33 (1.53%) 14 (1.95%) 10 (1.39%) 9 (1.26%) 
40% 1/ −≤ Δ tt LSLS <50% 29 (1.35%) 13 (1.81%) 11 (1.53%) 5 (0.70%) 
50% 1/ −≤ Δ tt LSLS <60% 15 (0.70%) 3 (0.42%) 7 (0.98%) 5 (0.70%) 
60% 1/ −≤ Δ tt LSLS <100% 16 (0.74%) 4 (0.56%) 5 (0.70%) 7 (0.98%) 
100% 1/ −≤ Δ tt LSLS 2 (0.1%) 0 0 2 (0.28%) 
Note: percentages of number of firms in each category are included in parentheses.  
Data Source: author 
Table 4.7 below provides the breakdown of original data sample by the identities of the 
largest shareholder’s ownership for each year. Within each year we divide shares 
controlled by the largest shareholder into four ranges based on key threshold percentages 
according to CSRC’s Administration Note for China’s PLCs, including no greater than 
10%, between 10% and 33% (including 33%), between 33% and 50% (including 50%), 
and over 50%. For each domain, consistent with CSRC’s uniform classification in listed 
companies annual reports, we classify listed companies into five different groups 
according to the identities of their largest shareholder, including state, state-owned legal 
person, private shareholder, foreign shareholder, and other shareholders respectively. 
Table 4.7 Distribution of companies by ownership concentration and by the 
identities of the largest shareholder 
Ownership Concentration range 














OC> 50% (1675 obs.) 
State 




























33%<OC<=50% (1217 obs.) 352 284 271 310 
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State 115 131 136 140 
State-owned Legal Person 81 91 76 82 
Private 142 47 36 61 
Foreign 4 4 6 7 
Others 10 11 17 20 
10%<OC<=33% (1481 obs.) 277 354 386 464 
State 77 99 103 117 
State-owned Legal Person 63 78 97 105 
Private 97 109 124 155 
Foreign 8 9 6 11 
Others 32 59 56 76 
OC<=10% (29 obs.) 2 6 10 11 
State 0 0 2 1 
State-owned Legal Person 0 3 1 0 
Private 2 3 3 6 
Foreign 0 0 1 0 
Others 0 0 3 4 
Note: Ownership concentration is measured by the share held by the largest shareholder. 
Data Source: author 
For each year, we find larger number of listed firms gather in higher level of ownership 
domains. State and state-owned legal persons have accounted for the obvious majority in 
all ranges except for the under 10% category. By contrast, it is rarely found that foreign 
investors take control of China’s PLCs. Even if the foreign investor is the largest 
shareholder of the company, its ownership rarely exceeds 50%, i.e. the share level to 
absolutely control the firm.  
On the other hand, as the reform proceeds, after spin-off restructuring and getting listed, 
majority of state-owned listed companies have witnessed declining performance. It has 
been proved that incorporation and being listed that was initially designed to improve 
SOE’s performance have failed its mission. More and more SOEs, especially those 
labeled as “ST” (special treatment) due to their pool performance, sell their legal person 
shares to private investors under administrative pressure from local authorities who are 
normally reluctant to lose the listing quota of the local area. Through this way more and 
more private enterprises manage to benefit from China’s fast growing stock markets, 
although the stock markets were initially established to solve external financial 
constraints problems for SOEs. Noticeably, compared with PLCs controlled by the state 
and state-owned legal persons, privately controlled PLCs tend to have a more dispersed 
ownership, and private largest shareholders gather in the 50% domains. The proportions 
of observations allocated in the four ranges starting from the bottom are 0.65%, 33.64%, 
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27.65%, and 38.05% respectively. This suggests majority of China’s PLCs have highly 
concentrated ownership. 
4.4.4.4 Persistence in Tunneling 
In the above section, we find China’s PLCs’ ownerships have been highly concentrated 
over the sample period. Due to the tradability constraints imposed on shares held by state 
and legal persons, the largest shareholder ownership of China’s PLCs tends to be rather 
persistent. This explains the reason why in the underdeveloped financial market the 
largest shareholders are more likely to become entrenched and carry out tunneling 
activities to pursue self interest. According to the Company Law, and Administrative 
Note of Chinese Publicly Listed Companies from the CSRC, mainly there are three 
illegal methods for controlling shareholders to carry out expropriation of other minority 
shareholders, including funds extraction and misappropriation, associated transactions at 
non-market prices, and irregular associated guarantees. In this study, we use PLCs’ 
balance of “Other Receivables” related to their largest shareholders to measure tunneling. 
Table 4.9 below shows the decision making pattern of funds extraction by largest 
shareholders.  
Table 4.9 Percentage and Probability of Tunnel Decision in Two Consecutive Years 
Description Year 













Tt = 0 | Tt-1= 1 13.24% 10.92% 12.83% 12.63% 12.40% 
Tt = 1 | Tt-1= 0 7.87% 11.30% 10.22% 10.74% 9.99% 
Total  21.11% 22.22% 23.05% 23.37% 22.39% 
Percentage 
Of 
Tt = 0 | Tt-1= 0 14.13% 16.20% 16.63% 19.16% 16.42% 
Tt = 1 | Tt-1= 1 64.76% 61.58% 60.32% 57.47% 61.19% 
Persistence Total 78.89% 77.78% 76.95% 76.63% 77.61% 
P(Tt|Tt-1=0) P(Tt =0|Tt-1=0) 64.23% 58.91% 61.94% 64.08% 62.17% 
P(Tt =1|Tt-1=0) 35.77% 41.09% 38.06% 35.92% 37.83% 
P(Tt|Tt-1=1) P(Tt =0|Tt-1=1) 16.97% 15.06% 17.54% 18.02% 16.85% 
P(Tt =1|Tt-1=1) 83.03% 84.94% 82.46% 81.98% 73.15% 
Note: T denotes tunneling (funds extraction) committed by the largest shareholder, which equals 
one if tunneling takes place that year, and equals zero otherwise.   
Data source: Author 
As we can see, there is a high persistence in funds extraction by the largest shareholders 
between two consecutive years. This justifies hypothesis 4 aforementioned in Chapter 3, 
which is that there is a high propensity for a controlling shareholder who tunneled in the 
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previous year to tunnel again this year. The percentage of persistent tunneling decision 
between two consecutive years (including tunneling in both years and not tunneling in 
both years) has a high average of 78%. Specifically, for the largest shareholders who did 
not tunnel (no funds extraction) in the previous year (TUNNELt-1 = 0), 37.83% will 
change to tunneling in the current year, whereas 73.15% of shareholders who tunneled in 
the previous year (TUNNELt-1 =1) carry on tunneling in the current year. This persistence 
in tunneling explains why we include a lagged dependent variable on the right side of 
tunneling model in above dynamic random effects probit model.   
4.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we first develop models for the relation between corporate ownership 
and firm value (the firm value model), and the possibility for the largest shareholder to 
carry out tunneling activities (the tunneling model) respectively. Hypotheses and 
variables are presented for each model. Then theoretically we try to find suitable 
econometric methods to estimate these models. For the firm value model, we compare 
cross section methods and fixed effects panel data methods. We find the former is fraught 
with potential problems of endogenous ownership variables, and its validity is further 
challenged by the difficulty of finding good instruments. A fixed effects model, on the 
other hand, mitigates endogeneity by allowing for the correlation between endogenous 
ownership variables and unobserved firm-specific effects. In terms of the tunneling 
model, we adopt a dynamic binary model to examine how tunneling persistently takes 
place in China’s PLCs. With a panel data sample, we compare traditional random and 
fixed effects models with a dynamic random effects probit model. We choose the latter 
method since it allows for endogeneity of ownership variables, unobserved heterogeneity 
and dynamic aspects (persistence) of tunneling activities.  
Through descriptive analysis, we find the coexistence of low levels of managerial 
ownership with high levels of the largest shareholder’s ownership in China’s PLCs. 
Nonetheless, both types of insider ownership change slowly over the sample period. We 
also find there is a high propensity for a controlling shareholder who tunneled in the 





In this chapter, we first use OLS to estimate the pooled sample in both single equation 
analysis and simultaneous equation analysis. Comparatively, to allow for unobserved 
firm-specific heterogeneity, panel data modes are applied in both single equation and 
simultaneous equation analysis.  In order to provide further evidence of the ownership­
and-firm value relation, we then use cross-sectional data to analyze the effects of the 
separation between cash flow rights and voting rights on firm value. The reason for using 
cross sectional data is due to data availability about the ultimate controlling parties in 
China’s stock markets. On the other hand, the highly concentrated ownership structure in 
China’s stock markets draws attention to the occurrence of tunneling. To allow for the 
high persistence of tunneling and the endogeneity problem of initial conditions, in latter 
part of this chapter we use a dynamic random effects probit model to examine the 
occurrence of tunneling. 
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. The second section is a preliminary 
analysis of the ownership-and-firm value relation on the pooled sample and will be 
carried out using single OLS analysis and OLS simultaneous equation analysis. The third 
section uses single equation analysis and simultaneous equation analysis by panel data 
methods. In the fourth section we use OLS on a cross-section dataset to further examine 
the role of ultimate controllers in the ownership-and-firm value relation. Then we explore 
the tunneling occurrence using a dynamic random effects probit model. Finally, we 
summarize our findings in the last section. 
5.2 Preliminary Analysis on Pooled Sample 
5.2.1 Single Equation Analysis by OLS 
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5.2.1.1 Firm Value Model  
Our OLS estimation of the ownership and firm value relation starts on the pooled 
sample by regressing firm value on ownership variables and control variables. Table 5.1 
below presents results of three specifications according to different combinations of 
managerial ownership and largest shareholder’s ownership. All six regressions control for 
unknown heteroskedasticity by using correction technique of White (1980).  
Table 5.1 OLS Estimation of Ownership and Firm Value Relation with Tobin’s Q as 
the Dependent Variable  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
INTERCEPT 4.0324***(10.22) 4.6703***(10.22) 4.9379 ***(14.55) 22.9082***(11.26) 22.5879***(11.12) 
MO -0.0469 * (-1.83) 0.1479 * (1.65) -0.3187 **(-2.02) -0.5170***(-3.75) -0.3415***(-2.92) 
MO2 - -0.076 (-0.42) 0.0303 *(1.87) 0.0441***(3.24) 0.0266 **(2.40) 
MO3 - - -0.0006 *(-1.78) -0.0008***(-3.05) -0.0005**(-2.26) 
LS 0.0013 (0.51) -0.0019 (-0.22) -0.0018 (-0.22) -0.0070 (-1.02) -0.0097 (-1.55) 
LS2 - 0.0002 (0.62) 0.0001 (0.63) 0.0003***(3.74) 0.0003***(3.85) 
STATE -0.2327***(-2.75) -0.2540***(-2.91) -0.2547***(-2.95) -0.0819 (-1.07) -0.0540 (-0.67) 
TOP5LS 0.0172**(3.75) 0.0179**(3.83) 0.0181***(3.83) 0.0180***(4.81) 0.0158***(4.67) 
INDIR -0.0422***(-9.37) -0.0460***(-10.70) -0.0423***(-11.95) -0.0252***(-8.99) -0.0034 (-0.73) 
LIQUID - - - 0.1078 (0.82) 0.0850 (0.62) 
INTANGIBLE - - - -0.3377 (-0.68) -0.4046 (-0.85) 
RISK - - - 0.4262***(13.82) 0.3917***(12.63) 
DIVIDEND - - - 0.2945 (1.28) 0.1616 (0.74) 
DAR - - - -1.2128***(-5.14) -0.1296***(-4.71) 
SIZE - - - -1.0488***(-10.20) -1.0255***(-10.00) 
GROWTH - - - 0.0021 (0.93) 0.0014 (0.64) 
AGE - - - 0.0358***(3.62) 0.0864***(8.61) 
SOEWORK - - - -0.0523 (-0.72) -0.1680**(-2.33) 
LOCATIONw - - - -0.0050 (-0.08) -0.0301 (-0.49) 
LOCATIONe - - - 0.3796***(5.76) 0.2818***(3.99) 
AUDITs - - - 2.57 **(0.0252) 1.79 (0.1116) 
DINDUSTRYs - - - - 8.41***(0.000) 
DYEARs - - - - 45.86***(0.000) 
Adjusted R2 0.1101 0.1106 0.1397 0.4089 0.4145 
F test 24.10 *** (0.000) 24.13 *** (0.000) 24.30 *** (0.000) 42.83***(0.000) 43.57***(0.000) 
Observations 2748 2748 2748 2748 2748 
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Note:  t statistics are in the parentheses for coefficients.  P values are in the parentheses for tests. 
*, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% confidence levels (two tailed) respectively. 
We have estimated the models with the variables entered individually as a test for 
multicollinearity, but given the t-tests indicate all three terms are significant, there is no 
evidence of multicollinearity, or something like this. Specifically, the first three 
specifications only contain ownership variables, with different combinations of 
managerial ownership (MO) and the largest shareholder’s ownership (LS). With square 
terms MO2 and LS2 added in specification 2, both adjusted R2 and joint significance just 
slightly increased. When we expand the model by adding cubic term of managerial 
shareholding (MO3), the increase in both adjusted R2 and joint significance of ownership 
variables become much larger. These improvements justify our cubic specification about 
managerial ownership in the ownership and firm value relation.  
When in specification 4 we include all the control variables, except the year and 
industry dummies, the adjusted R2 increases remarkably to 40.89%, suggesting their joint 
statistical significance. Specification 5 further expands the model by adding the year and 
industry dummies into the control variables. There is an increase in R2 to 41.45%. All 
three regressions confirm a cubic relation between firm value (Tobin’s Q) and managerial 
ownership (MO). Specifically, as managerial ownership increases, firm value will first 
decrease, then increase, and finally decrease. Noticeably, this finding does not justify our 
hypothesis of the increase-decrease-increase cubic relation, derived from studies by 
Morck et al. (1988) and Short and Keasey (1999) respectively. Likewise, we fail to 
support our hypothesis of an inverse “U” relation between the largest shareholder’s 
ownership (LS) and firm value. Instead, we detect a “U” shaped relation between them in 
the latter two specifications. We can interpret this point in two ways. The first explanation 
is that as the largest shareholder increases his shares, firm value will first decrease and 
then increase. The other one is that investors in China’s stock markets give higher 
valuations to firms with either low or high levels of the largest shareholder ownership 
than those firms with intermediate levels. This concern reflects the actual pattern of 
tunneling by controlling shareholders in China. Besides, the changes in significance of 
LS terms from specification 1 to 2 suggest that the inclusion of control variables affects 
the influence of LS on firm value.  
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As far as other ownership variables are concerned, in the last two specifications they are 
jointly statistically significant and of reasonable magnitudes. Individually, like empirical 
results regarding the inefficiency of state-owned enterprises, we find that firms with the 
state (departments) or SOEs as their largest shareholders tend to have lower firm value, 
although the significance of the dummy variable STATE disappears in specification 4 and 
5. Nevertheless, significantly throughout all models all at the 1% level, other large 
shareholders’ ownership (TOP5LS) plays a positive role in improving firm value. The 
significance of independent directors on the board (INDIR) disappears as we include year 
and industry dummies. Besides, auditing firms (AUDIT) also fail to work as an effective 
monitoring force against agency problems to ultimately improve firm value.   
In terms of control variables, smaller firms (SIZE) are found to have higher firm value 
thanks to their higher efficiency and more transparency. Firm value decreases from 
eastern areas to western areas of China. Firms located in eastern areas are more likely to 
have higher firm value. We also find firms with longer listing histories (AGE) experience 
higher firm value because they can signal an image of sustainable development to the 
market. Nonetheless, although the market regards a low debt level (DAR) as an 
advantage for a listed firm, firms with more volatile stock prices (RISK) surprisingly are 
shown to have higher firm value. This can only be explained by the fact that in China’s 
stock market with too much information asymmetry, investors tend to treat high volatility 
as speculation opportunities, instead of focusing on more solidly grounded factors. 
Furthermore, the proportion of SOE workers in a city’s total work force (SOEWORK) 
has significant negative effects on firm value. The changes in its significance from 
specification 4 to 5 reflect the fact that this political factor is closely related to 
government policies.  
  In addition, intangible assets (INTANGIBLE) do not significantly contribute to firm 
value. Besides, although with the expected positive influence, no significant evidence 
shows firms with faster growth of net profits (GROWTH) have higher firm value. Higher 
dividend (DIVIDEND) does not increase firm value. This might be explained by the high 
trade turnover ratio in China’s stock markets. By contrast, firms with more free cash flow 
(LIQUID) are more attractive to investors, but in an insignificant sense. Finally, industry 
and year dummy variables are significant but not reported.  
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5.2.1.2 Managerial Ownership Equation 
  Loderer and Martin (1997) suggest the adverse causality between managerial ownership 
and firm value: manager might decide to hold more shares as firm value (Tobin’s Q) 
increases. In this section, we use OLS on the pooled sample to examine the determinants 
of managerial ownership. The result is presented in Table 5.2 below. 
Table 5.2 OLS Estimation of Ownership and Firm Value Relation with Managerial 
Ownership as the Dependent Variable  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
INTERCEPT 2.2748 ** (2.19) 2.1219 ** (2.03) 2.5817 ** (1.96) 2.4305 * (1.80) 
Q 0.0294 * (1.77) 0.0279 * (1.69) 0.0381 * (1.95) 0.0365 * (1.85) 
LS 0.0047 * (1.77) 0.0092 * (1.74) 0.0049 * (1.80) 0.0093 * (1.80) 
LS2 - -0.0001 (-1.14) - -0.0001 (-1.13) 
STATE -0.1088 ** (-2.05) -0.1132 ** (-2.09) -0.1112 ** (-1.98) -0.1155 ** (-2.03) 
TOP5LS 0.0046 * (1.72) 0.0044 * (1.64) 0.0046 * (1.77) 0.0044 * (1.69) 
INDIR 0.0029 * (1.70) 0.0030 * (1.73) 0.0041 (1.18) 0.0042 (1.19) 
LIQUID 0.0212 (0.31) 0.0241 (0.35) 0.0005 (0.01) 0.0030 (0.03) 
INTANGIBLE 0.0912 (0.32) 0.0745 (0.25) -0.1245 (-1.04) -0.1405 (-1.11) 
RISK 0.0201 ** (2.42) 0.0193 ** (2.31) 0.0194 * (1.64) 0.0185 (1.54) 
DIVIDEND 0.3451 * (1.75) 0.3601 * (1.76) 0.2975 (1.50) 0.3133 (1.51) 
DAR -0.0914 *** (-2.64) -0.0914 *** (-2.64) -0.0542 (-0.86) -0.0551 (-0.86) 
SIZE -0.0865 * (-1.89) -0.0835 * (-1.82) -0.0977 * (-1.69) -0.0946 (-1.62) 
GROWTH 0.0003 (0.81) 0.0003 (0.92) 0.0003 (0.80) 0.0004 (0.89) 
AGE -0.0233 ** (-2.50) -0.0235 ** (-2.49) -0.0227 ** (-2.53) -0.0229 ** (-2.51) 
LOCATIONw -0.0884 (-1.24) -0.0858 (-1.18) -0.0954 (-1.24) -0.0928 (-1.18) 
LOCATIONe -0.0176 (-0.28) -0.0163 (-0.25) -0.0352 (-0.45) -0.0342 (-0.43) 
AUDITs 0.77 (0.5711) 0.85 (0.5140) 0.69 (0.6276) 0.70 (0.6197) 
DINDUSTRYs - - 2.07 ** (0.0197) 2.07 ** (0.0191) 
DYEARs - - 0.54 (0.6560) 0.54 (0.6570) 
Adjusted R2 0.0163 0.0166 0.0233 0.0235 
F test 2.34 *** (0.000) 2.29 *** (0.000) 1.75 *** (0.0043) 1.76 *** (0.0034) 
Observations 2748 2748 2748 2748 
Note:  t statistics are in the parentheses for coefficients.  P values are in the parentheses for tests. 
*, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% confidence levels (two tailed) respectively. 
There are four specifications of managerial ownership equation in Table 5.2. Tobin’s Q 
is significant at the 10% level in each model. Specification 2 and 4 include both LS and 
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LS2, but LS2 is not statistically significant in either specification. All four models have 
rather low adjusted R2. The inclusion of industry dummies in specification 3 and 4 
improves the explanatory power of regressors. The year dummies, on the other hand, do 
not significantly affect managerial ownership. This is consistent with the descriptive 
finding of only small changes in managerial ownership over the sample years. In the 
specification 3, the preferred model, we find firm value (Q) and largest shareholder’s 
ownership (LS) are both significant at the 10% level and positively affect managerial 
ownership. 
As for other regressors, firms controlled by the state departments or SOEs (STATE) tend 
to have lower managerial ownership at the 5% significance level, whereas other large 
shareholders’ ownership (TOP5LS) positively affect managerial ownership at the 10% 
significance level. Larger firms (SIZE) tend to have lower managerial ownership due to 
wealth constraints on managers. We also find firms with longer listing histories (AGE) 
tend to have lower managerial ownership. 
Noticeably, there are some changes in sign, magnitude and significance of regressors 
when industry and year dummies are added in specifications 3 and 4, indicating the 
influence of these regressors on managerial ownership rely on the firm’s industry 
affiliation and macroeconomic environment, the latter captured by year dummies. 
Specifically, intangible assets (INTANGIBLE) changes its sign from positive to negative 
and its magnitude and significance become larger. Besides, the significance of 
independent director on the board (INDIR) at the 10% level, dividends ratio (DIVIDEND) 
at the 10% level and leverage (DAR) at the 1% level disappears. Additionally stock 
volatility (RISK) becomes less significant from 5% to 10% level.  
5.2.1.3 Largest Shareholding Equation  
Another potentially endogenous variable in firm value model is the largest shareholder’s 
ownership. In other words, the simultaneity problem can arise in the sense that when firm 
value increases the largest shareholder tends to increase his ownership accordingly. As a 
result, OLS estimation becomes inconsistent. In this subsection, we examine the 
determinants of largest shareholder’s ownership. According to the institutional 
background mentioned before, state ownership is predominant in China’s stock markets 
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and PLCs controlled by state and its agencies are closely related to local governments. 
Thus we expand the ownership equation by adding three more control variables, the city 
level fiscal revenue per capita (LREVENUE), the unemployment rate of the city where 
PLC is located (UNEMPLOY), and the proportion of SOE workers in the city’s total 
work force (SOEWORK). The OLS estimation on the pooled sample is provided in Table 
5.3. 
Table 5.3 OLS Estimation of Ownership and Firm Value Relation with Largest 

Shareholder’s Ownership as Dependent Variable  

(1) (2) 
INTERCEPT 12.9752 *** (8.89) 14.1827 *** (9.64) 
Q 0.2571 ** (2.57) 0.2031 ** (2.08) 
MO -2.5535 ** (-2.36) -2.3991 ** (-2.32) 
MO2 0.3229 *** (3.31) 0.2057 ** (2.09) 
MO3 -0.0066 *** (-3.61) -0.0036 * (-1.94) 
STATE 1.9106 *** (5.15) 1.9320 *** (5.29) 
TOP5LS -0.9270 *** (-39.30) -0.9135 *** (-39.49) 
INDIR 0.0515 *** (4.28) 0.0020 (0.11) 
LIQUID 1.1529 (1.54) 1.2445 (1.54) 
INTANGIBLE -5.3993 ** (-2.56) -4.1530 * (-1.94) 
RISK -0.1732 (-1.35) -0.1288 (-0.99) 
DIVIDEND 5.1755 *** (4.31) 4.1720 *** (3.63) 
DAR -4.4224 *** (-5.58) -4.3303 *** (-5.41) 
SIZE 1.8284 *** (7.51) 1.7085 *** (7.20) 
GROWTH 0.0050 (0.51) 0.0074 (0.75) 
AGE -0.2310 *** (-3.08) -0.2571 *** (-3.53) 
LOCATIONw -0.6881 (-1.01) -0.7814 (-1.32) 
LOCATIONe -1.3959 ** (-2.31) -0.8198 (-1.26) 
UNEMPLOY -10.6153 *** (-2.90) -10.8631 *** (-3.14) 
SOEWORK -0.0610 (-0.15) -0.3227 (-0.81) 
LREVENUE 0.0001 ** (2.38) 0.0002 *** (3.95) 
AUDITs 1.39 (0.2249) 2.56 ** (0.0257) 
DINDUSTRYs - 15.48 *** (0.000) 
DYEARs - 14.55 *** (0.000) 
Adjusted R2 0.4872 0.5262 
F test 137.01 *** (0.000) 102.96 *** (0.000) 
Observations 2748 2748 
Note:  t statistics are in the parentheses for coefficients.  P values are in the parentheses for tests. 
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*, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% confidence levels (two tailed) respectively. 
Similar to Table 5.1, we have also estimated the models with the variables 
entered individually as a test for multicollinearity. Again, there is no evidence of 
multicollinearity. Since there is no much difference in magnitude and signs of other 
variables, we do not include all results here. Besides, the inclusion of industry dummies 
and year dummies, jointly significant at 1% and 5% respectively, increases the adjusted 
R2 by around 4%. Tobin’s Q (Q) significantly increases the largest shareholder’s 
ownership at 5% significant level in both specifications. Like its role in the 
aforementioned firm value model, managerial ownership (MO) is found to have a 
decrease-increase-decrease cubic relation with the largest shareholder’s ownership. 
With respect to other ownership control variables, firms controlled by state departments 
or SOEs (STATE) tend to have higher largest shareholder’s ownership, which is strongly 
related to these firms’ advantage of getting loans from banks compared with those firms 
controlled by private legal persons. The stronger second to the fifth largest shareholders’ 
ownership (TOP5LS) variable negatively affects the ownership of the largest shareholder. 
Similar to the managerial ownership equation, the inclusion of industry and year 
dummies makes the significance of independent directors on the board (INDIR) disappear. 
Auditing firm’s comments in the annual report (AUDIT), however, become significant at 
the 5% level. 
Unlike managerial ownership, larger firms (SIZE) tend to have higher ownership of the 
largest shareholder. This could also be explained by the fact that many PLCs in China are 
directly owned by the state (departments) or indirectly controlled through its institutions 
or enterprises, which normally have the advantage of preferential policies to get loans 
from banks. Nevertheless, the largest shareholder’s ownership in firms with higher debt 
(DAR), higher stock volatility (RISK) and a longer listing history (AGE) tend to be lower. 
High leverage and stock volatility indicates high financial risk. With a long history of 
being listed, experienced ultimate controllers of PLCs use complex ultimate controlling 
structures (mainly pyramid structure in China stock markets) to enlarge the separation 
between cash flow rights and voting rights. 
As for political factors, we find city fiscal revenue per capita (LREVENUE) is 
positively related to the largest shareholder’s ownership at 1% in the full specification. It 
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is consistent with the conjecture that a richer local government might put less pressure on 
individual firms. The city’s unemployment rate (UNEMPLOY), on the other hand, has 
significant negative effects on the largest shareholder’s ownership. A high unemployment 
rate means the largest shareholder will have to face higher pressure from local 
government to assume social responsibilities like reducing local unemployment. 
Surprisingly, the proportion of SOE workers in city’s work force (SOEWORK) fails to 
show any significant effects.  
Finally, the locations of firms do not have significant effects on the largest shareholder’s 
ownership. Industry effects and year dummies also significantly affect firms’ largest 
shareholding at 1% and 10% respectively.  
5.2.2 Simultaneous Equation Analysis by OLS 
5.2.2.1 Endogeneity of Corporate Ownership  
According to the above OLS estimation of single equations, firm value (Q), managerial 
ownership (MO) and largest shareholder’s ownership (LS) are shown to be seemingly 
jointly determined. However, the above OLS results for single equation analysis can be 
biased due to the potential endogeneity of ownership variables. Regarding the 
endogeneity of corporate ownership, Demsetz (1983) theoretically argues that corporate 
ownership is jointly determined by a firm’s external environment, and internal 
characteristics such as industry affiliation, investment opportunity, growth potential, and 
asymmetric information. His study finds supports from further researches by Demsetz 
and Lehn (1985), Kroszner and Sheehan (1999), Himmelberg et al. (1999) and Demsetz 
and Villalonga (2001) respectively. Endogenous ownership in the firm performance 
model means the disturbance term ε i not only affects firm performance but reflects 
factors that cause changes in the ownership variables. If this is the case, the OLS results 
are no longer consistent and conventional statistic tests are no longer valid. Consequently, 
this will make it impossible to isolate the influence of corporate ownership variables on 
firm performance.  
  In order to examine the exogeneity of managerial ownership and largest shareholder’s 
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ownership, we perform an augmented regression test suggested by Davidson and 
MacKinnon (1993). We first regress managerial ownership (MO) and largest 
shareholder’s ownership (LS) respectively on all exogenous independent variables in the 
equation system and store the residuals of two regressions into MO_residual and 
LS_residual respectively. Then we estimate the following two augmented regressions: 
Q =ϕ +ϕ MO +ϕ LS +ϕ MO _ residual +ϕ LS _ residual + u (5.1)i 0 1 i 2 i 3 i 4 i i 
2 3 2Q =α +α MO +α MO +α MO +α LS +α LS + β STATE + β TOP5LS + β INDIRi 0 1 i 2 i 3 i 4 i 5 i 1 i 2 i 3 i 
2 (5.2) 





+ γ 2 ∑YEARj +γ 3 ∑ INDUSTRYk +ϕ5 MO _ residuali +ϕ6 LS _ residuali +ε i 
j=1 k =1 
The result shows ϕ3 and ϕ4 in the first equation and ϕ5  and ϕ6 in the second equation 
are all significantly different from zero at 5%, 1%, 10% and 10% respectively, indicating 
both managerial ownership and largest shareholder’s ownership are endogenous in the 
firm value model. The simultaneity problem between firm value and ownership variables 
results in inconsistency in the above OLS estimates of ownership firm value relation by 
single equations. So we use 2SLS method in a simultaneous equation model to tackle this 
problem. 
5.2.2.2 Simultaneous Equation Analysis  
The simultaneous equation model contains three equations as follows. 
2 3 2Qi =α10 +α11MOi +α12 MOi +α13MOi +α14 LSi +α15 LSi + β11STATEi + β12TOP5LSi + β13 INDIRi          (5.3) 
+ β LIQUID + β RISK + β INTANGIBLE + β SIZE + β AGE + β RSOEWORKER14 i 15 i 16 i 17 i 18 i 19 i 
2 3 11 
+ β110 AUDITi + γ 11 ∑LOCATIONi +γ 12 ∑YEARj + γ 13 ∑ INDUSTRYk + ε1i 
i=1 j=1 k =1 




+ β210 AUDITi +γ 21 ∑LOCATIONi +γ 22 ∑YEARj +γ 23 ∑ INDUSTRYk +ε 2i 
i=1 j=1 k=1 
LS =α +α MO +α MO 2 +α MO 3 +α Q + β STATE + β TOP5LS + β INDIRi 30 31 i 32 i 33 i 36 i 30 i 32 i 33 i         (5.5) + β LIQUID + β RISK + β INTANGIBLE + β SIZE + β AGE + β RSOEWORKER34 i 35 i 36 i 37 i 38 i 39 i 
3 11 
+ β310 AUDITi + β311RFREVENUEi + β312 RUNEMPLOY +γ 32 ∑YEARj +γ 33 ∑ INDUSTRYk +ε 3i 
j=1 k =1 
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Since two predetermined variables, city fiscal revenue per capita (LREVENUE) and the 
city’s unemployment rate (UNEMPLOY), are only included in the largest shareholder’s 
ownership equation, both the firm value model and the managerial ownership equation 
meet the necessary condition of identification. In effect, the firm value model is just 
identified due to the exclusion of the above two variables and the managerial ownership 
model is over identified because another political factor SOEWORK is also excluded. 
For the identification of the largest shareholder’s ownership equation, we exclude two 
location dummies (LOCATIONe and LOCATIONw) due to their insignificant effects on 
the largest shareholder’s ownership. Table 5.4 below provides two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) estimation of the simultaneous equation system.    
Table 5.4 2SLS Estimation of Ownership and Firm Value Relations 
Q MO LS 
INTERCEPT 16.3005 *** (8.28) 10.5495 ** (2.32) 19.36202 ** (1.99) 
QHAT 0.6684 *** (2.68) 2.9076 *** (8.59) 
MOHAT 1.4208 * (1.75) -10.5468 *** (-4.72) 
MOHAT2 - 1.0186 *** (5.23) 
MOHAT3 - -0.0196 *** (-5.43) 
LSHAT -0.1564 * (-1.76) 0.0578 ** (2.17) 
LSHAT2 0.0002 *** (4.31) -0.0004 *** (-2.68) 
STATE -0.1298 * (-1.80) -0.2352 * (-1.92) 4.6841 *** (5.10) 
TOP5LS 0.1512 ** (2.00) 0.0283 * (1.96) -0.7922 *** (-15.50) 
INDIR -0.0067 (-1.56) 0.0017 (0.64) -0.0697 * (-1.78) 
LIQUID 0.0786 (0.63) 0.0867 (1.13) -0.8372 (-0.71) 
INTANGIBLE 0.1910 (0.70) -0.3128 * (-1.74) -18.1601 *** (-5.14) 
RISK 0.3431 *** (15.72) -0.2286 ** (-2.59) -0.7180 *** (-2.56) 
DIVIDEND -1.2323 * (-1.98) 0.4113 * (1.74) 1.7366 *** (3.52) 
DAR -1.0881 *** (-5.53) -1.0616 * (-1.75) -1.1708 (-0.75) 
SIZE -0.8137 *** (-9.56) -0.5413 ** (-2.48) 1.5838 *** (3.86) 
GROWTH 0.0006 (0.44) 0.0016 (1.39) 0.0200 (1.52) 
AGE 0.1351 *** (3.44) 0.0618 (1.19) -1.0594 *** (-4.75) 
LOCATIONw -0.0100  (-0.24) -0.1087 (-1.37) -
LOCATIONe 0.2631 * (1.90) 0.2176 * (1.79) -
SOEWORK -0.1531 (-1.44) - -0.6736 (-0.54)  
LREVENUE - - 0.0006 *** (4.84) 
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UNEMPLOY - - -10.5233 *** (-2.58) 
AUDITs 2.21 * (0.0506) 0.84 (0.5207) 3.94 *** (0.0014) 
DINDUSTRYs 5.46 *** (0.000) 2.07 ** (0.0197) 13.66 *** (0.000) 
DYEARs 18.92 *** (0.000) 0.85 (0.4640) 18.50 *** (0.000) 
Adjusted R2 0.4205 0.0267 0.5123 
F test 40.21 *** (0.000) 1.69 *** (0.0073) 101.66 *** (0.000) 
Observations 2748 2748 2748 
Note:  t statistics are in the parentheses for coefficients.  P values are in the parentheses for tests. 
*, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% confidence levels (two tailed) respectively. 
The firm value model is shown in the first column. Overall, regressors are jointly 
significant and have reached a reasonable explanatory power (adjusted R2 is 42.05%). 
MOHAT and LSHAT are predicted values of managerial ownership (MO) and the largest 
shareholder’s ownership (LS), which are obtained from the first-stage regressions of 
managerial ownership equation and the largest shareholder equation respectively. Unlike 
the OLS single equation, 2SLS estimation fails to detect a cubic relation between 
managerial ownership (MOHAT) and firm value (Tobin’s Q). Instead, only an incentive 
alignment effect of managerial ownership is found. On the other hand, like single 
equation analysis, the significance and positive sign of LSHAT2 suggests that the largest 
shareholder’s ownership affects firm value in a “U”-shaped way, which is inconsistent 
with our hypothesis of LS: the inverse “U”-shaped effects on firm value. In other words, 
we fail to detect an incentive alignment effect of the largest shareholders. This nonlinear 
influence of the largest shareholder’s ownership on firm value confirms our conjecture 
that tunneling by controlling shareholders reaches its most severe level when their 
ownership is at intermediate level. While too low ownership does not give the largest 
shareholder enough controlling power, too high ownership means tunneling is carried out 
at high cash flow cost. Other large shareholders’ ownership (TOP5LS) positively affects 
firm value at the 5% significance level, indicating their monitoring role against agency 
problems. Nonetheless, independent directors on the board (INDIR) do not seem to serve 
as an internal effective monitoring force. Similar to the single equation analysis, firms 
with a state department or a SOE as the largest shareholder (STATE) tend to have lower 
firm value.  
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High stock volatility (RISK) is still shown to significantly increase firm value at the 1% 
level. This finding is consistent with high speculation and high trade turnover ratio in 
China’s stock markets. Despite its positive effects on firm value, intangible assets 
(INTANGIBLE) have always been insignificant. This might be due to the small 
proportion of R&D and advertising in PLC’s total assets. Although smaller firms (SIZE) 
tend to be evaluated higher thanks to their less frequent principal-agency problems, firms 
with a longer history of being listed (AGE) are also expected to have higher firm value 
due to their sustainability and experience. In addition, leverage (DAR) is found to have 
significant negative effects on firm value at the 1% level. Surprisingly, despite its 
significance at 10%, dividend (DIVIDEND) is found to negatively affect firm value. 
Besides, net profit growth rate (GROWTH) does not significantly increase firm value. 
This seemingly “strange” finding of dividend and profit suggests given the fact that 
earning management and profit tunneling by controlling shareholders of PLCs have been 
epidemic in China’s stock markets, investors are rather suspicious of (accidental) high 
dividends and high growth announcement. Additionally, firms with more free cash flow 
(LIQUID) are shown to insignificantly have higher firm value. Furthermore, the 
proportion of SOE workers in a city’s total work force (SOEWORK) is shown to have 
negative but insignificant effects on firm value. Finally, dummy variables of auditing 
comments, location, year, and industry effects are all jointly significant.  
The second column of Table 5.4 reports the 2SLS estimation of the managerial 
ownership equation. QHAT is the predictor of Tobin’s Q obtained from the first-stage 
firm value regression. First-stage regressions of the firm value model and the largest 
shareholder’s ownership equation show the strong explanatory power that all exogenous 
variables have in QHAT and LSHAT. In other words, QHAT and LSHAT are good 
predictors for Q and LS respectively. But in the second stage, we find a rather weak 
relation (adjusted R2 equals 2.67%). We find firms with higher value (QHAT) tend to 
have higher managerial ownership at 1% significance level. The largest shareholder’s 
ownership (LSHAT), however, has an inverse-“U” relation with managerial ownership, 
which can probably be explained by the predominance of state ownership in China’s 
stock markets. Specifically, initially firms with state departments or SOEs as the largest 
shareholder (STATE) tend to have lower managerial ownership. As reform of 
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incorporation proceeds, budget constraints on state-owned legal persons became 
tightened and regulatory scrutiny from CSRC became increasingly strict. As a result, 
during the sample years, some state-owned legal person block shares has been sole to 
private investors so that some PLCs have experienced change of control from the state to 
private investors. In this privatization process, management buy-outs (MBOs) is one of 
the methods adopted in 2001-2, after which the enthusiasm has faded away owing to the 
suspicion of undervaluation of state asset and state asset-stripping. Finally, other large 
shareholders (TOP5LS) are in favor of increasing managerial ownership to enhance 
managers’ incentive, which is consistent with their objective of deterring agency 
problems.  
In addition, due to their wealth constraints managers of larger firms (SIZE) tend to have 
lower managerial ownership. But, firms with a longer history of being listed (AGE) are 
found to have higher managerial ownership. This is because experienced managers need 
to be awarded so as to behave competently. Interestingly, dividend ratio (DIVIDEND) 
intangible assets (INTANGIBLE) and stock volatility (RISK) are shown to have positive, 
negative, and negative effects on managerial ownership respectively, which is of exact 
opposite directions to their effects on firm value reported in column 1. These differences 
reflect the problem of information asymmetry between insiders and outside investors in 
China’s stock markets. On the other hand, leverage (DAR) is shown to have negative 
effects on managerial ownership at 10% significance level. Besides, we also find firms 
located in eastern areas of China tend to have higher managerial ownership. Nonetheless, 
similar to the single equation analysis, we also fail to find significance from independent 
directors on the board (INDIR), free cash flow (LIQUID) and net profit growth 
(GROWTH). Finally, managerial ownership is significantly affected by the firm’s 
industry affiliation, but not by year dummies. 
The 2SLS estimation of the largest shareholder’s ownership is reported in the third 
column of Table 5.4. Overall, the adjusted R2 reaches over 50%, indicating regressors 
jointly have significant influence on the largest shareholder’s ownership. Individually, we 
find higher firm value (QHAT) leads to the increases in the largest shareholder’s 
ownership. Surprisingly, we find a cubic relation between managerial ownership 
(MOHAT) and the largest shareholder’s ownership (LS). In other words, as the 
98 
managerial ownership increases, the largest shareholder’s ownership will first decrease, 
then increase, and finally decrease. The possible interpretation, if any, lies in the different 
relations between the largest shareholder and managers of the firm among China’s PLCs. 
Specifically, the largest shareholder of a firm with low managerial ownership does not 
mind giving up small number of shares to managers to consolidate his control of the firm 
and reduce managerial agency costs. As for firms with high managerial ownership, the 
largest shareholder has to increase his shares from other shareholders to deal with MBO 
(manager buy out) threat to the firm. Firms with stronger insiders where managerial 
ownership tends to be high, top managers might have the power to increase their shares to 
take effective control of the firm at the expense of impairing controlling status of the 
largest shareholder. 
In terms of other ownership structure variables, similar to single equation results, firms 
under state control (STATE) have higher levels of largest shareholder ownership. It is 
shown that other large shareholders (TOP5LS) tend to object to the increase in the largest 
shareholder’s ownership so as to keep their shares stable and avoid tunneling activities by 
the controlling shareholder. Noticeably, as another internal monitoring force, a higher 
proportion of independent directors on the board (INDIR) reduces the incentive of the 
largest shareholder to increase ownership.  
As for control variables, we find intangible assets in total assets (INTANGIBLE) have 
significant negative effects on the largest shareholder’s ownership. A higher ratio of 
intangible assets to total assets indicates a larger opportunity set for discretionary 
spending. As a result, a controlling shareholder might not necessarily increase cash flow 
rights to gain private benefits of control. Similar to managerial ownership, information 
asymmetry is also reflected by the significantly negative effects of stock volatility (RISK) 
on the largest shareholder’s ownership. Understandably, higher dividends (DIVIDENDS) 
and net profit growth (GROWTH) enhance the largest shareholders’ incentive to increase 
their ownership, although the latter is not significant. Additionally, larger firms (SIZE) 
are found to have higher ownership of the largest shareholder, whereas largest 
shareholders of firms with longer history of being listed (AGE) are not keen to increase 
their cash flow rights to gain more benefits.  
As far as political factors are concerned, firms located in cities with higher fiscal 
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revenue per capita (LREVENUE) tend to have higher levels of the largest shareholder’s 
ownership. Higher fiscal revenue will reduce the tax pressure on individual PLCs so that 
the budget constraint for the largest shareholder to increase shareholding is limited and 
the permission of increasing shares by transference transactions is easier to obtain. On the 
other hand, the proportion of SOE workers (SOEWORK) and city’s unemployment rate 
(UNEMPLOY) both have negative effects on the largest shareholder’s ownership, 
although the former’s effect is insignificant. Since many PLCs are controlled by SOEs, 
the financial pressures due to a large number of SOE workers impair these SOEs’ attempt 
to increase their shareholding in PLCs. Finally, all dummy variables, including auditing 
comments, year, and industry effects, are shown to have significant influence on the 
largest shareholder’s ownership. 
    It should be noted that we have also test multicollinearity in the firm value model (the 
first column) and the largest shareholder ownership model (the third column). There is no 
evidence of multicollinearity when we expanding both models with variables entered 
individually. We only include the final confirmed specification here. 
5.3 Panel Data Methods Analysis 
5.3.1 Fixed Effects Model and Random Effects Model 
  In the previous section, we have identified the endogeneity of managerial ownership and 
the largest shareholder’s ownership in OLS estimations of ownership and firm value 
relations. To mitigate this simultaneity problem, a simultaneous equation model is 
estimated by OLS to reveal more consistent relations between corporate ownership and 
firm value, in which all presumably predetermined observable firm characteristics are 
used as instrumental variables in the 2SLS estimation to tackle the endogeneity problem. 
Results of 2SLS estimation show observable firm characteristics significantly affect both 
firm value and corporate ownership. Following a study by Demsetz (1983), Himmelberg 
et al. (1999) argue that managerial ownership is endogenously determined by the 
contracting environment, which can differ across firms in both observable and 
unobservable ways. In order to further mitigate the endogeneity problem of managerial 
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ownership, unobserved firm heterogeneity needs to be controlled for as well. Besides, 
Lee and Ryu (2003) note that the history of managerial ownership needs to be taken into 
account since it is regarded as an effective signal to outside investors in an inefficient 
financial market where is full of asymmetric information. As such, a panel data approach 
is better suited than the cross-sectional methods that were traditionally adopted by Morck 
et al. (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990) respectively. 
The panel data model of the relations between ownership and firm value can be written 
as follows: 
y = D 'α + X ' β +ε                        (5.6) it i it it 
where y can be Tobin’s Q, managerial ownership, or the largest shareholder’s ownership. 
D is the matrix of firm dummies to capture time-invariant unobserved firm-specific 
effects, such as firm’s organization efficiency, management skill and quality, and firm 
connections with local authorities. X is the matrix of observable firm characteristics, 
including ownership variables and control variables. ε it is a white noise error term with 
the distribution of IID (0,δε 2 ). 
  Specifically, if Di is assumed to be correlated with Xit, fixed effects model can be 
derived from Eq. 5.6 as follows: 
yit = Xit 'β +αi +ε it (5.7) 
where αi is time-invariant firm effects. The correlation between α i and Xit render the OLS 
estimation inconsistent. On the other hand, if Di can be assumed to contain a random 
element to be uncorrelated with Xit, Eq. 5.6 will change to a random effects model:  
yit = Xit 'β +α + ui +ε it (5.8) 
where ui is a firm-specific random residual term with the distribution of IID (0, δu 2 ). The 
last two terms in the Eq. 5.8, ui andε it , constitute a compound disturbance.  
With different assumptions made on the correlation between unobserved firm 
heterogeneity and observable explanatory variables, a fixed effects model captures the 
within-firm variation over the sample period, whereas a random effects model uses both 
within-effects and between-effects information. In this section, we will use both fixed 
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effects and random effects model to carry out single equation analysis of the corporate 
ownership and firm value relation. 
5.3.2 Single Equation Analysis by Panel Data Models 
5.3.2.1 Firm Value Model  
Firm value model is estimated by fixed effects model and random effects model and 
results are presented in column 1 and 2 of Table 5.5 respectively. According to the within 
R2, fixed effects model perform slightly better (52.81%) than that of the random effects 
model (52.39%), while the between and the overall R2 of the former (8.08% and 16.63%) 
are both much lower than those of the latter (37.94% and 41.58%) respectively. Both F 
tests in fixed effects models to test the joint significance of all the explanatory variables 
and test joint significance of all firm-specific effects are statistically significant at the 1% 
level. The Wald test in the random effects model confirms the joint significance of all 
regressors. The Breusch-Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier test in random effects model rejects 
the null hypothesis that the variance of the ui s equals zero ( δu 2 =0), indicating 
unobserved firm-specific effects do make a difference in the compound disturbance. 
However, the two Hausman specification tests show the preference of the fixed effects 
model to both the random effects model and OLS.  
So we focus on the fixed effects estimation. Unlike the OLS estimation of the pooled 
sample, we find an inverse-“U”-shaped relation between managerial ownership (MO) and 
firm value (Q), indicating that as managerial shareholding increases, firm value increases 
first due to the incentive alignment effect and then decreases due to the entrenchment 
effect. We find incentive alignment effects of the largest shareholder’s ownership (LS) at 
the 10% significance level, without any non-linear effect detected. This finding is 
consistent with a positive relation between cash flow rights of the largest shareholder and 
firm value found by Claessens et al. (2000) in eight East Asia countries. However, it 
seems not to reflect the case that tunneling controlling shareholders of PLCs is prevalent 
in China’s stock markets. The reason for this might be that the lack of firms’ ultimate 
ownership information throughout the whole sample period limits the ability of our model 
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to use the separation between cash flow rights and voting rights to capture the 
entrenchment effect of controlling shareholders.  
































F test (all i s = 0α ) 
Wald test 
BP-LM test (Var(u)=0) 
Hausman (FE vs. OLS) 
19.3223 *** (13.29) 
0.3125 ** (2.03) 
-0.0088 ** (-2.14) 
-
0.0100 * (1.71) 
-
-1.0001 ** (-2.39) 
0.0093 * (1.90) 
0.0031 (1.61) 
0.1894 *** (2.70) 
0.6704 * (1.79) 
0.2451 *** (19.74) 
0.0239 (0.15) 
-0.5866 *** (-3.71) 
-0.6686 *** (-10.31) 
-0.0015 (-1.54) 











 10.65 *** (0.000) 
-
-
327.49 *** (0.000) 
16.1348 *** (23.08) 
-0.3828 * (-1.46) 
-
-
-0.0031  (-0.45) 
0.0002 ** (2.13) 
-0.0916 ** (-2.23) 
0.0116 *** (3.78) 
0.0021 (1.35) 
0.1807 *** (2.67) 
0.2511 (0.87) 
0.2728 *** (22.87) 
0.0139 (0.09) 
-0.6562 *** (-6.05) 
-0.6810 *** (-22.96) 
-0.0012 (-1.33) 
0.0599 *** (5.12) 
-0.1224 * (-1.64) 
0.1735 *** (2.95) 
0.1196 * (1.68) 
3.53 (0.6191) 
49.83 *** (0.000) 






2654.61  *** (0.000) 
1134.19 *** (0.000) 
-
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Hausman (FE vs. RE) 148.70 *** (0.000) -
Observations 2748 2748 
Note:  t statistics are in the parentheses for coefficients.  P values are in the parentheses for tests. 
*, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% confidence levels (two tailed) respectively. 
We have also test multicollinearity by expanding both models with variables entered 
individually. There is no evidence of multicollinearity found. We only include the final 
confirmed specification here. In terms of other explanatory variables, firm value will 
increase with the identity change of a firm’s largest shareholder from the state or a SOE 
(STATE) to a private legal person. The positive effects of other large shareholders 
(TOP5LS) on firm value are significant at the 10% level. The low significance can be 
explained by the stability of their shares due to the tradability constraints imposed on 
block holders’ shares in China’s stock market. Nevertheless, the increase in independent 
directors on the board (INDIR) does not improve firm value. Besides, the increase in a 
firm’s stock volatility (RISK) tends to improve its value, whereas dividends (DIVIDEND) 
increase does not seem to have significantly positive effects on firm value. On the other 
hand, with fast growth prospect and less suffering from agency problems, smaller (SIZE) 
and younger (AGE) firms are valuated at higher value. However, the net profit growth 
(GROWTH) is still insignificant, as found in the OLS estimation. In addition, leverage 
(DAR) is of significant negative influence on firm value at the 1% level. In contrast to the 
OLS estimation on the pooled sample, free cash flow (LIQUID) positively contributes to 
firm value in both models at the 1% significance level. 
5.3.2.2 Corporate Ownership Equations 
The managerial ownership equation is examined by the fixed effects model and the 
random effects model and the results are reported in columns 1 and 2 respectively in 
Table 5.6. Overall, according to R2 in both models we find rather weak explanatory 
power for all regressors, despite significant results implied by the F test and the Wald test. 
However, in both models we fail to detect any significant effects of the largest 
shareholder’s ownership (LS) or Tobin’s Q (Q) on managerial ownership. This result is 
different from the simultaneity relations found in 2SLS estimation using the pooled 
sample. To explain this, the descriptive finding of low and stable managerial ownership in 
PLCs listed on China’s stock markets might be the answer. The insignificance of firm 
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value is consistent with the fact that in China’s stock markets managerial shareholding 
incentive plans are in their infancy. The majority of PLCs, especially SOE controlled 
ones, have very low managerial ownership and slow transitional changes to avoid state 
asset stripping. Instead, these firms tend to use career promotion as their prior incentive 
tool to reduce managerial agency cost.  
Table 5.6 Panel Data Estimation of Ownership and Firm Value Relation with 




























F test (all = 0α i ) 
Wald test 
BP-LM test (Var(u)=0) 
Observations 
4.9686 ** (2.20) 
-0.0360  (-1.09) 
0.0087 (0.99) 




-0.0207  (-0.20) 




-0.2315 ** (-2.33) 
-0.0001 (-0.01) 
-0.0084  (-0.26) 
-
-






1.82 ** (0.0129) 




2.8603 *** (3.21) 
-0.0392 (-1.52) 
0.0054 (1.58) 
-0.0091 ** (-2.57) 
-0.0066 * (-1.94) 
0.0045 (1.26) 
0.0041 * (1.83) 
-0.0163 (-0.17) 




-0.1099 *** (-2.88) 
0.0002 (0.11) 











46.65 * (0.0901) 
438.87 *** (0.000) 
2748 
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Note:  t statistics are in the parentheses for coefficients.  P values are in the parentheses for tests. 
*, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% confidence levels (two tailed) respectively. 
As far as the largest shareholder’s ownership is concerned, results of fixed effects model 
and random effects model are reported in Table 5.7 below. Overall, both models have 
reasonable levels of R2. Both F tests in the fixed effects model and the Wald test in the 
random effects model confirm the joint significance of all regressors respectively. 
According to the F test for all α i s = 0 in the fixed effects model, unobserved firm effects 
are jointly significant. Likewise, Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test in the 
random effects model confirms the existence of a random term of unobserved firm 
specific effects in the compound disturbance. Two Hausman specification tests compare 
fixed effects model with OLS and with random effects model respectively, and both of 
them confirm the preference of fixed effects model.    
Table 5.7 Panel Data Estimation of Ownership and Firm Value Relation with 

Largest Shareholder’s Ownership as Dependent Variable 

Variables  FE RE 
INTERCEPT 18.8708 ** (2.16) 19.3670 *** (7.61) 
Q 0.1470 * (1.80) 0.2526 *** (2.98) 
MO 0.0575 (1.02) 0.0673 (1.17) 
STATE 0.2087 * (1.74) 0.3281 *** (3.07) 
TOP5LS -0.8631 *** (-71.78) -0.8567 *** (-73.15) 
INDIR 0.0117 (1.62) 0.0101 (1.39) 
LIQUID -0.2865 (-1.05) -0.2970 (-1.08) 
INTANGIBLE -3.2697 ** (-2.30) -4.5544 *** (-2.82) 
RISK -0.0216 (-0.42) -0.0491 (-0.82) 
DIVIDEND 0.4804 (0.78) 0.6348 (0.89) 
DAR -3.2029 *** (-4.75) -2.6079 *** (-3.95) 
SIZE -1.1056 *** (-3.98) -0.8681 *** (-3.23) 
GROWTH 0.0039 (0.98) 0.0042 (1.06) 
AGE -0.2089 * (-1.95) -1.3043 *** (-5.90) 
SOEWORK -0.0229 (-0.11) -0.0195 (-0.10) 
LREVENUE 0.0385 (0.51) 0.1128 (0.72) 
RUEMPLOY -0.2475 (-0.15) -0.4030 (-0.24) 
LOCATIONE - 1.3646 (1.20) 









F test (all i s = 0α ) 
Wald test 
BP-LM test (Var(u)=0) 
Hausman (FE vs. OLS) 
Hausman (FE vs. RE) 
Observations 
0.81 (0.5406) 





262.55 *** (0.000) 
118.44 *** (0.000) 
-
-
368.18 *** (0.000) 
182.40 *** (0.000) 
2748 
5.69 (0.3374) 
24.18 *** (0.000) 






684.77 *** (0.000) 




Note:  t statistics are in the parentheses for coefficients.  P values are in the parentheses for tests. 
*, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% confidence levels (two tailed) respectively. 
In both models, we find Tobin’s Q has significant positive effects on the largest 
shareholder’s ownership. Managerial ownership, despite its positive effects, is not 
significant at any statistical significance level in either model. As for other ownership 
variables, firms with SOE as the largest shareholder (STATE) are more likely to have 
higher levels of the largest shareholder’s ownership. This reflects the predominance of 
state ownership in China’s stock markets, which heavily rely on their easier access to 
loans from banks. As expected, other large shareholding (TOP5LS) is negatively related 
to the largest one’s ownership at the 1% significance level. Independent directors on the 
board (INDIR) have no significant influence on the largest shareholder’s ownership.   
All control variables, except free cash flow (LIQUID), are of expected signs. The 
insignificance of free cash flow helps us understand that controlling shareholders do not 
simply depend on increasing their cash flow rights to gain control of firms’ resources. 
Similar to their counterparts in the 2SLS estimation on the pooled sample, higher 
intangible assets (INTANGIBLE), higher firm leverage (DAR) and higher stock volatility 
(RISK) tend to reduce the incentive of the largest shareholder to increase his shares, 
although RISK is insignificant. The largest shareholders in longer listed firms (AGE) are 
more reluctant to increase their cash flow rights. This might be because their controlling 
status have already been solidified through all these years. Interestingly, firm size (SIZE) 
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changes its direction in the pooled sample analysis, from positive to the expected 
negative sign, indicating it is more difficult for the largest shareholder to increase his 
ownership as the firm grows larger. On the other hand, net profit growth (GROWTH) is 
shown to have insignificant positive effects on the largest shareholder’s ownership. 
Besides, we find firms located in eastern (western) areas tend to have higher (lower) 
levels of largest shareholder’s ownership in the random effects model, insignificantly 
though. Furthermore, local political indicators, local city fiscal revenue per capita 
(LREVENUE), city unemployment rate (UNEMPLOY) and the proportion of local SOE 
workers in the work force (SOEWORK), do not seem to have significant influence on the 
incentive of the firm’s largest shareholder to increase shareholding level.  
5.3.3 Simultaneous Equation Analysis by Panel Data Models 
According to single equation analysis by fixed effects and random effects model, we 
find firm value and the largest shareholder’s ownership are jointly determined. 
Managerial ownership, however, is shown to have significant effects only on firm value 
(not the largest shareholder’s ownership), not vice versa. Single equation analysis by 
fixed effects models shows us the fixed effects model is preferable to the random effects 
model. The fixed effects model mitigates the endogeneity problem by allowing for the 
correlation between the ownership and unobserved firm-specific effects α i s. However, it 
should be noted that the traditional fixed effects model cannot totally remove the 
endogeneity caused by the correlation between ownership and error term ε it in the model. 
With instruments, we might be able to further solve the endogeneity problem of the 
ownership variables. 
In this section we first examine the exogeneity of managerial ownership and the largest 
shareholder’s ownership, and then apply fixed effects 2SLS method in a simultaneous 
equation framework to estimation the corporate ownership and firm value relation.  
5.3.3.1 Endogeneity in Fixed Effects Model 
Like the case of OLS, under a panel data framework, we perform an augmented 
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regression test suggested by Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) to examine the exogeneity 
of managerial ownership and the largest shareholder’s ownership. We first use fixed 
effects model to regress managerial ownership (MO) and largest shareholder’s ownership 
(LS) respectively on all exogenous independent variables in the equation system. We then 
store the residuals of two regressions as MO_residualit and LS_residualit respectively. 
Corresponding to Eq. 5.1 and Eq. 5.2, we then estimate the following two augmented 
regressions using fixed effects models: 
Q =ϕ +ϕ MO +ϕ LS +ϕ MO _ residual +ϕ LS _ residual + u                (5.9) it 0 1 it 2 it 3 it 4 it it 
2 3 2Q =α +α MO +α MO +α MO +α LS +α LS + β STATEOWN + β LEGALit 0 1 it 2 it 3 it 4 it 5 it 1 it 2 it 




+ β9 SIZEit + β10 AGEit + γ∑YEARit +ϕ5 MO _ residualit +ϕ6 LS _ residualit + ε it 
i=1 
Different from results by OLS, the results show coefficients for managerial ownership 
residuals, ϕ3 andϕ5 , are not significant at any conventional level, whereas coefficients for 
the largest shareholder’s ownership, ϕ4  andϕ6 , are significantly different from zero at 
1% and 10% respectively. In other words, after allowing for correlation between 
explanatory variables and unobserved firm heterogeneity and focusing on the within 
variations, managerial ownership technically becomes exogenous, and only largest 
shareholder’s ownership is found endogenous in the firm value model. Thus we can 
conclude that under a panel data framework the simultaneity problem mainly exists 
between firm value and the largest shareholder’s ownership. Thus, we use the fixed 
effects 2SLS method in a simultaneity equation model to tackle this problem. 
5.3.3.2 Simultaneous Equation by Fixed Effects Model 
According to single equation analysis by a fixed effects model, managerial ownership 
can be treated as an exogenous regressor in fixed effects models. Therefore, the fixed 
effects simultaneous equation model now contains the following two equations:      
2 3 2Q = α MO +α MO +α MO +α LS +α LS + β STATE + β TOP5LS + β INDIRit 1 it 2 it 3 it 4 it 5 it 1 it 2 it 3 it (5.11) + β LIQUID + β RISK + β INTANGIBLE + β DAR + β SIZE + β AGE + β GROWTH4 it 5 it 6 it 7 it 8 it 9 it 10 it 
3 
+ β11DIVIDENDit + β12 AUDITit + γ∑YEARj +μi + ε it 
j=1 
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LS = α MO +α MO 2 +α MO 3 +α Q + β STATE + β TOP5LS + β INDIR + β LIQUIDit 1 it 2 it 33 it 6 it 1 it 2 it 3 it 4 it (5.12)+ β5 RISKit + β6 INTANGIBLEit + β7 DARit + β8 SIZEit + β9 AGEit + β10GROWTHit + β12 AUDITit
 
3




where μ i is an unobserved firm-specific effect, which is allowed to be correlated with 
observable firm characteristics. It should be noted that time-invariant variables, such as 
location and industry effects, are left out of both equations. Given that the dividends 
issued by PLCs are averagely low and shares held by state and legal persons are only 
transferrable with the permission of the authorities because of tradability constraints in 
China’s stock markets, the dividend has a closer relation to firm value than the largest 
shareholder’s ownership. On the other hand, political factors are expected to affects the 
authorities’ decision making on the largest shareholder’s shares transference. Thus, for 
identification reasons, Eq. 5.11 excludes three local political indicators (SOEWORK, 
UNEMPLOY, and LREVENUE), whereas Eq. 5.12 excludes dividend (DIVIDEND). 
Therefore, Eq. 5.11 is over identified and Eq. 5.12 is just identified.  
The first stage of the fixed effects 2SLS estimation is carried out by regressing Tobin’s 
Q and the largest shareholder’s ownership on all exogenous variables, including ex­
endogenously-treated managerial ownership. In this state, we obtain the predicted values 
of firm value and the largest shareholder’s ownership, QHATit and LSHATit. In the 
second stage, we regress the firm value model and the largest shareholder’s ownership 
equation with LSit in Eq. 5.11 and Qit in Eq. 5.12 replaced with LSHATit and QHATit 
respectively. Estimation results of the firm value equation and the largest shareholder 
equation are presented in Table 5.8.  





INTERCEPT 15.1932 *** (9.37) 14.4498 *** (7.18) 
QHAT 4.8669 ** (2.25) 
LSHAT 0.1576 ** (2.25) 
LSHAT2 -0.0010 *** (-2.79) 
MO 0.2532 * (1.79) -0.0224  (-0.33) 
MO2 - -
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STATE -0.3857 *** (-3.01) 0.1074 (1.32) 
TOP5LS 0.9087 ** (2.19) -0.8603 *** (-72.81) 
INDIR 0.0025 (0.78) 0.0276 *** (2.99) 
LIQUID 0.0786 (0.48) -0.3362 (-1.17) 
INTANGIBLE 0.5633 (0.43) -2.8712 * (-1.79) 
RISK 0.2701 *** (11.48) 1.2172 ** (2.27) 
DIVIDEND -0.4397 (-1.61) -
DAR -0.8248 (-0.63) -2.7805 ** (-1.98) 
SIZE -0.7420 * (-1.70) -2.7721 * (-1.88) 
GROWTH -0.0019 (-0.79) -0.0071 (-1.52) 
AGE -0.4235 *** (-2.86) -2.2433 *** (-2.60) 
SOEWORK - 0.1689 (0.72) 
UNEMPLOY - 4.1832 (1.41) 
LREVENUE - -0.0437 (-0.77) 
AUDITs 1.42 (0.2147) 1.09 (0.3647) 
DYEARs 10.23 *** (0.000) 5.69 *** (0.0034) 
within R2 0.5257 0.7930 
between R2 0.0763 0.3918 
overall R2 0.1585 0.4129 
F test 191.54 *** (0.000) 385.13 *** (0.000) 
F test (all = 0iμ ) 10.87 *** (0.000) 53.03 *** (0.000) 
Hausman (2slsFE vs. FE) 72.80 *** (0.000) 68.76 *** (0.000) 
Observations 2748 2748 
Note: t statistics are in the parentheses for coefficients.  P values are in the parentheses for tests. 
*, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% confidence levels (two tailed) respectively. 
Similar to previously reported tables, multicollinearity of managerial ownership has also 
been tested by expanding both models with variables entered individually. Likewise, we 
only report final confirmed model specification here. The first column shows 2SLS fixed 
effects estimation of the firm value model. Overall, the F test confirms joint significance 
of all regressors and overall adjusted R2 reaches 15.70%, which is much smaller than 
adjusted R2 obtained from 2SLS estimation of the pooled sample (40.21%). The 
Hausman specification test compares two-stage fixed effects model with a fixed effects 
χ 2model, and confirms the former is preferred to the latter according to the Hausman 
statistic (72.80). LSHAT is the predicted value of the largest shareholder’s ownership 
(LS), obtained from the first-stage regression of the largest shareholder equation. 
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Different from 2SLS on the pooled sample and single equation analysis by panel data 
models, the largest shareholder’s ownership (LSHAT) is shown to have inverse-“U” 
shaped influence on firm value. This finding supports our empirically derived hypothesis 
of coexistence and dynamic dominance of the incentive alignment effect and the 
entrenchment effect of the largest shareholder. This nonlinear influence on firm value 
suggests as the largest shareholder’s ownership increases the firm’s value will first 
increase, but after the largest shareholder’s ownership reaches some high level, firm 
value goes down. In other words, after gaining effective control of the firm the incentive 
for the largest shareholder to carry out tunneling activities to obtain private benefits 
becomes intensified. As a result of tunneling, firm value decreases.  
  On the other hand, we fail to detect a cubic relation between managerial ownership (MO) 
and firm value. Instead, similar to 2SLS estimation on the pooled sample, only the 
incentive alignment effect of managerial ownership is found at the 10% significance level. 
Other large shareholders’ ownership (TOP5LS), as always, positively affects firm value 
thanks to their monitoring role against principal-agency problems. Independent directors 
on the board (INDIR), however, do not contribute to firm value significantly. Similar to 
2SLS analysis on the pooled sample, firms under control of a state department or a SOE 
(STATE) tend to have lower firm value at 1% significance level, indicating PLCs formed 
by spin-off assets from SOEs are more likely to surfer from tunneling through various 
channels. 
Most of the control variables are shown to affect firm value consistently with 2SLS 
estimation on the pooled sample. Smaller firms (SIZE) tend to be evaluated at higher 
market values because they suffer less from principal-agency problems. High stock 
volatility (RISK) is still shown to significantly increase firm value at the 1% level, which 
can be explained by the high speculation and high trade turnover ratio in China’s stock 
markets. Despite its positive effects on firm value, intangible assets (INTANGIBLE) still 
fail to show any significant influence on firm value. Additionally, an increase in free cash 
flow (LIQUID) does not improve firm value significantly. The “strange” finding of 
negative roles of significant dividends (DIVIDEND) and insignificant influence of net 
profit growth (GROWTH) on firm value reflects market concerns about the source 
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(origin) and the use of this growth, given that earning management and profit tunneling 
by controlling shareholders of PLCs have been epidemic in China’s stock markets. 
In addition, apart from the largest shareholder’s ownership, some control variables also 
change their roles in the firm value model. Firms with a longer history of being listed 
(AGE) are evaluated with lower firm value. In this case, the market’s concern about 
entrenchment of controlling shareholders prevails over the positive information of firm’s 
sustainability. Besides, surprisingly, there is no statistically significant influence of 
leverage (DAR) on firm value. The possible explanation might be that with averagely 
high levels of debts, the marginal effects of debts on firm value reduce. Finally, annual 
auditing comments become insignificant, which reflect the case that annual auditing 
comments for most firms are hardly changed during sample years.  
The 2SLS estimation of the largest shareholder’s ownership is reported in the second 
column of Table 5.8. Overall, all regressors are jointly significant with the adjusted R2 
just over 40%. Hausman χ 2  statistic (68.76) is not high, but still confirms the two-stage 
fixed effects model is preferable to the fixed effects model. Individually, at the 5% 
significance level, the largest shareholder tends to increase his share holding as firm 
value (QHAT) increases. Unlike the 2SLS estimation on the pooled sample, where a 
cubic relation between managerial ownership and the largest shareholder’s ownership is 
found, using a two-stage fixed effects model we only detect insignificant and negative 
effects of managerial ownership. This finding is consistent with the fact that in China 
managerial shareholding is on average quite low (0.017%). Because of the suspicion on 
MBOs (Management buy-outs) of state assets undervaluation and stripping, only dozens 
of PLCs have managed to implement MBOs in 2001-2. Overall, the influence of 
managers and the threat of MBO are marginal, let alone the development of managerial 
shareholding in state controlled PLCs where it is a more sensitive issue and heavily relies 
on the government’s polices.  
Among other ownership structure variables, the identity dummy of state as the largest 
shareholder (STATE) does not significantly affect the largest shareholder ownership. It 
should be realized that tradability constraints imposed on state and legal person shares 
further solidify the ultimate predominance of state ownership as a whole. As a result, we 
would not expect this identity dummy to change frequently during sample years. On the 
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other hand, other large shareholders (TOP5LS) object to the expansion of the largest 
shareholder’s ownership since their large volume of shares guarantee their voting rights 
to avoid tunneling activities by the controlling shareholder. 
Noticeably, there are changes in effects of several other independent variables on the 
largest shareholder’s ownership. First, independent directors on the board (INDIR) do not 
significantly reduce the incentive of the largest shareholder to increase ownership. 
Second, the significance of intangible assets in total assets (INTANGIBLE) has declined 
to the 10% level. But its negative sign still indicates the largest shareholder might use 
intangible assets as a substitute channel to increasing cash flow rights to gain benefits. 
Third, debt level (DAR) significantly reduces the incentive of the largest shareholder to 
increase shareholding at the 1% level. Clearly, a high debt level matters more to block 
shareholders than to atomistic outside investors. Fourth, as a firm gets larger (SIZE), the 
largest shareholder faces more difficulty in increasing his shares. Fifth, annual comments 
from auditing firms become insignificant, which consistently reflects the practical 
relation between auditing firms and their PLC customers which are directly controlled by 
the largest shareholders. 
Changes also take place to directions of three political factors, which are all 
insignificant. Surprisingly, we find increase in fiscal revenue per capita (LREVENUE) of 
the city where the firm is located tend to reduce the incentive of the largest shareholder to 
increase his shareholding, whereas an increase in the proportion of SOE workers 
(SOEWORK) and city’s unemployment rate (UNEMPLOY) have the opposite effects. 
This is exactly the opposite to the cross-sectional 2SLS estimation on the pooled sample. 
In other words, when we purely focus on within-variations using a fixed effects model, 
higher fiscal revenue per capita might mean local officials face more pressure to keep up 
the high standard, while a higher proportion of SOE workers and the city’s 
unemployment rate put up more pressure on local officials to “persuade” SOE controlled 
PLCs not to privatize (reduce) their shares. Therefore the attitude and actual influence of 
local officials to SOE controlled PLCs and privately controlled ones are rather different. 
It is certain that firms controlled by private entities will change the overstaffing situation 
by laying-off many employees, which will intensify social issues that cannot simply be 
paid off by the one-shot proceeds generated from privatization process.  
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  Other control variables have the same effects on the largest shareholder’s ownership. We 
find significantly negative effects of stock volatility (RISK), which support our 
conjecture of the information asymmetry between the market and inside large 
shareholders. Besides, net profit growth (GROWTH) boosts largest shareholder’s 
incentive to increase his ownership, but still in an insignificant way. Additionally, as a 
firm is listed longer (AGE), the largest shareholder is more reluctant to increase his cash 
flow rights because he has built up the experience of controlling the firm to gain private 
benefits through various channels. Furthermore, free cash flow (LIQUID) has negative 
effects, though insignificantly, on the largest shareholder’s ownership. When more free 
cash becomes available in a firm, the largest shareholder of the firm does not necessarily 
increase his cash flow rights to obtain more private benefits of control. Instead, he can 
fulfill this objective by associated transactions based on non-market prices or investing in 
associated companies where he has higher cash flow rights. Finally, year dummy 
variables have significant influence on the largest shareholder’s ownership. 
5.4 Ownership-Control Separation and Firm Value 
In previous sections we examine the relation between firm value and the largest 
shareholders who directly controls listed firms and find their nonlinear effects on firm 
value. Liu and Sun (2005) argue that the state ultimately predominates the markets 
directly through its departments at various levels and indirectly through state-owned legal 
persons (institutions). Pyramid controlling structure is the most pervasive ultimate 
controlling structure. Since 2001, CSRC has required listed companies to disclose the 
information on their ultimate controllers. However, this information has not been 
properly provided by most PLCs because most PLCs simply reported their largest 
shareholder’s information. For our sample period between 2001 and 2004, information on 
ultimate controllers of PLCs is only available for 2004 from our data source. In this 
section, by using the same package of controlling variables as in the above firm value 
model we use this data to cross-sectionally examine how the separation between cash 
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flow rights and voting rights affects firm value. The OLS estimation result is reported in 
Table 5.9.  
Table 5.9 OLS Estimation of Relation between Ownership-and-Control Separation 
and Firm Value  
(1) (2) (3) 
INTERCEPT 9.9666 *** (10.52) 10.2669 *** (10.85) 10.3095 *** (10.89) 
V/C -0.0265 ** (-2.05) -0.0327 *** (-2.65) -0.0569 * (-1.78) 
(V/C)2 - - 0.0012 (0.98) 
STATEU 0.1677 *** (2.67) 0.1015 (1.59) 0.0855 (1.26) 
TOP5LS 0.0049 ** (2.43) 0.0034 * (1.70) 0.0036 * (1.77) 
INDIR 0.0164 (1.49) 0.0169 (1.53) 0.0168 (1.52) 
LIQUID 0.4674 *** (4.78) 0.4027 *** (3.69) 0.4020 *** (3.72) 
INTANGIBLE 0.0340 (0.16) -0.6501 (-1.09) -0.6493 (-1.09) 
RISK 0.2585 *** (7.18) 0.2620 *** (7.56) 0.2620 *** (7.58) 
DIVIDEND 1.0465 *** (4.33) 0.9714 *** (4.02) 0.9659 *** (4.00) 
DAR 1.9589 *** (5.13) 1.9483 *** (5.21) 1.9478 *** (5.21) 
SIZE -0.4972 *** (-11.25) -0.5133 *** (-11.97) -0.5131 *** (-11.97) 
LOCATIONw -0.0701 (-1.10) -0.0754 (-1.17) -0.0752 (-1.17) 
LOCATIONe 0.1519 *** (2.63) 0.1588 *** (2.81) 0.1612 *** (2.85) 
DINDUSTRYs - 5.81 *** (0.000) 5.79 *** (0.000) 
Adjusted R2 0.7580 0.7909 0.7910 
F test 21.14 *** (0.000) 15.49 *** (0.000) 15.13 *** (0.000) 
Observations 1149 1149 1149 
Note:  t statistics are in the parentheses for coefficients.  P values are in the parentheses for tests. 
*, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% confidence levels (two tailed) respectively. 
Overall, in all three specifications, we find fairly high values of adjusted R2. The 
inclusion of industry dummies improves the explanatory power of regressors. The 
separation between voting rights and cash flow rights, measured by the ratio of voting 
rights to cash flow rights (V/C), is significant at the 1% level in the first two models and 
at 10% in the third model, where the square term of the ratio of voting rights and cash 
flow rights, (V/C)2, is added but fails to show any significance. In the specification 2, by 
performing an augmented regression to examine the exogeneity of V/C, we fail to find 
the statistical significance of V/C_residual in the augmented regression, indicating the 
exogeneity of V/C.   
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The negative signs of V/C suggest that firms with a larger discrepancy between cash 
flow rights and voting rights tend to have lower firm value (Tobin’s Q). This finding 
provides supportive evidence from China’s listed companies for the results found by 
Claessens et al. (2000) in other East Asia countries.  In other words, the cash flow rights 
of the ultimate controller in the PLC have a positive relation to firm value (the incentive 
alignment effect), whereas the voting rights of the ultimate controller in the PLC is 
negatively related to firm value (the entrenchment effect). Analogical to the largest 
shareholders who directly control the PLC, ultimate controllers also have incentive 
alignment effects and entrenchment effects. Noticeably, while the two effects of the 
former is embodied by the nonlinear effects of the largest shareholder’s ownership on 
firm value, as shown in the above sections, the two effects of the latter are reflected by 
the cash flow rights and the voting rights of the ultimate controller.  
The effects of other ownership variables and control variables do not seem to change 
much compared with our OLS estimation on the whole pooled sample. 
5.5 Evidence of Tunneling 
Estimation results are presented in Table 5.10. We estimate tunneling by a static pooled 
probit, a dynamic pooled probit, a traditional random effects probit, and dynamic random 
effects probit model respectively. 










INTERCEPT -1.3845 ** -2.1079 ** -2.0428 ** -1.5992* 
(-2.51) (-2.41) (-2.32) (-1.87) 
TUNNELt-1 1.4574 *** 1.4081 *** 1.0275 *** 
(19.47) (16.03) (3.87) 
DIVIDENDt-1 -0.7602 *** -0.5922 ** -0.6143 ** -0.2208 * 
(-2.81) (-2.04) (-2.00) (-1.73) 
ROAt-1 2.1687 *** 1.0477 * 1.1631 ** 1.9624 *** 
(3.55) (1.70) (1.95) (2.94) 
AUDITt-1 0.1567 0.1008 0.1160 0.2530 
(1.44) (0.87) (0.71) (1.08) 
DARt-1 0.3965 *** 0.4003 *** 0.5135 *** 0.3557 ** 






































































































































556.47 *** (0.000) 
N/A 
2914 
92.48 *** (0.000) 
N/A 
Note:  Z values are in the parentheses for coefficients.  P values are in the parentheses for tests. *, 
** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% confidence levels (two tailed) respectively. 
As we can see from the column 3 and 4, both dynamic models confirm that there is a 
significant persistence (TUNNELit-1) in tunneling decisions among the sample years at 
the 1% level. The remarkable increase in pseudo R square from the static pooled probit in 
column 2 to the dynamic polled probit in column 3 confirms the importance of tunneling 
activity in the previous year. The static pooled probit model, however, unreasonably 
ignores this indispensible dynamic factor and overstates the influence of all year 
dummies and some industry dummies on tunneling. The dynamic pooled probit model 
and the standard random effects probit model, on the other hand, reach similar results and 
both overestimate the state dependence at over 140 per cent respectively, compared with 
100 per cent in the dynamic random effects probit model. Notably, both a dynamic 
pooled probit model and the traditional random effects probit model give rise to the 
endogeneity problem due to the correlation between the lagged dependent variable and 
118 
the error term. As such, we now focus on the results estimated from the dynamic random 
effects probit model.  
Apart from the indispensable tunneling in the previous year, all four models confirm 
significantly negative for the dividend in the pervious year (DIVIDENDt-1) in tunneling 
decision making. The dividend can be regarded as a part of tunneling opportunity cost. In 
other words, if the dividend is expected to be high, projected from its previous level, the 
controlling shareholder will be more reluctant to forgo high dividend to pursue private 
benefits. From another perspective, higher levels of previous dividends will draw more 
attention from investors and financial institutions, which will generate pressure against 
tunneling behavior. On the other hand, higher return on assets in the previous year (ROAt­
1) make tunneling more possible in the current year in all four models. This finding also 
explains why when making the tunneling decision, the controlling shareholder might tend 
to ignore the reserved part of profit that is used for maintenance and future investment. 
Another lagged regressor, the external auditing comments in the previous year (AUDITt-1) 
fails to show any significant deterrent role in tunneling. Each year only small numbers of 
PLCs are given “non-standard comments” because of substantial abnormal incidents 
taking place, which does not reflect the epidemic of tunneling in China’s markets. 
  Noticeably, the largest shareholder ownership only has insignificantly positive effects on 
tunneling. According to the ultimate ownership theory (La Porta et al, 1999), this might 
be due to the discrepancy between the cash flow rights and voting rights. Unfortunately, 
due to the availability of ultimate ownership, our tunneling model is unable to testify this 
conjecture. Also, there is no evidence showing that PLCs with state or state agents as 
their controlling shareholder tend to significantly suffer from tunneling problem, with a 
positive relation between their having a state identity (STATE) and tunneling. 
As far as internal monitoring forces are concerned, we find no significant negative 
effects of the second to the fifth largest shareholders (TOP5LS) in deterring tunneling. 
This finding suggests from a corporate governance perspective that the predominance of 
the largest shareholder on the board might be the fundamental reason for tunneling. 
Moreover, independent directors on the board (INDIR) turns out not to have significant 
influence in deterring against the tunneling either. Surprisingly, unlike the first three 
models, we find a positive role independent directors played in tunneling. As we 
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mentioned before, the objectiveness of independent directors’ opinion might be distorted 
by the power of the controlling shareholder, whose opinion can affect the board’s 
decision of nominating, electing, and replacing independent directors.  
In terms of controlling variables, results from dynamic random effects probit model 
show that firms with larger scale of assets (SIZE), higher debt in the previous term 
(DARt-1), and longer history of being listed (AGE) are more likely to suffer from 
tunneling by their controlling shareholders. In other words, larger PLCs in China’s stock 
market might have more associated firms, and lacking transparency and higher agency 
costs will overshadow their presumably more advanced monitoring and management 
system. This finding also explains why some PLCs suffer from problems of heavy debts 
and tunneling at the same time. After all, debt holders, unlike equity creditors, cannot get 
much control of the listed company once a fixed repayment schedule is provided to meet 
their claims of debts. Controlling shareholders of longer listed firms can build up political 
and economic connections and become more entrenched so as to pursue the private 
benefits of control. 
All four models confirm that firms located in western areas of China are more likely to 
be tunneled by their controlling shareholders. Specifically, PLCs’ public shares are traded 
in SHSE and SZSE and minority investors scatter all over the nation. It is understood that 
people in eastern areas are richer and make up more minority investors of PLCs in China, 
so that these people as a whole are expected to be more sensitive to tunneling 
(expropriation of minority investors) and in turn show more deterrent effects against 
tunneling. Besides, the lower level of transparency and less efficient legal enforcement 
and administration can also make it easier for tunneling to take place in western areas in 
China. 
Year dummies from 2002 to 2004 have more and more significantly negative effects on 
tunneling, showing that macro policies launched during these sample years have been 
gradually stricter and more effective in deterring tunneling. However, political factors 
from local governments do not significantly deter tunneling. While the unemployment 
rate (UNEMPLOY) has negative effects on tunneling, the positive relation between 
tunneling occurrence and fiscal revenue per capita (DEFICIT) confirms the tax evasion 
nature of tunneling. 
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Finally, some industries including heavy industries like coal mining and electricity 
generation and gas, and quality-oriented industries like food manufacture and the medical 
industry, tend to suffer more from tunneling problem at significance levels of 5%, 5%, 
5% and 10% respectively. Heavy industries are mostly capital intensive ones and have 
complicated production processes. As a result, there are many transactions between 
associated companies, which give rise to opportunities for controlling shareholders to 
tunnel. Food manufacture industry and medical industry, on the other hand, can only 
solve their core problems like product quality and safety control through reinvesting in 
the production system. Tunneling by controlling shareholders obviously has significant 
negative effects on such maintenance and investment activities of PLCs.  Our finding of 
different extents of tunneling problem suffered from by different industries suggests that 
authority policies sometimes need to be made in a more specialized way so as to capture 
different characteristics of tunneling behaviors from different industries. 
5.6 Conclusion 
There are several empirical findings from the study. We find firm value, managerial 
ownership and the largest shareholder’s ownership are jointly determined under a cross-
sectional framework of simultaneous equation analysis. While managerial ownership is 
shown to have monotonically positive effects on firm value, the largest shareholder’s 
ownership has a “U” shaped influence on firm value. However, when taking into account 
unobserved firm-specific effects under a panel data framework, we only find firm value 
and the largest shareholder’s ownership are jointly determined, although managerial 
ownership still affecting firm value in a linearly positive way. In other words, we only 
find the endogeneity of the largest shareholder using panel data models. Firm value has 
positive effects on the largest shareholder’s ownership, while the largest shareholder 
ownership is found to have an inverse-“U” shape influence on firm value, indicating the 
empirical dynamic dominance between the incentive alignment effect and the 
entrenchment effect. Furthermore, to further allow for ultimate ownership in the relation, 
we use cross-sectional data and find the separation between cash flow rights and voting 
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rights is negatively related to firm value. This proves the coexistence of the incentive 
alignment effect (embodied by cash flow rights) and the entrenchment effect (embodied 
by voting rights). 
In terms of other factors affecting firm value, the second to the fifth largest shareholders 
are shown to positively contribute to firm value. Nonetheless, we fail to detect any 
significant roles of independent directors on the board and external auditing comments in 
improving firm value. Firms controlled directly by the state and indirectly controlled 
state-owned institutions are found to have lower firm value. We also find larger and 
longer listing firms have lower firm value. However, debt level does not show any 
significant effects on firm value. High speculation is found to dominate the China’s stock 
markets, because of the significant role of risk taking among outside investors.  
On the other hand, the largest shareholder’s ownership is found to be positively but 
insignificantly related to the local proportion of SOE workers and local unemployment. 
The second to the fifth largest shareholders significantly object to the increase in the 
largest shareholder’s shares. It is more difficult for the largest shareholders of larger and 
longer listed firms to increase their shareholding. According to the significant negative 
roles of intangible assets and debt level we find the largest shareholder tend to be more 
rational to increase his shares.  
We explore the occurrence mechanism of the largest shareholder’s tunneling and find 
that firms that suffered from tunneling in the past tend to have the same problem in the 
current year. In other words, tunneling of the largest shareholder is rather persistent. 
Firms with a longer listing history and higher debt levels are more likely to suffer from 
tunneling problems. Firms located in western area of China are more likely to be tunneled 
by their controlling shareholders. We find central government policy against such 
behavior has become increasingly effective. This is signaled by the significant negative 
role of year dummies. From local authorities’ perspectives, however, we only find an 
insignificant negative role for the local unemployment rate. The local fiscal deficit is 





Recent studies on corporate governance show that globally concentrated ownership is 
more pervasive than the widely dispersed ownership under which managerial principal-
agency problems can easily arise. The expropriation of minority shareholders by 
controlling shareholders gives rise to another type of agency problem between controlling 
shareholders and minority shareholders. However, existing researches on the relation 
between corporate ownership and firm value have just focused on either managerial 
principal-agency problems or the controlling shareholder’s expropriation agency problem, 
leaving the interaction between these two problems unexplored. Another issue with these 
studies on ownership-and-firm value relations is their way of handling the endogeneity of 
corporate ownership. They either simply use cross-sectional estimation methods without 
tackling the endogeneity problem, or try to use instrumental variables to solve the 
problem in OLS or panel data models, without taking into account simultaneity between 
ownership and firm value.  
In this study of China’s listed companies, we apply a 2SLS fixed effects model in a 
simultaneous equation system to study the interaction among firm value (Tobin’s Q), 
managerial ownership, and the largest shareholder’s ownership, controlling for two 
sources of endogeneity: unobserved firm heterogeneity and the simultaneity problem. We 
find all three variables are jointly determined under a cross-sectional framework of 
simultaneous equation analysis. However, when taking into account unobserved firm-
specific effects under a panel data framework, we find that only firm value and the largest 
shareholder’s ownership are jointly determined, although managerial ownership still 
affects firm value in a linearly positive way. In other words, we only find the endogeneity 
of the largest shareholder in panel data models. Firm value has positive effects on the 
largest shareholder’s ownership, while the largest shareholder ownership is found to have 
an inverse-“U” shape influence on firm value. To further allow for ultimate ownership in 
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the relation, we use cross-sectional data and find the separation between cash flow rights 
and voting rights is negatively related to firm value. This proves the coexistence of the 
incentive alignment effect (embodied by cash flow rights) and the entrenchment effect 
(embodied by voting rights).  
The nonlinear influence of the largest shareholder’s ownership on firm value calls 
attention to the expropriation of minority shareholders through various types of tunneling 
behavior. By using a dynamic random effect probit model to allow for unobserved firm 
heterogeneity, dynamic factors and endogeneity of initial conditions, we explore the 
occurrence mechanism of the largest shareholder’s tunneling. We find tunneling of the 
largest shareholder is rather persistent in the sense that firms that suffered from tunneling 
in the previous period tend to have the same problem in the current year. Firms with 
longer listing histories and higher debt levels are more likely to suffer from tunneling 
problems. Firms located in western areas of China are more likely to be tunneled by their 
controlling shareholders. We find government policy against such behavior becomes 
increasingly effective, according to the significant negative role of year dummies. From 
local authorities’ perspective, however, we only find an insignificant negative role for the 
local unemployment rate. On the other hand, the local fiscal deficit is positively related to 
tunneling occurrence, reflecting the tax evasion nature of tunneling. 
6.2 Policy Insights 
There are some policy insights that can be drawn from our studies. First, although we 
find larger managerial shareholding does lead to higher firm value, failing to detect the 
reverse causality between these two aspects suggests in China managerial shareholding is 
not used as a main incentive tool to encourage improvement in managers` performance. 
On average, managerial ownership is rather low and only changes slowly across time 
unless substantial changes in ownership structure take place. In effect, in many cases, 
managerial ownership is a legacy of SOEs partial privatization process that took place in 
a particular period of time. Instead, currently managers in China’s PLCs are mainly 
driven by their compensation package (annual payment and bonus), which lacks 
flexibility and only has limited influence on the firm’s sustainable development over the 
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years. Our study suggests PLCs should relate managerial shareholding to firm 
performance so as to use it as a fundamental incentive tool to improve firm value. 
Second, we also provide evidence that at high levels of ownership, the largest 
shareholders become more entrenched and carry out tunneling activities to pursue private 
benefits, rather than maximize firm value. However, in China’s PLCs the largest 
shareholders normally dominate the firm’s board, so that the monitoring and deterrent 
roles of other large shareholders against non-value-maximizing decisions are quite 
limited. This suggests authorities should launch policies to regulate board composition 
and the appointment of senior managers. Besides, independent directors on the board are 
not playing effectively independent role either, indicating the appointment of independent 
directors should not be mainly under the control of the largest shareholder. If necessary, 
the bonus independent directors obtained from the PLC should be reconsidered to be 
issued from a state agency or a market entity that is independent of the PLC. 
Furthermore, although tunneling is quite epidemic in China’s stock markets, annual 
comments from auditing firms do not reflect this. In each year, only a minority of PLCs 
have a “non-standard comments” indicating substantial incidents taking place in the year. 
Thus, law and regulations against collusion between auditing firms and PLCs should be 
introduced, so that auditing firms should bear more economic and indeed even legal 
responsibility if they fail to detect potential problems underlying PLCs, and reflect this 
crucial information in auditing reports in time. Finally, in order to protect interests of 
minority investors in a more effective way, CSRC (China Securities Regulatory 
Commission) should lower the limit on shareholding percentage for minority 
shareholders to collectively raise extraordinary motions in shareholder meetings of PLCs. 
From the supervision perspective, another suggestion can be made according to our 
study. In order to improve the transparency of stock markets, supervision entities (not just 
official legal departments) should be given the right to directly obtain the PLC’s 
controlling shareholder’s financial information relating to the PLC. Once solid evidence 
of tunneling is found, there should be penalties directly applicable to the “tunneler”, not 
just staffs of the PLC involved in tunneling or the PLC itself. Besides, atomistic investors 
should be given rights to sue the controlling shareholder to protect themselves against the 
expropriation of minority shareholders. Finally, “Politically correct” should not be a valid 
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excuse for SOE controllers, or even for local governments, if used to justify the 
expropriation of minority investors. There should be some policies against local political 
interference into local courts’ decisions of local PLCs, although this situation cannot be 
thoroughly eliminated.  
  State controlled listed companies, directly or indirectly, are shown to have lower firm 
value than ones that are controlled by private legal persons. Insignificantly we also find a 
positive relation between the presence of state as the controlling shareholder and the 
occurrence of tunneling. This suggests the legacy of PLCs’ “carve-out” formation is still 
affecting their performance. Therefore cooperation between CSRC (China Securities 
Regulatory Commission) and SASAC (State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission) has to be improved in order to effectively regulate large 
state-controlled listed firms.  
  Last but not least, the location and political affiliation of PLCs are shown to have effects 
on firm value and the possibility of tunneling. Firms located in western areas of China 
have lower firm value but a higher possibility of tunneling problems. This suggests 
western areas suffer more from lack firm transparency and effective corporate 
governance than other areas of China. On the other hand, the local unemployment rate 
and fiscal deficit of these areas are not necessarily higher than those of eastern industrial 
areas, so that local governments are not expected to exert more pressure on, or provide 
stricter supervision for PLCs. Thus local governments should not only implement 
uniform central government policies, but should develop their own effective methods to 
further improve the quality of both local PLCs and local supervision. 
6.3 Future Research 
With respects to future research on the topic, more information of ultimate ownership in 
China’s listed companies needs to collected and used in the study. Besides, this study 
only provides evidence from China’s listed companies that are just a small part of China’s 
economies. Studies on larger samples including unlisted companies are expected to depict 
a more inclusive picture of the relation between firm value and corporate ownership. 
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